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VISUAL ATTENTION AND COGNITIVE BIASES TO THREAT IN ANXIETY 
by Helen Jane Richards 
 
Anxiety disorders are  prevalent throughout the lifespan and are associated with a 
number of negative effects on an individual’s quality of life. A large body of research 
has adopted a cognitive approach to explore factors that are involved in the 
development and maintenance of elevated anxiety. Cognitive theories of anxiety 
emphasise the importance of attentional processes and propose that anxiety is 
characterised by selective attention to threat (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998), impaired 
attentional control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) and/or hypervigilance 
and enhanced threat detection (Eysenck, 1992).  
  This thesis utilised eye movement and reaction time measures to explore the 
relationship between anxiety and the cognitive mechanisms underlying the localisation 
and detection of threat. Across four studies the results showed that anxiety was not 
associated with an enhanced ability to locate threatening stimuli (Experiments 1 and 4). 
Anxiety was associated with impaired attentional control; individuals with higher levels 
of anxiety were slower to orient attention towards a task-relevant stimulus in the 
presence of a threatening distractor (Experiment 2). This effect was apparent even when 
threatening distractors were presented in peripheral locations, indicating that anxious 
individuals were able to detect threat within a broad focus of attention. Furthermore, by 
adopting a broad focus of attention, individuals with higher levels of anxiety were able 
to integrate threatening information from multiple locations across the visual field; 
thereby facilitating threat detection in the presence of multiple (vs. single) threats 
(Experiment 3).  
  Taken together, the findings indicate that anxiety is characterised by a tendency to 
maintain a broad focus of attention, where this strategy leads to enhanced threat 
detection and increased distraction from task-irrelevant threat across the visual field.  
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Chapter 1 : Anxiety and Attention 
 
1.1 Anxiety 
 
Anxiety and fear are normal and adaptive emotional experiences that assist 
individuals in the detection of impending danger and the generation of appropriate 
behavioural responses (Beck & Clark, 1997). Anxiety and fear are typically associated 
with a variety of responses that involve cognitive (e.g., worry), behavioural (e.g., 
avoidance and escape) and physiological (e.g., muscle tension, sweating, heart 
palpitations) systems (Lang, 1968). Although the symptoms of anxiety and fear 
converge, the occurrence of these emotional experiences can be distinguished by the 
immediacy or proximity of the perceived threat; anxiety occurs in response to the 
possibility or anticipation of a future threat, whereas fear occurs in response to a present 
danger (Craske et al., 2009).   
Anxiety is regarded as atypical when an individual’s perception of threat is 
consistently greater than the objective danger in the environment (Beck & Clark, 1997). 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV Text Revision (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000) lists 12 anxiety disorders including generalised anxiety 
disorder (GAD), social phobia, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD), and specific phobia. According to DSM-IV-TR, there are a 
number of symptoms that occur across the anxiety disorders. For example, clinical 
levels of anxiety are associated with excessive or unreasonable fear and dread, 
persistent worries and intrusive thoughts, avoidance of the feared object/situation and a 
variety of physiological symptoms (e.g. palpitations, sweating, nausea, dizziness, 
shortness of breath, blushing, abdominal distress). In order to meet diagnostic criteria 
for these anxiety disorders, the symptoms should persist for a minimum duration of time 
(typically 6 months) and interfere with occupational functioning, social activities and 
relationships.   
Clinical levels of anxiety are typically regarded as an extreme variation on a 
continuum, rather than as qualitatively distinct from sub-clinical levels of anxiety (Beck 
& Clark, 1997; Yiend, 2010). For this reason, theories and research in anxiety 
frequently focus on sub-clinical populations, which include individuals reporting high 
levels of trait anxiety, state anxiety or social anxiety. It has been argued that elevated 
trait anxiety is a vulnerability factor in the development of anxiety disorder (Eysenck, 
1992). Trait anxiety is regarded as a stable personality dimension that occurs as a 
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consequence of distal factors such as genetics and environmental experiences (Eysenck, 
1992; Spielberger, 1985) . In contrast, state anxiety is shaped by proximal factors (e.g., 
the immediate environment) that occur at the current moment in time (Eysenck, 1992; 
Spielberger, 1985). Social anxiety can include a fear of interacting or communicating 
with other people and a fear of public scrutiny (e.g., eating, drinking, speaking) and 
these are often regarded as two distinguishable forms of social fear (Mattick & Clarke, 
1998).  
Epidemiological studies have shown lifetime prevalence rates of anxiety 
disorders in the general population at around 25% (Andrade et al., 2000; Kessler et al., 
2005; Kessler et al., 1994). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the prevalence 
of anxiety disorders in England has increased in the past decade (Mental Health 
Foundation, 2009). The typical age of onset of anxiety disorders is 11 years (Kessler et 
al., 2005) and, due to this early onset, there are a multitude of negative outcomes that 
occur throughout the lifespan. Indeed, a recent meta analysis highlighted the negative 
impact of anxiety on an individual’s quality of life in relation to five domains: physical 
health, mental health, social activities, home and family, and work (Olatunji, Cisler, & 
Tolin, 2007). Specifically, anxiety disorders are linked to prolonged absence from 
school and work, school drop-out, and fewer qualifications (The National Audit Office, 
2005; Van Ameringen, Mancini, & Farvolden, 2003); they are also associated with 
unemployment, social isolation, reduced social support, relationship problems, marital 
disruption and a high rate of divorce (Kessler, 2007; Olatunji et al., 2007). These high 
prevalence rates and negative outcomes highlight the need for research to consider the 
factors involved in the development and maintenance of elevated anxiety and anxiety 
disorder.  
 
1.2 Attention 
 
 A number of researchers have adopted a cognitive approach in an attempt to 
understand the factors that underlie elevated anxiety and anxiety disorder (Eysenck, 
1992; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). It has been 
proposed that cognition is one of the three components involved in an anxious response 
(Lang, 1968) and it is likely to be central to the development and maintenance of 
anxiety for two reasons. Firstly, anxiety is a future-oriented mood state (Barlow, 2002) 
and the anticipation and worry that occur in response to the possibility of future adverse 
events will necessarily involve the cognitive system (Eysenck, 1992). Secondly, specific 
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stimuli or situations often provoke anxiety (e.g. spiders, social interactions) and 
cognitive processes are required to evaluate the affective significance of these stimuli 
and respond to their potential danger (Eysenck, 1992).  In pursuing this cognitive 
approach, an area that has generated considerable interest is that of pre-attentive and 
attentional processes in anxiety. Theories and empirical research in this area have tried 
to elucidate the attentional processes that occur in individuals with high levels of 
anxiety in the presence of threatening stimuli. This theory and research has, most 
notably, explored the possibility that anxiety is associated with automatic or pre-
attentive processing of threatening stimuli, selective attention to threat and enhanced 
threat detection. Therefore, before providing a detailed account of the conceptual 
frameworks of anxiety and attention, it is important to describe: 1) the characteristics of 
processing, selecting and detecting significant sensory inputs in the environment and; 2) 
the neural substrates that are likely to underlie selection and detection of emotionally 
significant stimuli.  
 
1.2.1 Information Processing  
Sensory information can be assessed at an automatic or strategic stage of 
processing. Automatic processes have been defined as those that are involuntary, 
capacity-free and occur without awareness; strategic processes require conscious 
attention, cognitive capacity (e.g., resources, effort and energy) and are subject to 
voluntary control (McNally, 1995). There has been considerable debate regarding the 
specific temporal relationship between automatic processing and the deployment of 
attention. It has been agued that, in contrast to pre-attentive processes which always 
precede attention, automatic processes may also occur after attention has been allocated 
or may bypass attentional processing entirely (Bargh, 1992). Alternative theories and 
research suggest that automatic processes are always post-attentive and involve the fast 
and effortless retrieval of well-practiced memory traces after attention has been 
deployed on a stimulus (Logan, 1992; Treisman, Vieira, & Hayes, 1992). Importantly, it 
has been proposed that automatic processes, once initiated, are independent of attention 
and conscious guidance, irrespective of whether this occurs at a pre-attentive or post-
attentive stage of processing (Bargh, 1992; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Information 
processing, whether automatic or strategic, should provide preliminary information 
about which objects or locations in the visual field are of potential interest and need to 
be selected for further processing,  
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1.2.2 Selection 
In humans there is limited capacity to process all of the available sensory 
information. Therefore, the cognitive system selects relevant or significant stimuli for 
further processing and ignores irrelevant stimuli (Hutton, 2008; Luck, 1998). 
Specifically, it is essential that the cognitive system is capable of selecting high priority 
signals that are relevant to survival (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003). The selection of 
information from the sensory input can either occur via stimulus-driven processes (e.g., 
when attention is captured by the abrupt onset of a target) or goal-directed processes 
(e.g., by voluntarily searching for a pre-specified target (Fan et al., 2009)). Stimulus-
driven processes involve the exogenous (bottom-up) capture of attention by properties 
of the stimulus and goal-directed processes involve the selection of information based 
on the endogenous (top-down) goals, beliefs and expectations of the observer (Yantis, 
1993). Research suggests that the stimulus-driven and goal-directed attentional systems 
are subserved by distinct anatomical regions in the brain; the stimulus-driven attentional 
system involves the temporo-parietal and ventral frontal cortex and the goal-directed 
system involves the prefrontal cortex (Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002).  
The spotlight metaphor of attention. The size of the attentional window from 
which sensory information can be selected has been a matter of debate. The spotlight 
metaphor of attention suggests that a mechanism analogous to a spotlight selects 
information from one location in the visual field and excludes information from all 
other locations (Cave & Bichot, 1999; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). A small 
spotlight is particularly important for situations in which it is necessary to select targets 
for further processing and to simultaneously eliminate distractor interference (Cave & 
Bichot, 1999). This metaphor suggests that the spotlight is a location-based selection 
mechanism; that is, attention can only be selectively allocated to a particular stimulus 
after it has been located (Cave & Bichot, 1999). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
localisation can only occur after the target stimulus has been discriminated from 
distractor stimuli (Johnston & Pashler, 1990). Thus, two processes are required before 
the spotlight of attention can selectively focus on the target: the target must be 
discriminated from the distractors and then the target must be localised.  
Orienting is the mechanism that allows potentially relevant items to be localised 
and selected for further processing (Fan et al., 2009; Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, 
Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Rueda, 
Posner, & Rothbart, 2005). The orienting network depends on a reactive posterior 
 5 
attention system (similar to the stimulus-driven attentional system described by 
Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) that selectively allocates attention to relevant 
objects/locations in order to enhance perceptual processing in these regions of the visual 
field (Callejas, Lupianez, Funes, & Tudela, 2005).  Orienting involves aligning attention 
(overtly or covertly) with sensory stimuli in the following sequence: the posterior 
parietal lobe disengages attention from the current location; the mid brain and superior 
colliculus shift attention to a new location and; the thalamus and lateral pulvinar engage 
attention at the new location (Posner & Petersen, 1990).  
There are, however, situations in which selective attention disrupts performance 
in ongoing activities; for example, attention may be captured by and focused on task-
irrelevant items via stimulus-driven processes. In these instances, volitional and 
controlled attentional processes are required to regulate orienting responses (Rueda et 
al., 2005). It has been suggested that an anterior attention network (similar to the goal-
directed attentional system described by Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), located in the 
frontal cortex, is involved in the effortful control of behaviour and the regulation of the 
posterior attention network (Rothbart, Derryberry, & Posner, 1994). Brain areas that 
have been consistently implicated in the functioning of this anterior attention network 
are the anterior cingulate and lateral prefrontal cortex (Fan et al., 2005; Posner & 
Rothbart, 2007; Rothbart et al., 1994), which are involved in the modulation of 
attention, planning, decision making, monitoring competition, motivation, error 
detection and working memory (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).  
The spotlight metaphor of attention assumes that orienting and selection occur 
via covert attentional processes (i.e. attending to a location without moving the eyes 
(Posner et al., 1980)). However, there are two reasons to believe that selection is 
intrinsically linked to overt attentional processes (i.e., moving the eyes). Firstly, visual 
information is typically sampled and selected in a cognitive visual task by directing the 
eyes to various locations in the visual field (Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). Indeed, 
scanning the visual environment with numerous eye movements is a default setting that 
occurs even when it is not essential or beneficial to the completion of the task (Findlay 
& Gilchrist, 2003; Zelinsky & Sheinberg, 1997). The necessity of moving the eyes in 
order to sample and attend to the visual environment can be understood by considering 
the physiological constraints of the visual system. Specifically, visual acuity declines 
systematically as retinal eccentricity increases with the fovea, parafovea and periphery 
corresponding, approximately, to eccentricities of less than 1°, 1-5° and greater than 5°, 
respectively (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003). Thus, the constraints of the retinal input to the 
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visual system demand that eye movements operate as a selection mechanism and, in line 
with the spotlight metaphor of attention, this mechanism depends on the location of 
objects of interest (Cave & Bichot, 1999). It is necessary to execute eye movements to 
locations containing objects of interest such that they fall within foveal vision and can 
be inspected in more detail with high visual acuity (Liversedge & Findlay, 2000). 
Peripheral vision is used to guide these eye movements by providing information about 
the nature and location of potential objects of interest (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003; 
Findlay & Walker, 1999; Hutton, 2008; Liversedge & Findlay, 2000; Moschovakis & 
Highstein, 1994).  
Secondly, there is a considerable body of theory and research to suggest that 
there is a close relationship between overt and covert shifts in attention (Hoffman & 
Subramaniam, 1995; Hutton, 2008; Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004; Rizzolatti, 
Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994). In support of this relationship, the pre-motor theory of 
attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1994) suggests that the preparation of motor actions is 
responsible for covert shifts in attention and, furthermore, the preparation of 
oculomotion is particularly important in primates and humans due to the development 
of foveal vision. This theory predicts that there should be activity in brain regions 
associated with eye movements during covert shifts of attention (e.g. the superior 
colliculus). The theory makes two specific predictions: firstly, that executing a saccade 
to a location in the visual field involves attending to that region and; secondly, that 
saccades to an attended region will be faster than those to unattended regions. These 
predictions have been supported by empirical work (Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; 
Peterson et al., 2004). Hoffman and Subramaniam (1995), for example, reported that 
participants were unable to simultaneously execute a saccade to one location and orient 
attention to a different location and they concluded that there is an obligatory link 
between attention and saccades. Furthermore, fMRI data has supported the link between 
overt and covert attention, indicating that overlapping cortical regions (e.g. the frontal 
eye fields, supplementary eye fields, parietal and temporal regions) are recruited during 
covert and overt visual orienting (Corbetta et al., 1998).  
The zoom lens metaphor of attention. The zoom lens metaphor of attention 
extends the spotlight metaphor to suggest that the size of the unitary spotlight can be 
adjusted in line with task demands such that it increases in size if the exact location of 
the target stimulus is unknown or is expected within a large region (Cave & Bichot, 
1999; Eriksen & St James, 1986; Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes, & Kramer, 2007). 
Eriksen and St James (1986) suggested that there would be an even distribution of 
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attentional resources and parallel processing of all stimuli within a wide zoom. 
However, they also highlighted that there is a limited supply of attentional processing 
resources; therefore, a broad distribution of attention would be associated with a low 
density of resources. The rate of processing stimuli and the ability to discriminate fine 
stimulus details would be reduced given a low density of resources. In contrast, a high 
density of resources would be deployed on a stimulus given a narrow zoom and this 
would enhance the rate of processing and the quantity and the quality of the information 
extracted from the stimulus.  
Recent empirical evidence also suggests that the size of the attentional window 
is under top-down control and can be adjusted flexibly in line with task demands 
(Belopolsky et al., 2007). Belopolsky et al. (2007) presented three or nine letters in a 
triangular formation; one letter in each display was a unique colour (red) and the 
remaining letters were all the same colour (green). In the context of a go/ no-go task, 
participants were asked to indicate whether a letter E or a letter H were present in the 
display; target letters were as likely to be the colour singleton as any other letter in the 
display (note that target colour was task-irrelevant). In the diffuse attention condition, 
participants were asked to search for and indicate the identity of the target letter when 
all of the letters in the display formed a triangle that pointed upwards (go condition) and 
to withhold this response when the display items formed a triangle that pointed 
downwards (no-go condition). In the focused attention condition, participants were 
instructed to search for and respond to the target when the fixation point was a circle (go 
condition) and to withhold this response when it was a square (no-go condition). They 
found that the search slopes (i.e. the change in reaction time (RT) with an increase in set 
size) were approximately 27 ms/item in the focused attention condition, irrespective of 
whether the target was unique (i.e. the colour singleton) or non-unique (i.e., green). In 
contrast, the search slope was shallower when the target was unique (16 ms/item) 
compared with non-unique (26 ms/item) in the diffuse attention condition. They 
concluded that the colour singleton captured attention to a greater extent within a wide 
(vs. narrow) attentional window. They suggested that while top-down factors (e.g. task 
instructions) can be used to modulate the size of the attentional window, it is not 
possible to exert top-down control within the attentional window. Therefore, salient 
stimuli will capture attention if they are located within the attentional window and this 
is particularly likely to occur when attention is distributed widely.  
These studies are important in highlighting the costs and benefits of maintaining 
a broad distribution of attention. The costs are that only a low density of processing 
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resources can be allocated to task-relevant stimuli (Eriksen & St James, 1986) and there 
is a greater chance of attentional capture by task-irrelevant stimuli (Belopolsky et al., 
2007) within a broad attentional beam. However, the principal benefit of a broad 
distribution of attention is that significant stimuli will not go unnoticed even if their 
exact location or timing is unknown (Eriksen & St James, 1986). Thus, it seems 
plausible that a broad distribution of attention is particularly beneficial in target 
detection; that is, if it is known that a target could occur but its location and timing are 
unknown, then the optimal strategy for target detection would be to monitor and remain 
hypervigilant within a large area of the visual field (Eysenck, 1992).  
 
1.2.3 Detection 
In evolutionary terms, it is essential that the human cognitive system is capable 
of rapidly detecting high priority signals, especially if they have the potential to threaten 
survival (Beck & Clark, 1997; Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Mathews, Mackintosh, & 
Fulcher, 1997). For example, an ability to rapidly detect threat serves as an early 
warning signal that alerts an individual to danger and, therefore, increases the chances 
of survival (Beck & Clark, 1997; LeDoux, 1998).  
There are a number of processes involved in target detection. Firstly, efficient 
detection requires that the cognitive system remains in a state of readiness for the 
possible occurrence of a target. It has been argued that an alerting network sustains 
activation in the cognitive system over extended periods of time (vigilance) and in 
response to warning signals (phasic alertness) such that it is possible to respond rapidly 
to high priority stimuli (Posner & Petersen, 1990). Alerting is associated with activation 
in diffuse brain locations including frontal and parietal regions of the right hemisphere 
(Fan et al., 2005).  
Signal detection theory highlights that two further important components of 
target detection are stimulus strength and response bias (Logan, 2004; Tanner & Swets, 
1954). A key feature of signal detection theory is that it considers the detection of a 
signal amongst noise (e.g., a target amongst distractors). Tanner and Swets (1954) 
suggested that, even in the absence of a target signal, there would be neural activation in 
response to the background noise in the visual environment. This neural activation 
would be greater when a target signal was presented amongst the background noise and 
would continue to increase as the strength of the target signal increased. Tanner and 
Swets (1954) highlighted that there is also a decisional component involved in target 
detection; an individual must decide whether the visual array and the associated neural 
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activity are consistent with background noise alone or a target signal amongst 
background noise. If this decision criterion is low, then minimal neural activity will be 
required before an individual decides that a target signal is present (i.e., a response bias 
towards target presence (Logan, 2004)). In contrast, a high level of neural activity will 
be required to indicate the presence of a target signal if the decision criterion is high (i.e. 
a response bias towards target absence (Logan, 2004)). It has been argued that 
psychological and physiological factors can influence the setting of this decision 
criterion (Tanner & Swets, 1954).  
The exact nature of the relationship between target detection and target 
localisation is unclear. Posner et al., (1980) distinguished between orienting and 
detecting, suggesting that orienting involves aligning attention with a given stimulus 
and detection requires that the stimulus has reached a level in the nervous system at 
which it is possible to make an arbitrary response to signal its presence. On this basis, 
they argued that orienting to a stimulus is a habitual response that occurs before it is 
possible to generate a non-habitual (i.e. verbal or manual) response to indicate its 
presence. Indeed, the spotlight metaphor of attention predicts that target detection is 
facilitated within the attentional beam, which implies that detection performance 
depends on the ability to locate the target (Posner et al., 1980). Posner et al (1980) 
found that there was a benefit in detection latencies to respond to an LED target (i.e., 
faster responses) when it was presented in a location that had been cued as having the 
highest probability of containing the target. In contrast, there was a cost in detection 
latencies (i.e. slower responses) when the LED stimulus was presented in a location that 
had a low probability of containing the target. They argued that orienting must precede 
or occur in parallel to detection if it can affect the efficiency of the detection response. 
Furthermore, they emphasised that this covert orienting response was unrelated to 
foveal vision and eye movements.  
However, Posner et al’s (1980) interpretation is likely to be dependent on their 
definition of detection. As highlighted by the authors, their definition requires an 
arbitrary and non-habitual response that is almost inevitably slower in comparison with 
habitual orienting responses. This does not preclude the possibility that there are 
habitual detection responses (e.g., at the level of neural activation) that precede 
orienting responses. Indeed, other researchers have either suggested that target detection 
precedes or can occur in the absence of target localisation (Cave & Wolfe, 1990; 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Sato, 1990; Wolfe, 1994; Wolfe, Cave, & 
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Franzel, 1989) or that detection and localisation occur at a similar stage of processing 
(Sagi & Julesz, 1985).  
 
1.2.4 The Neural Substrates of Detecting and Selecting Emotional Stimuli 
Research has identified the neural substrates that underlie the rapid detection, 
selection and inhibition of threat and other emotionally significant stimuli (Compton, 
2003; Craske et al., 2009; Davis & Whalen, 2001; LeDoux, 1998). This research 
suggests that emotional stimuli are encoded rapidly and without conscious awareness 
and that they guide the selection of sensory information from the environment.  
It has been argued that a sub-cortical neural circuit including the amygdala and 
thalamus is involved in the early stages of processing and detecting emotional stimuli 
based on low-level sensory input (LeDoux, 1998). The amygdala is particularly 
responsive to negatively valenced stimuli (Davis & Whalen, 2001; LeDoux, 1998). 
Therefore, it has been proposed that this sub-cortical thalamo-amygdala pathway may 
serve as a neural substrate for a pre-attentive threat detection mechanism (Dolan & 
Vuilleumier, 2003) and, furthermore, that anxiety may affect the sensitivity of this 
mechanism (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mathews et al., 1997).  
Emotionally significant stimuli influence selective attention through a cortical 
neural circuit including the amygdala and prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, ventromedial 
regions of the prefrontal cortex, orbital frontal cortex, cingulate cortex and the 
hippocampus can suppress the inappropriate selection of emotional stimuli (i.e., task-
irrelevant stimuli) by exerting top-down control via reciprocal connections with the 
amygdala. These sub-cortical and cortical pathways are reviewed and described by 
Compton (2003); Craske et al. (2009); Davis & Whalen (2001), LeDoux (1998).  
 
1.2.5 Summary 
This section emphasised that sensory information can be processed at an 
automatic or strategic level of processing, where automatic processes are those that 
proceed independently of attention. It also reviewed evidence suggesting that relevant 
information is selected from the vast array of sensory inputs via stimulus-driven and 
goal-directed processes, that selective attention depends on a location-based selection 
mechanism and that it is possible to adjust the size of the selected region. It provided 
evidence to indicate that the detection of high priority stimuli is enhanced if an 
individual remains vigilant over an extended period of time, if the strength of the target 
signal is high and if there is a low threshold for deciding that the target is present. 
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Finally, this section reviewed evidence to suggest that emotionally significant stimuli 
are detected via sub-cortical neural circuits and selected via cortical neural circuits.  
 These features of attention have been of considerable interest in understanding 
whether a threat processing bias can be regarded as a factor underpinning elevated 
anxiety. Based on the evidence presented in this section, if threatening information is 
processed automatically in anxiety, then this will occur involuntarily, without awareness 
and in a capacity-free manner. However, the validity of using the term ‘automatic’ to 
refer to cognitive factors in emotion processing has been called into question. Compton 
(2003) suggested that emotion researchers should be cautious in using this term due to 
the complexities of defining automatic processes and the methodological difficulties 
involved in ensuring that stimuli are genuinely perceived without awareness.  
Of greater importance in the current work is understanding whether the 
attentional processes involved in selecting and detecting threat are subject to influence 
from anxiety. In the context of the preceding discussion on attention, the purpose of 
selective attention to threat would be to enhance processing of the threatening stimulus 
and to ignore non-threatening stimuli. This would be accomplished by discriminating 
between the threats and non-threats in the visual field and by overtly orienting the 
spotlight of attention to the location containing the threat (i.e. by moving the eyes). 
Furthermore, a failure to regulate selective attention would be evident in an inability to 
prevent the spotlight of attention being captured by threat, an inability to disengage the 
spotlight of attention from threat or an inability to direct the spotlight of attention to a 
non-threat when threats are present in the visual field. Enhanced threat detection would 
be accomplished by maintaining vigilance for threat, by amplifying the threat signal or 
by lowering the threshold for deciding that threat is present in the environment.  
 
1.3 Conceptual Frameworks of Anxiety and Attention 
 
Conceptual frameworks of anxiety and attention have typically considered 
whether anxiety is associated with: 1) selective attention to threat, where individuals 
with high levels of anxiety automatically and preferentially select, orient towards and 
allocate attentional resources to threatening (vs. non threatening) stimuli in their 
environment (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997); 2) an inability to regulate 
attention such that individuals with high levels of anxiety fail to inhibit processing of 
threatening stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, 
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Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Lonigan, Vasey, Phillips, & Hazen, 2004); 3) a hypervigilant 
state which allows anxious individuals to respond rapidly to high priority threatening 
stimuli (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005; Eysenck, 
1992; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
The majority of the influential conceptual frameworks focus on the relationship 
between trait anxiety and attention (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). Eysenck (1992) 
argued that comparing the cognitive functioning of non-clinical individuals high and 
low in trait anxiety provides a means of identifying the cognitive factors that predispose 
those with elevated trait anxiety to anxiety disorder. Moreover, it has been emphasised 
that similar cognitive processes should be evident in clinically anxious and high trait 
anxious individuals (Eysenck, 1997). A further point raised by a number of the 
conceptual frameworks is that the effects of high levels of trait anxiety on attentional 
processes will be particularly apparent when an individual also experiences high levels 
of state anxiety (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997).   
 
1.3.1 Anxiety and Selective Attention to Threat  
 The majority of the conceptual frameworks of anxiety and attention have 
focused on the notion that anxiety is characterised by selective attention to threat. These 
theories propose that individuals with high levels of anxiety allocate attentional 
resources to threatening stimuli in their environment in preference to neutral or positive 
stimuli. Therefore, these accounts have similarities with the spotlight metaphor of 
attention (Posner et al., 1980), where attention is focused on a relevant object or 
location (i.e., threat) and irrelevant information is ignored (i.e., non-threats). The 
emphasis placed on selective attention to threat is consistent with the view that orienting 
and selection are the most important components in the relationship between attention 
and emotion (Yiend, 2010). These theoretical accounts of selective attention to threat in 
anxiety can be divided into two subcategories: those assuming that anxiety directly 
affects selective attention, orienting and the allocation of attentional resources to threat 
(Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Williams et al., 1997) and; those assuming that anxiety affects the initial 
evaluation of threatening and non-threatening stimuli, where the outcome of this 
evaluation process is to selectively allocate attention to threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
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Anxiety and the allocation of attentional resources. Williams et al., (1997) 
proposed that there are two mechanisms involved in stimulus processing: the affective 
decision mechanism (ADM) and the resource allocation mechanism (RAM). The ADM 
is proposed to assess the affective valence of a stimulus at a pre-attentive stage of 
processing and the RAM pre-attentively allocates attentional resources towards or away 
from a stimulus. Williams et al (1997) suggested that the response tendencies of high 
and low trait anxious individuals differ at a pre-attentive stage of processing. 
Specifically, they proposed that trait anxiety affects the functioning of the RAM such 
that if a stimulus has been labelled as threatening by the ADM, then individuals with 
high levels of anxiety will allocate attentional resources towards the threat stimulus and 
individuals with low levels of anxiety will allocate attentional resources away from the 
threat stimulus. Williams et al (1997) proposed that the tendency to direct resources 
away from threatening stimuli in low trait anxious individuals represents a protective 
response as it removes the necessity to process mild threat stimuli and thereby prevents 
increased anxiety. However, a number of cognitive theorists (e.g., Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998) have highlighted that this account would also suggest that 
individuals with low levels of anxiety direct resources away from stimuli with a high 
threat value. If this were the case, then low trait anxious individuals would be unable to 
implement survival behaviours in objectively dangerous situations. This limitation has 
been addressed by alternative theories (Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
In a related account, Beck and Clark (1997) suggested that anxiety was 
associated with an ‘orienting mode’ that was excessively sensitive to threat at the 
earliest stages of stimulus processing. They proposed that, for all individuals, the 
function of this orienting system was to identify threatening stimuli (or any stimuli that 
were important to survival) and to automatically allocate attentional resources to these 
stimuli such that they received processing priority.  They further proposed that a bias in 
the functioning of the orienting system exists in anxious individuals. Specifically, they 
suggested that anxiety is associated with enhanced threat detection and, therefore, there 
is a greater tendency to orient and allocate attentional resources towards threatening 
stimuli in anxious individuals.  
Anxiety and stimulus evaluation. Mogg and Bradley (1998) proposed a two stage 
model of stimulus processing that consisted of a valence evaluation system (VES) and a 
goal engagement system (GES). In general, these systems are analogous to the ADM 
and RAM proposed by Williams et al., (1997). That is, the function of the VES is to 
automatically assess the affective valence of a stimulus and the function of the GES 
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depends on the inputs it receives from the VES. The GES automatically allocates 
resources to the stimulus and interrupts current goals if the input it receives suggests 
that the stimulus is threatening. If a low threat value has been assigned to the stimulus, 
then the GES continues allocating resources to current goals and inhibits processing of 
the stimulus. Mogg and Bradley (1998) proposed that the threshold at which the VES 
labels a stimulus as threatening is lowered in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety 
and, therefore, the GES directs attentional resources towards threatening stimuli more 
frequently compared to those with low levels of trait anxiety. Within this framework it 
is suggested that the VES is not solely influenced by trait anxiety; it is also affected by 
more objective variables such as the nature of the stimulus and the context in which the 
stimulus occurs. Hence, a stimulus with an objectively high threat value will be labelled 
as threatening by the VES in all individuals, irrespective of trait anxiety levels, and will 
lead to the appropriate allocation of resources by the GES.  Therefore, Mogg and 
Bradley (1998) suggested that vulnerability to anxiety may be reflected in pre-attentive 
or attentional biases towards mild threat rather than high threat stimuli. An additional 
component of the model is that, in conjunction with automatic vigilance for danger, 
high trait anxious individuals may subsequently avoid threat stimuli in order to 
minimise their discomfort. This pattern of vigilance-avoidance is suggested to maintain 
anxiety as it precludes habituation to threatening stimuli. 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) also proposed a model in which trait anxiety 
had an effect on a threat evaluation system (TES). They argued that an attentional bias 
to threat could only occur if there was competition between a threatening and non-
threatening stimulus. They suggested that anxiety is characterised by the preferential 
selection of threatening information over non-threatening information, rather than 
greater speed or efficiency in processing threat. They argued that the output of the TES 
increases if it automatically assesses and labels the emotional valence of a stimulus as 
threatening. The output from the TES is also increased in individuals with high levels of 
trait anxiety. Attentional resources will be directed towards the threat stimulus and 
directed away from the non-threat stimulus if there is a strong output from the TES. In 
line with Mogg and Bradley (1998), this model also proposes that objectively high 
threat stimuli will elicit a strong output from the TES and will lead to orienting to threat 
in all individuals, irrespective of anxiety. Thus, the effects of anxiety will only be 
evident when a mild threat stimulus is presented.  
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1.3.2 Anxiety and Impaired Attentional Control 
A number of recent conceptual frameworks have considered the ways in which 
goal-directed processes can be used to override the bias towards threat and how these 
processes differ as a function of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eysenck et al., 2007; 
Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Lonigan et al., 2004). These frameworks are not 
necessarily inconsistent with the notion of selective attention and orienting to threat in 
anxiety; however, they suggest that selective attention to threat is a consequence of 
impaired attentional control. Attentional control can be defined as the ability to regulate 
orienting responses through the use of voluntary attention (Derryberry & Reed, 2002) 
and, therefore, involves using the anterior attentional system to control the deployment 
of the spotlight of attention (Rothbart et al., 1994; Rueda et al., 2005). Derryberry and 
Reed (2002) developed a self-report measure of attentional control (Attentional Control 
Scale; ACS) which aimed to assess the ability to use the anterior attentional system to 
voluntary focus and shift attention. Whilst some researchers suggest that there is a 
general deficit in attentional control in anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007), others suggest 
that individual differences in attentional control will exist within an anxious population 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Lonigan et al., 2004). According to the latter view, 
attentional control can be regarded as a self-regulative trait that moderates the anxiety-
related threat bias. 
 Impaired attentional control. In their Attentional Control Theory (ACT), 
Eysenck et al (2007) suggested that the balance between the goal-directed attentional 
system and the stimulus-driven attentional system is disrupted by anxiety. Specifically, 
anxiety is associated with: automatic processing of threat stimuli due to the increased 
influence of the stimulus-driven attentional system and impaired attentional control due 
to the decreased influence of the goal-directed attentional system. Therefore, while 
previous definitions and measures of attentional control (i.e. ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 
2002) focus on voluntary attention and the anterior attentional system, ACT extends 
these accounts by emphasising the bi-directional relationship between the goal-directed 
(anterior) attentional system and the stimulus-driven (posterior) attentional system. 
Eysenck et al., (2007) argued that the impairment in attentional control should lead to 
negative effects on performance efficiency (i.e. the effort invested to attain a required 
level of performance on a task) but little or no effect on performance effectiveness (i.e. 
the accuracy or the quality of task performance). It is important to note that Eysenck et 
al. (2007) suggested that the impairment in attentional control would occur irrespective 
of whether a threat-related stimulus was present or absent. In the presence of threat, 
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anxious individuals would automatically allocate attentional resources to task-irrelevant 
threat, which would lead to a loss of attentional focus and impaired performance on the 
ongoing task. In the absence of threat, anxious individuals would adopt the optimal 
strategy for threat detection, which is to maintain a wide distribution of attention and 
thereby reduce attentional focus on the ongoing task. This latter proposal is consistent 
with the notion of hypervigilance for threat in anxiety. Eysenck et al (2007) proposed 
that attentional control is used for inhibition (e.g. inhibiting a prepotent response or 
resisting distractor interference), attentional shifting (moving between multiple tasks) 
and updating working memory; and proposed that these functions are impaired in 
anxiety. It is further suggested that the impairment in these functions should be 
particularly evident when the anxious individual is presented with threat-related stimuli 
and when state anxiety is high.  
Alternative theories suggest that the processes associated with attentional control 
(or effortful control) moderate attentional biases to threat-related stimuli (Derryberry & 
Reed, 2002; Lonigan et al., 2004). According to Lonigan et al (2004), automatic 
attentional biases mediate the relationship between reactive temperamental processes 
(e.g. neuroticism) and anxiety. In their model, it is suggested that effortful control 
processes moderate the risk for increased anxiety by overriding these attentional biases, 
where effortful control is often defined as a temperamental trait that allows self-
regulative behaviour (Rueda et al., 2005). This theory proposes that anxiety will only 
occur if an individual has high levels of neuroticism in conjunction with low levels of 
effortful control. An individual who has high levels of neuroticism will be able to 
regulate their attention to threat and reduce their risk of anxiety if they are able to exert 
adequate effortful control. High levels of effortful control may, for example, allow an 
individual with high levels of anxiety to employ compensatory strategies to enhance 
task performance and decrease attention to threat. These compensatory strategies may 
include increased effort in tasks requiring inhibition or attentional shifting (Eysenck et 
al., 2007), thus enabling individuals with high levels of anxiety and high levels of 
effortful control to inhibit processing of threatening distractors and/or shift attention 
away from threat.   
 Delayed disengagement from threat. In contrast to the notion that there is a 
pervasive impairment in attentional control in anxiety, attention maintenance theory 
(Fox et al., 2001, 2002) suggests that anxiety is more specifically characterised by 
slower attentional disengagement from threatening stimuli. This theory proposes that 
threat stimuli do not influence the initial orienting of attention in anxious individuals. 
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Instead, the threat bias occurs after the initial orienting of attention due to increased 
dwell time on threat stimuli. Delayed disengagement can be regarded as a consequence 
of failing to inhibit the processing of threatening stimuli.  This proposal would suggest 
that the threat-related bias in anxiety can be characterised by post-attentive processes 
rather than pre-attentive processes.  
  
1.3.3 Anxiety, Hypervigilance and Threat Detection  
Eysenck (1992) suggested that trait anxiety is characterised by the rapid 
detection of threat. He proposed that, in order to enhance threat detection, anxious 
individuals should be hypervigilant (Eysenck, 1991); they should either rapidly scan the 
environment with a narrow focus of attention and numerous eye movements or they 
should maintain a broad focus of attention until a threatening stimulus is encountered. It 
is argued that this hypervigilant attentional style and broad focus of attention would lead 
to increased distraction from task-irrelevant stimuli (particularly if it is threatening) in 
individuals with high levels of anxiety (i.e., impaired attentional control (Eysenck et al., 
2007)). Indeed, the ability to focus attentional resources on current tasks would be 
limited and attentional control would be impaired because a considerable proportion of 
an anxious individual’s cognitive capacity would be dedicated to scanning the 
environment for threat (Beck et al., 2005).  
A further feature of Eysenck’s (1992) theory is that, following detection, 
anxious individuals should selectively attend to threatening (vs. neutral stimuli) such 
that attention is narrowed onto the threat stimulus in order for it to be processed in more 
detail (as indexed by more fixations on these stimuli). This suggestion is consistent with 
the zoom lens metaphor of attention (Eriksen & St James, 1986), where the size of the 
attentional spotlight expands if the location of the target stimulus is unknown and 
contracts if the location of the target stimulus is known.  
In addition to high trait anxiety, the notion of hypervigilance has also been 
raised in models of social phobia (Beck et al., 2005; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Rapee 
and Heimberg (1997) suggested that, after detecting an audience, individuals with social 
phobia are hypervigilant for external sources of threat in the form of signs of negative 
evaluation (e.g. frowns), anger and aggression.  
 
1.3.4 Summary of the Current Conceptual Frameworks 
The most consistent feature across the cognitive models of anxiety is the 
assumption that anxious individuals automatically select threatening information for 
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further processing at the expense of processing non-threatening stimuli or carrying out 
ongoing tasks. This anxiety-related bias may manifest itself in a variety of forms; the 
automatic allocation of attentional resources to threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams et 
al., 1997), a lowered threshold for evaluating a stimulus as threatening (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998), an amplification of the threat signal (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), or 
an inability to inhibit threat processing or disengage from threat stimuli (Eysenck et al., 
2007; Fox et al., 2001, 2002). The notion of hypervigilance (Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck, 
1992) adds a further dimension to these theories. Although Eysenck (1992) suggests 
that there is a selective attentional bias and a narrowing of attention onto threat in 
anxiety, he also highlights that the initial phase of threat detection may be enhanced by 
distributing attentional resources widely and scanning the environment for threat. 
Chapter 2 will review the empirical evidence that has been conducted to test the 
predictions put forward by these conceptual frameworks of anxiety and attention. It will 
discuss the progress that has been made in understanding threat processing in anxiety 
and it will also highlight some of the important questions that remain in this field of 
research. Finally, Chapter 2 will outline the approach that is used in this thesis to 
address these research questions. Specifically, it is argued that a greater understanding 
of anxiety and attention requires a more comprehensive amalgamation of the principles, 
theories and findings underlying research in the separate fields of cognition and 
emotion. A more thorough consideration of the purpose and mechanisms involved in 
attentional selection and target detection should provide greater insight into whether 
these processes are affected by emotionally significant stimuli in anxiety.  
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Chapter 2 : An Empirical Review of Threat Processing in Anxiety 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Empirical research on anxiety and attention has utilised a variety of cognitive 
paradigms and experimental techniques to elucidate the attentional processes underlying 
the anxiety-related threat bias. Behavioural (RTs), neuropsychological (eye 
movements), electrophysiological (event related potentials; ERPs) and neuroimaging 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) measures have, most notably, provided 
evidence of selective attention to threat (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; 
Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Mueller et al., 2009), impaired attentional control 
(Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009; Mogg et al., 2000; 
MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010) and enhanced threat detection (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; 
Matsumoto, 2010) in anxiety. Presently, there is only a small literature on 
hypervigilance and the breadth of attention in anxious individuals (Horley, Williams, 
Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2004; Keogh & French, 1999; Shapiro & Lim, 1989). This 
chapter will review the existing literature on attentional processing of threatening 
stimuli in anxiety; it will highlight that, from a cognitive perspective, there are a number 
of unresolved issues surrounding the processes and mechanisms involved in the 
selection, inhibition and detection of threat and; it will outline the approach adopted in 
this thesis to explore these issues.  
Before providing a detailed review of the existing literature on anxiety and 
attention, it is important to outline the participant characteristics and stimulus 
considerations that frequently underlie this work. As highlighted in Chapter 1, empirical 
research on threat processing in anxiety has been conducted with clinically anxious 
individuals and sub-clinical populations with high levels of self-reported anxiety. In 
their meta-analysis, Bar-Haim et al (2007) reported that there was no difference 
between these groups in the effect size of the threat bias. Furthermore, they found that 
this effect size was similar across clinical anxiety disorders and that it was equivalent in 
adult and child populations. These findings suggest that it is of theoretical value to 
consider the threat bias in all individuals with high levels of anxiety, irrespective of 
their age and the clinical status of their anxious symptomatology.  
The nature of the threatening stimuli used in these studies has developed over 
time, with earlier studies focusing on threatening word stimuli and more recent studies 
often employing threatening pictures. It has been argued that threatening word stimuli 
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are more abstract and less salient than pictorial threat cues (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 
2000). Furthermore, it has been suggested that an anxiety-related attentional bias to 
threatening words may be confounded by word familiarity because individuals with 
high levels of anxiety (vs. individuals with low levels of anxiety) display heightened 
familiarity with these stimuli (Bradley et al., 2000; Calvo & Eysenck, 2008). Recent 
research has increasingly favoured the use of more naturalistic threat stimuli such as 
emotional faces. Indeed, the empirical work presented in this thesis utilises threatening 
and non-threatening facial expressions. Faces are widely regarded as important stimuli, 
perceived using specialised neural regions in the human brain (Kanwisher & Yovel, 
2006). Emotional facial expressions are encountered from birth and are considered to be 
meaningful stimuli in the development of normal social interaction (Herba & Phillips, 
2004).  Given the significance of faces, it is of interest to consider whether threatening 
facial expressions receive processing priority in anxious individuals. Angry faces, for 
example, denote dominance and aggression and are associated with survival threats in 
mammalian evolutionary history (Mineka & Öhman, 2002) and, as such, are likely to be 
perceived as particularly threatening by those who are anxious or fear social 
interactions.  
 
2.2 Anxiety and Selective Attention to Threat: Empirical Evidence 
 
 Cognitive models of selective attention to threat suggest that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety allocate processing resources towards rather than away from 
threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams et al., 1997) and that they have a lowered 
threshold for evaluating a stimulus as threatening (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg 
& Bradley, 1998). With respect to the allocation of attentional resources, empirical 
research has typically considered the following questions: Do anxious individuals 
preferentially attend to threatening (vs. neutral) stimuli? Is anxiety characterised by 
rapid orienting towards threat at an early stage of stimulus processing? With respect to 
stimulus evaluation, the principal question of interest is whether anxious individuals are 
more inclined to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening.  
 
2.2.1 The Allocation of Attentional Resources 
Evidence to support the proposition that individuals with high levels of anxiety 
selectively allocate attentional resources to threatening stimuli in preference to neutral 
stimuli has typically been found using an emotional variant of the dot probe paradigm 
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(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Yiend, 2010). This paradigm involves the presentation of 
stimulus pairs, which consist of an emotional stimulus (threatening or positive) and a 
neutral stimulus displayed simultaneously to the left and right of central fixation. The 
stimulus pair is replaced by a dot probe, which either appears in the location of the 
previous emotional stimulus or the location of the previous neutral stimulus. The task is 
to make a decision about the presence/absence, location or identity of the probe. The 
rationale underlying the task is that if an individual selectively orients their attention 
towards one of the items in the stimulus pair, then RTs to the subsequent dot probe will 
be faster if the probe appears in the same location as the ‘selected’ stimulus compared 
with the same location as the ‘unselected’ stimulus. Indeed, if the subsequent dot probe 
appears in the same location as the selected stimulus, then the individual can process 
and respond to the probe without shifting their attention between spatial locations. If a 
subsequent dot probe appears in the same location as the unselected stimulus, then the 
individual will need to disengage their attention from the selected location and shift 
their attention to the unselected location before they can process and respond to the 
probe.  
It has been argued that vigilance for threat would be reflected in RTs that are 
faster when the probe replaces the threat stimulus compared with when the probe 
replaces the neutral stimulus. In contrast, threat avoidance would be associated with 
RTs that are slower when the probe replaces the threat stimulus compared with when 
the probe replaces the neutral stimulus (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). It is 
important to note that the term ‘vigilance’ tends to be used interchangeably with 
‘selective attention’ in the dot probe literature. In this context, vigilance refers to only 
one subsection of Eysenck’s (1991, 1992) hypervigilance theory. Specifically, the term 
is used to indicate that, following threat detection, anxious individuals selectively 
process and narrow their attention onto threatening stimuli.  
The dot probe paradigm has generated a body of highly replicable findings using 
various stimuli (e.g. faces, words, spiders) in sub-clinical and clinical populations. A 
number of studies indicate that individuals with high levels of anxiety selectively attend 
to threatening stimuli (i.e. where probe responses are faster when the probe replaces the 
threatening compared with the neutral stimulus). These findings of selective attention to 
threat have been demonstrated with high trait anxious individuals (Bradley et al., 1998), 
high state anxious individuals (Mogg, Bradley, DeBono, & Painter, 1997), individuals 
with a clinical diagnosis of GAD (MacLeod et al., 1986), individuals with a clinical 
diagnosis of social phobia (Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004) and spider fearful 
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individuals (Mogg & Bradley, 2006). These studies typically indicate that the threat bias 
does not occur in non-anxious control participants and that there is not a bias for happy 
faces in individuals with high levels of anxiety. However, with respect to the latter 
point, there is some limited evidence from the dot probe paradigm to indicate that 
anxious individuals are vigilant for angry and happy faces (Bradley, Mogg, White, 
Groom, & DeBono, 1999). Explanations for this type of emotional bias (i.e. the 
preferential allocation of attentional resources to happy and angry faces) typically 
suggest that individuals with high levels of anxiety interpret both happy and angry faces 
as threatening; specifically, it is possible that they evaluate a happy face as a sign of 
being mocked (Bradley et al., 1999; Garner et al., 2006).  
Dot probe findings of selective attention to threat in anxiety are reliably 
observed when the stimulus pairs are presented for a short duration (i.e. up to 500 ms 
(Bradley et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Mogg et al., 1997; Mogg et al., 2004)) 
and they are less reliable when the stimulus pairs are presented for longer durations (i.e., 
over 1250 ms (Bradley et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Mogg et al., 2004)). This 
evidence has been interpreted as suggesting that selective attention and vigilance for 
threat occurs at an early stage of stimulus processing in anxious individuals (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2006). Additional studies have found that the threat bias occurs even when the 
threat stimuli are presented subliminally under conditions that preclude conscious 
processing (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). 
These findings are consistent with the notion of a pre-attentive threat bias in anxiety.  
Yiend (2010) recently highlighted the strengths and limitations of the RT dot 
probe paradigm. She argued that a benefit of the paradigm is that it provides convincing 
evidence to indicate that anxious individuals selectively allocate attention to threatening 
stimuli in preference to neutral stimuli. However, a limitation associated with the dot 
probe paradigm is that it can only consider the attentional bias to threat at the snapshot 
of time in which the probe occurs and, therefore, it is not possible to infer whether 
attention was also allocated to the threatening stimulus before or after the onset of the 
probe. She argued that a further limitation is that this paradigm cannot readily be used 
to distinguish between initial orienting to threat and delayed disengagement from threat. 
Recently, eye movement and ERP measures have been utilised to address these 
limitations; these measures allow a consideration of the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of orienting attention from the onset until the offset of the threatening 
stimulus.  
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There are currently relatively few studies that have considered selective attention 
to threat by measuring the eye movement behaviour of anxious individuals during threat 
processing. Several studies (Garner et al., 2006; Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007; Mogg, 
Millar, & Bradley, 2000) have utilised traditional RT dot probe tasks and concurrently 
measured eye movements in individuals with high levels of anxiety when they are 
presented with picture pairs containing one emotional picture and one neutral picture. 
These studies indicate that, in comparison with non-anxious control participants, there is 
initial vigilance for: angry faces in individuals with GAD (Mogg et al., 2000); angry 
and fearful faces in individuals with high trait anxiety (Mogg et al., 2007) and; angry 
and happy faces in individuals with high fear of negative evaluation when experiencing 
current social-evaluative stress (Garner, et al., 2006; note that a vigilant-avoidant pattern 
of eye movements was observed in this study). Heightened vigilance in these studies 
was inferred from a higher proportion of first fixations or initial saccades landing on the 
emotional face (vs. the neutral face), shorter latencies between the onset of a stimulus 
pair and the first fixation on emotional faces (vs. neutral faces), and shorter latencies 
between the onset of a stimulus pair and the initial saccades to emotional faces (vs. 
neutral faces). The conclusion drawn from these studies is that there is a bias in initial 
orienting to threat in anxiety (Mogg et al., 2000). These studies support the proposition 
that individuals with high levels of anxiety selectively attend to threat.  
Findings of initial vigilance for threat have not always been replicated in eye 
movement studies (Gerdes, Pauli, & Alpers, 2009). Gerdes et al. (2009) found that high 
and low spider fearful individuals did not differ in the latency between the onset of a 
display and the first accurate fixation when participants were instructed to look towards 
a spider picture (paired with a neutral picture).  However, when instructed to move their 
eyes away from the spider picture, the latency between the onset of a display and the 
first accurate fixation was longer in high fearful individuals compared with low fearful 
individuals. They concluded that high fear was not associated with the rapid allocation 
of attention towards threat; instead, it was characterised by slowed disengagement from 
threat (see Section 2.3.2 for further evidence of delayed disengagement from threat in 
anxiety).  
To consider vigilance, disengagement and avoidance in further detail, additional 
eye tracking studies have considered the temporal characteristics of the threat bias in 
anxiety by presenting stimuli for 2000 – 9000 ms. Studies that have used emotional-
neutral picture pairs and allowed free viewing have found evidence of initial vigilance 
for angry and happy faces in individuals with a heightened fear of negative evaluation 
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(Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Muhlberger, 2009) and social phobia (Gamble & 
Rapee, 2010) and initial vigilance for positive and threatening pictures in individuals 
with high levels of trait anxiety (Calvo & Avero, 2005). In these studies, vigilance was 
inferred from a higher probability of first fixations, or a higher proportion of total 
fixations or total viewing time directed towards the emotional (vs. neutral face) within 
the first 500 ms or 1000 ms of stimulus presentation.  
However, further studies using a similar methodology have found no evidence 
of anxiety-related vigilance for threat at early stages of viewing; instead, they have 
found evidence of avoidance of threat from 500 ms of viewing time onwards (Hermans, 
Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999; Pflugshaupt et al., 2007; Rohner, 2002). For example, 
Rohner (2002) monitored the direction of gaze during presentation of angry-neutral and 
happy-neutral face pairs and reported that gaze was averted from angry faces to a 
greater extent than happy faces in high trait anxious individuals (but not low trait 
anxious individuals) from 1800 ms onwards. Similarly, Pflugshaupt et al., (2007) 
presented participants with picture pairs containing a spider and a non-spider (e.g. a 
butterfly) for 9 seconds. They found that there was a significantly shorter viewing time 
and a lower percentage of fixations on spiders in the spider phobic group compared with 
the control group. Furthermore, they found evidence of gradual oculomotor avoidance 
in the spider phobic group, where the percentage of fixations on the spider picture 
decreased over time. See further eye tracking evidence for avoidance of spiders in 
spider anxious individuals in Hermans, et al., 1999 and avoidance of emotional scenes 
in high trait anxious individuals in Calvo & Avero, 2005.  
 Thus far, eye tracking studies have been unable to definitively determine 
whether selective attention to threat in anxiety is a consequence of rapid orienting 
towards threat or delayed disengagement from threat or whether anxiety is more 
consistently characterised by a tendency to avoid threat. The inconsistencies between 
these eye tracking findings may be a result of differences between the anxiety groups 
and differences in the task instructions. For example, the findings indicate that 
individuals with high social anxiety are vigilant for emotional faces in general (Gamble 
& Rapee, 2010; Garner et al., 2006), whereas individuals with GAD or high trait 
anxiety are more likely to demonstrate threat-specific vigilance (Mogg et al., 2007; 
Mogg et al., 2000). On the other hand, fear of spiders is typically associated with slow 
and controlled processes such that there is evidence of delayed disengagement (Gerdes 
et al., 2009) or attentional avoidance (Pflugshaupt et al., 2007) from threat.  
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Further evidence of selective attention to threat has been provided in ERP 
studies (Eldar, Yankelevitch, Lamy, & Bar-Haim, 2010; Fox, Derakshan, & Shoker, 
2008; Mueller et al., 2009). Mueller et al., (2009), for example, measured the P1 
component (measured at 80-150 ms post-stimulus onset) as an index of rapid orienting 
of covert spatial attention during a dot probe task in which angry-neutral or happy-
neutral face pairs preceded the dot probe. They found that the P1 amplitude was greater 
in response to the angry-neutral face pairs compared with the happy-neutral face pairs in 
individuals with social anxiety disorder (this effect was not observed for control 
participants). This finding was consistent with the behavioural RT data in which 
individuals with social anxiety disorder, but not the control participants, were faster to 
respond to probes that replaced angry compared with happy faces. They concluded that 
these findings were indicative of hypervigilance and rapid spatial orienting to threat in 
anxiety.  
Similarly, Fox et al., (2008) and Eldar et al. (2010) presented angry-neutral or 
happy-neutral face pairs and asked participants to manually respond to a subsequent 
target. Fox et al., (2008) measured ERPs in response to the face pairs and found that 
there was a rapid shift of attentional resources towards threat (i.e. angry faces) in high 
trait anxious individuals as indexed by an enhanced N2pc component (this was not 
evident in low trait anxious individuals or for happy faces). In contrast, Eldar et al 
(2010) reported that the amplitude of the C1 component (65-105 ms post-stimulus 
onset) was greater in individuals with high (vs. low) levels of trait anxiety in response to 
angry-neutral (but not happy-neutral) face pairs. They concluded that anxiety was 
associated with a more intense response to threat.  
Taken together, these ERP studies provide preliminary electrophysiological 
evidence to indicate that anxious individuals orient covert attention to threatening 
stimuli in preference to neutral stimuli at early stages of processing. However, these 
results need to be treated with caution because the ERP literature on attentional biases in 
anxiety currently uses a wide variety of experimental tasks and focuses on different 
ERP components. Even studies using similar tasks, such as those presented above, 
identify different ERP components to explain a single phenomenon. Thus far, there are 
an insufficient number of studies to determine whether these are replicable effects.  
To summarise, the studies reviewed in this section have been of central 
importance in providing converging evidence from RTs, eye movements and ERPs to 
indicate that individuals with high levels of anxiety allocate attentional resources to 
threatening stimuli in preference to neutral stimuli. It is argued here that, in contrast to 
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the conclusions that are typically drawn from these studies, this attentional bias does not 
necessarily imply that there is selective attention to threat in anxiety. To refer back to 
Chapter 1, the evolutionary purpose of selective attention is to ensure that the limited 
capacity cognitive system selects high priority signals for further processing from a 
large array of competing environmental stimuli. Therefore, it is important to determine 
whether anxiety is associated with an enhanced ability, rather than just a preference, to 
select high priority threat signals from competing visual inputs. Selectively attending to 
a particular stimulus requires that the spotlight of attention is directed to its location 
and, therefore, an important line of enquiry is to establish whether anxiety is associated 
with enhanced threat localisation. Furthermore, it is important to determine the 
parameters of selective attention to threat; that is, a selective attentional mechanism is of 
limited value if it only operates when two items are present in the visual field. If 
selective attention to threat is a fundamental attribute in anxious individuals, then it 
should be evident regardless of the complexity (i.e., the number of items) in the visual 
environment.  
 
2.2.2 Stimulus Evaluation 
It is possible that the preference to allocate attentional resources to threat in 
anxiety is the result of a lowered threshold for evaluating a stimulus as threatening 
(Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Although the significance of 
research on anxiety and stimulus evaluation is acknowledged (i.e., the interpretative 
bias), only a very brief summary of this research will be provided here because this 
thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between anxiety and the deployment 
of attention.  
The literature on anxiety and stimulus evaluation has typically considered the 
notion that anxious individuals evaluate or interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). The interpretative bias has principally been assessed 
using two methodologies. Firstly, many studies present participants with words, 
sentences or situations that are ambiguous and, therefore, could have a threatening or a 
neutral meaning. These studies frequently find that clinically anxious individuals and 
individuals high in trait or social anxiety are more likely to generate the threatening (vs. 
neutral) interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Mathews, 
Richards, & Eysenck, 1989). Mathews et al. (1989), for example, asked participants to 
listen to a list of words and to write down each word after they heard it. The word list 
included unambiguously threatening words (e.g., ‘hazard’), unambiguously neutral 
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words (e.g., ‘blanket’) and homophones. The homophones were words that had two 
meanings (threatening and non-threatening) and two spellings but the same 
pronunciation (e.g., ‘die/dye’, ‘groan/grown’, ‘weak/week’). They found that all 
participants generated the threatening spelling of the homophone more frequently 
compared with the neutral spelling. Furthermore, the percentage of homophones that 
were spelled in the threatening form was greater in individuals with GAD (85%) 
compared with the control participants (70%). They concluded that anxious individuals 
were inclined to interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening and that this may serve to 
cause or maintain anxiety.  
Secondly, a number of studies have created ambiguous emotional faces by 
morphing two facial expressions. These studies have found that anxious individuals 
demonstrate enhanced identification and sensitivity to anger and fear in ambiguous 
facial expressions (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2002). Richards et al., 
(2002), for example, morphed faces along six continua: happiness-surprise, surprise-
fear, fear-sadness, sadness-disgust, disgust-anger, anger-happiness. Within each 
continuum, every morphed face was created by blending prototypical emotions in 
varying proportions. On the anger-happiness continuum, for example, the angry 
prototype (100% anger) and happy prototype (100% happiness) were blended to create 
morphed faces with the following proportions of anger and happiness: 90%: 10% (e.g., 
mainly angry), 70%:30%, 50%:50%, 30%:70%, 10%:90% (e.g., mainly happy). 
Participants were asked to classify the emotion expressed in each morphed face in a 
forced choice response task; that is, they had to classify the face as happy, surprised, 
fearful, sad, disgusted or angry. Richards et al (2002) primarily considered the number 
of fear classifications made on the surprise-fear and fear-sadness continua, the number 
of angry classifications made on the disgust-anger and anger-happiness continua, and 
the number of happy classifications made on the happiness-surprise and anger-
happiness continua. They found no evidence to suggest that angry or happy 
classification responses were influenced by social anxiety. However, they did find that 
high socially anxious participants classified more of the faces on the fear continua as 
expressing fear compared with the low socially anxious participants. They concluded 
that there was an interpretative bias in anxiety such that ambiguous facial expressions 
were more likely to be interpreted as expressing fear in individuals with high social 
anxiety. They argued that this interpretative bias was consistent with the notion that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety are hypervigilant for signals of danger.  
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2.2.3 Summary  
The existing literature on selective attention to threat provides evidence to 
suggest that anxiety is associated with a bias in allocating attentional resources to 
threatening stimuli in preference to neutral stimuli and a tendency to evaluate 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening. These findings provide some evidence of selective 
attention to threat in anxiety; however, further work is required to consider how anxiety 
affects the mechanisms that underlie attentional selection (i.e., localisation) and the 
parameters in which they operate (e.g., the ability to localise threat as the number of 
stimuli or the complexity in the visual environment increases). With respect to threat 
localisation, it is possible that selective attention to threat in anxiety will manifest itself 
as rapid orienting towards and/or delayed disengagement from the location of the 
threatening stimulus. This may occur as a consequence of an enhanced ability to 
generate orienting responses towards threatening stimuli or a difficulty regulating 
orienting responses in the presence of threatening stimuli. The latter proposition would 
be consistent with existing empirical research highlighting that there is impaired 
attentional control in anxiety.  
 
2.3 Anxiety and Impaired Attentional Control: Empirical Evidence 
 
In considering the role of impaired attentional control in anxiety, empirical 
evidence has typically focused on whether individuals with high levels of anxiety are 
able to inhibit processing of threatening stimuli. According to ACT (Eysenck et al., 
2007), anxiety should be characterised by impairments in inhibitory processes in the 
presence and, to a lesser extent, in the absence of threatening stimuli. ACT also 
highlights that impaired attentional control will lead to deficits in shifting attention 
between multiple tasks and updating working memory; however, these functions are not 
as clearly related to the aspects of attention that are considered in this thesis (e.g. 
selection and detection) and, therefore, will not be discussed in further detail. Fox and 
colleagues (2001, 2002) proposed that there is a more specific impairment in attentional 
control in anxiety in which there is a delay in disengaging attention from threatening 
stimuli.  
 
2.3.1 Impaired Attentional Control  
Findings from the emotional Stroop paradigm have provided evidence that 
anxiety is associated with difficulties in inhibiting the processing of threatening stimuli 
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(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Williams, Mathews, & Macleod, 1996; Yiend, 2010). In the 
original Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935), participants were asked to name the colour a 
word was written in and ignore the semantic content of the word. It was argued that 
interference from the semantic content of the word was reflected in longer response 
latencies to name the colour of the word. In the emotional version of this task, 
emotional words or faces are presented in various font colours and the participant is 
asked to colour name the stimulus as quickly as possible while ignoring (i.e. inhibiting) 
the affective content of the word or face. A number of studies have found that anxious 
individuals are slower to colour name threatening stimuli compared with neutral stimuli, 
indicating that they are unable to inhibit threat processing. Specifically, greater 
interference from threatening (vs. neutral) stimuli has been reported in clinically 
anxious individuals (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, & 
Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989), high trait anxious individuals 
(Mogg et al., 2000) and individuals with elevated levels of both state and trait anxiety 
(MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Rutherford, MacLeod, & Campbell, 2004).  Although 
some research suggests that Stroop interference from threatening stimuli occurs at a pre-
attentive stage of processing in anxious individuals (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; 
Wikström, Lundh, & Westerlund, 2003), others suggest that it is driven by a slow and 
controlled process involving disengagement from threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Phaf & 
Kan, 2007). Findings from these studies also indicate that the threat bias does not occur 
in non-anxious control participants and that there is typically no bias for happy faces in 
anxious individuals. With respect to the latter point however, there are examples of 
studies in which the magnitude of Stroop interference was equivalent for positive and 
negative stimuli in anxious individuals (Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991; Reinholdt-
Dunne, Mogg, & Bradley, 2009).  
Findings of Stroop interference from threat stimuli in anxious individuals are 
frequently interpreted as evidence of vigilance and a selective attentional bias to threat 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, it has been suggested that this paradigm is not an 
ideal method for testing selective attention because the relevant (colour) and irrelevant 
(semantic content) components of the task are presented in the same spatial location 
(Fox, 1993). The spotlight metaphor of attention suggests that selection occurs through 
the use of a location-based mechanism (Cave & Bichot, 1999); therefore, if task-
relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions occupy the same location, then both dimensions 
are likely to be selected for further processing.  However, further RT (Fox, 1993; Fox, 
1994; Fox, 1996; Georgiou et al., 2005) and eye tracking studies (Derakshan et al., 
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2009; Wieser, Pauli, & Muhlberger, 2009) have extended the Stroop paradigm to 
consider the ability to inhibit threat that appears in a different location to the task-
relevant stimulus.  
Using experiments in which relevant and irrelevant components of a task were 
presented in different spatial locations, Fox and colleagues found that there was only 
evidence of a selective attentional bias to threat in anxiety when the task-irrelevant 
threat stimuli were presented within focal attention (i.e. within foveal vision). For 
example, Georgiou et al., (2005) presented task-irrelevant fearful, happy or neutral faces 
in the centre of the screen and asked participants to categorise letters presented in the 
periphery while keeping their eyes focused on the central face. Their results indicated 
that participants with high levels of trait anxiety were slower to categorise the letters 
when the face was fearful compared with non-fearful (happy or neutral). This effect was 
not observed in participants with low levels of trait anxiety. Similarly, Fox (1996) 
reported that threatening (vs. neutral) distractor words delayed RTs to categorise a 
target stimulus in high trait anxious individuals if they were presented within foveal 
vision. These findings suggest that high trait anxiety is associated with selective 
attention to threatening distractors presented within focal attention (in this case a delay 
in disengaging from or inhibiting threat stimuli). In contrast, Fox (1993, 1994) used a 
separated Stroop task in which a central colour patch was flanked by threatening, 
neutral or colour words presented outside focal attention. The results indicated that, in 
high trait anxious individuals, there was either no evidence of slowed colour naming of 
the patch in the presence of threat words (vs. neutral words; Fox, 1994) or that there 
was a general difficulty inhibiting distracting stimuli, where colour naming the patch 
was slower in the presence of threatening and colour words compared with neutral 
words (Fox, 1993). These studies extend the Stroop paradigm to indicate that the failure 
to inhibit threat processing is not limited to situations in which the task-relevant and 
task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions are presented in the same spatial location.  
Similarly, in recent eye tracking studies participants were asked to inhibit 
processing of a threatening (or non-threatening) stimulus in order to execute a saccade 
to a different location. Specifically, the antisaccade paradigm has been used to explore 
the possibility that anxiety is associated with impaired inhibition of threatening stimuli 
(Derakshan et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009). In this task, participants are presented with 
a peripheral visual cue; in the prosaccade condition they are asked to look towards the 
cue as quickly as possible and in the antisaccade condition they are asked to look away 
from the cue as quickly as possible. Accurate performance in the antisaccade condition 
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requires the inhibition of an exogenous prosaccade to the cue and volitional 
programming of an endogenous antisaccade to the mirror position. Therefore, a typical 
finding in this paradigm is that accurate first saccade latencies are slower in the 
antisaccade condition compared with the prosaccade condition. In Experiment 2, 
Derakshan et al., (2009) presented participants with face cues (angry, happy or neutral) 
in peripheral locations and asked participants to either execute a saccade towards the 
cue in the prosaccade condition or away from the cue in the antisaccade condition. 
Participants were also instructed to make a manual keypress response to indicate the 
direction of an arrow that appeared immediately following the cue; this arrow appeared 
in the same location as the cue on the prosaccade task and in the opposite location to the 
cue in the antisaccade task. Derakshan et al., (2009) reported that the latency of the 
accurate first saccades in the antisaccade condition were significantly longer in the high 
trait anxious group compared with the low trait anxious group when the cue was an 
angry face. This effect was not observed for neutral or happy cues in the antisaccade 
task or for any cue in the prosaccade task. Furthermore, there was no effect of anxiety 
on the error rate in the antisaccade task (e.g. where the participant incorrectly executes a 
prosaccade to the cue). They concluded that there was an impairment in inhibiting 
processing of threatening stimuli in anxious individuals.  
However, contrasting findings were reported by Wieser et al., (2009) in a similar 
antisaccade task which included angry, happy, fearful, sad and neutral faces as cues. 
Here, the study found that individuals high in fear of negative evaluation made 
significantly more errors (i.e. prosaccades to the cue) in the antisaccade task compared 
with control participants for all facial expressions. They did not find any evidence to 
indicate that anxiety affected the latency of the first saccade on the antisaccade task. 
They concluded that there was a general attentional control deficit in anxious 
individuals (i.e. it was not threat specific).  Taken together, these two studies concur in 
highlighting that anxiety is associated with impaired attentional control and, 
furthermore, there is some evidence to indicate that this impairment is associated with a 
specific difficulty in inhibiting threat processing (Derakshan et al., 2009).  
The RT studies conducted by Fox and colleagues (Fox, 1993, 1994, 1996; 
Georgiou et al., 2005) and the antisaccade studies (Derakshan et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 
2009) have provided important evidence to indicate that anxiety is associated with an 
impairment in attentional control. However, the findings cannot fully address the 
proposition raised in ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) that there is an imbalance between the 
stimulus-driven and goal-directed attentional systems in anxiety. Firstly, a limitation of 
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Fox et al’s studies is that participants were instructed to maintain central fixation either 
on a threatening distractor (Georgiou et al., 2005) or on the task-relevant neutral targets 
(a colour patch or a numerical digit; Fox, 1993, 1994, 1996). This task requirement does 
not allow stimulus-driven and goal-directed processes to be placed in direct 
competition; the former case favours processing of the task-irrelevant stimulus and the 
latter case favours processing of the task-relevant stimulus. Secondly, while the 
antisaccade studies are indicative of an impairment in goal-directed processes and/or 
increased influence of stimulus-driven processes in the presence of threat in anxiety, it 
is unclear whether this effect on eye movement behaviour also occurs when a task-
relevant stimulus competes for attention with task-irrelevant threat.  
Some authors have argued that to fully assess the balance between the stimulus-
driven and goal-directed attentional systems, it is necessary to consider whether 
attention is captured by a stimulus when it is task-irrelevant and is presented in 
competition with a task-relevant stimulus (Van der Stigchel et al., 2009). In this case, it 
becomes possible to establish whether the stimulus is selected for further processing via 
an involuntary (exogenous) shift in attention even though this is contrary to the 
endogenous goals of the individual (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2003; Van der Stigchel et al., 
2009). This approach allows an assessment of the ability to inhibit task-irrelevant threat 
processing in order to voluntarily shift the spotlight of attention to a task-relevant target 
(i.e., the ability to inhibit interference from threatening distractors).  
Interference from threatening distractors has recently been considered by 
MacNamara and Hajcak (2010) in an ERP study. They presented participants with two 
pairs of pictures simultaneously; one pair was presented horizontally to the left and right 
of central fixation and one pair was presented vertically above and below central 
fixation. A stimulus pair consisted of either two aversive pictures or two neutral 
pictures. A cue was presented prior to the onset of the four images to indicate which 
picture pair was the target (the uncued picture pair was the distractor). Participants were 
instructed to indicate whether the two pictures in the target pair were the same or 
different. MacNamara and Hajcak (2010) measured the LPP (the late positive potential), 
which is known to be greater for emotional compared with neutral stimuli and is 
averaged from 400-800 ms post-stimulus onset. They found that, in comparison with 
control participants, the increase in the amplitude of the LPP in response to an aversive 
(vs. neutral) target was greater in individuals with GAD, but only when the distractor 
was neutral. Furthermore, their behavioural data indicated that the error rate was higher 
for the individuals with GAD compared with control participants on the aversive 
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distractor trials. Taking these findings together, they concluded that the individuals with 
GAD expended greater attentional resources on threatening targets (as indexed by the 
LPP) when distractors required minimal attentional resources (i.e. when they were 
neutral). In contrast, threatening distractors disrupted performance (as indexed by the 
error rate) and competed for attentional resources to a greater extent compared with 
neutral distractors and, therefore, it was not possible for individuals with GAD to 
enhance processing of the threatening target. These findings highlight that threatening 
distractors compete for attention in anxious individuals even when they are irrelevant to 
the ongoing task.  
Recent neuroimaging studies have provided an insight into the neural structures 
and mechanisms that may account for increased distractibility by threat in anxiety 
(Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2007). Bishop et al (2007), for example, asked 
participants to decide whether a string of six letters, superimposed on a task-irrelevant 
fearful or neutral face, contained the letter X or N. Using fMRI, they found that, among 
individuals with high levels of trait anxiety, there was reduced activation in areas 
associated with attentional control (lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate 
cortex) in response to task-irrelevant fearful (vs. neutral) faces. Bishop et al., (2007) 
reported that these findings only held under conditions of low perceptual load. The 
letter string contained 6 Ns or six Xs in the low perceptual load condition and contained 
one target letter and five different non-target letters in the high perceptual load 
condition; thus, search demands were increased in the high perceptual load condition. 
They concluded that, when the task-relevant stimuli did not occupy all of the attentional 
resources (i.e. under conditions of low perceptual load), high trait anxious individuals 
were unable to recruit prefrontal control mechanisms to prevent the allocation of 
attentional resources to task-irrelevant threat distractors.  
The findings presented so far suggest that impaired inhibition of threat is a 
general deficit that occurs in all anxious individuals. However, further research suggests 
that there are individual differences in attentional control within an anxious population 
and that these individual differences moderate the ability to inhibit threat processing. 
For example, Reinholdt-Dunne et al. (2009) obtained a behavioural measure of 
attentional control using the Attentional Network Task (ANT), which assesses alerting, 
orienting and executive attention. They asked participants to complete an emotional 
Stroop task with words (threat, positive or neutral) and faces (angry, fear, happy or 
neutral). They found that individuals with high levels of trait anxiety were slower to 
colour name emotional faces compared with neutral faces, but only if they displayed 
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low attentional control (there was no such effect in individuals with low levels of trait 
anxiety or in either group for word stimuli). Similarly, Derryberry and Reed (2002) 
found that high (vs. low) trait anxious individuals were slower to disengage from 
threatening stimuli, where this effect was greatest in anxious individuals with low levels 
of self-reported attentional control. While these findings are inconsistent with the notion 
of a general deficit in attentional control in anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007), they are 
consistent with the notion that attentional (or effortful) control is a self-regulative 
temperamental trait that can be used to override an attentional bias to threat in anxious 
individuals (Lonigan et al., 2004). Thus, it is possible that impaired inhibition of threat 
is only apparent in a subsection of the anxious population.  
In line with the hypotheses from ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), there is converging 
evidence from RT, eye movement, ERP and fMRI data to indicate that there is impaired 
inhibition of threat in anxiety and that this disrupts performance in ongoing tasks. 
Impaired inhibition occurs even when the threatening stimulus is a task-irrelevant 
distractor (Bishop et al., 2007; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010) and/or when it is presented 
in a different spatial location to the ongoing task (Derakshan et al., 2009; Georgiou et 
al., 2005). However, there is a notable point of departure between the findings reported 
by Bishop et al (2007) and ACT. While ACT predicts that attentional control would be 
particularly impaired under conditions that place high demands on processing resources, 
the fMRI findings indicate that attentional control is particularly impaired under 
conditions that place low demands on processing resources (Bishop, 2009). This 
apparent discrepancy may reflect the focus on working memory load (i.e., demands on 
the central executive in tasks requiring the inhibition and shifting functions of 
attentional control) in ACT and the focus on perceptual load in the work of Bishop et 
al., (2007). For example, if attentional resources are directed towards task-irrelevant 
threat to a greater extent under conditions of low (vs. high) perceptual load, then it is 
plausible that the demands on the central executive will actually increase under these 
conditions because greater effort will be required to inhibit threat processing or shift 
attentional resources away from the task-irrelevant threat. Although the current work 
makes no attempt to distinguish between these propositions, it is important to keep in 
mind that they at least concur in highlighting that demands on attention and processing 
resources (e.g., the complexity of the visual environment) affect the extent to which 
anxious individuals display impaired inhibition of threat. This is an important point 
because it raises the possibility that although anxiety may be characterised by impaired 
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inhibition of threat, this characteristic may not be apparent in all threat-related 
scenarios.  
While the existing literature has been important in highlighting that there is an 
impairment in inhibiting threat processing in anxiety, there is relatively limited evidence 
considering interference from threatening distractors that are both task-irrelevant and 
presented in a different spatial location to the ongoing task. The few studies that have 
considered this issue have found evidence to suggest that anxious individuals allocate 
attentional resources to threatening distractors (MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010) and that 
this may occur due to reduced recruitment of prefrontal control mechanisms (Bishop et 
al., 2007). However, the principal measures of interest in these studies either have poor 
temporal resolution (i.e. fMRI, Bishop et al., 2007) or occur at a relatively late stage of 
stimulus processing (i.e. the LPP component averaged from 400-800 ms in MacNamara 
& Hajcak, 2010). Therefore, it remains unclear whether the allocation of attentional 
resources to threatening distractors occurs as a consequence of early attentional capture 
by threat or delayed disengagement from threat at a later stage of stimulus processing.  
 
2.3.2 Delayed Disengagement from Threat  
There is growing evidence to suggest that the attentional bias to threat in anxious 
individuals is better understood in terms of delayed disengagement from threat rather 
than attentional capture by threat. An emotional version of the spatial cueing paradigm 
has typically been used to distinguish between these processes. In the original paradigm 
(Posner, 1980), participants were presented with a neutral peripheral cue which was 
either congruent (valid cue) or incongruent (invalid cue) with the location of a 
subsequent target. Posner (1980) reported that RTs to respond to the target were 
facilitated by valid cues and delayed by invalid cues. In the emotional version of the 
spatial cueing paradigm, the target stimuli are preceded by threatening, positive or 
neutral cues. Fox et al (2001, 2002) argued that anxiety-related attentional capture by 
threatening stimuli would be reflected in quicker RTs to detect or categorise the target 
following valid threat cues in individuals with high levels of anxiety (vs. non-anxious 
individuals). Conversely, individuals with high levels of anxiety would be slower (vs. 
non-anxious individuals) to respond to the target following invalid threat cues if they 
had difficulties in disengaging attention from threatening stimuli.  
Using this rationale, evidence from the spatial cueing paradigm indicates that 
anxiety is associated with slowed disengagement from angry faces in individuals with 
high levels of state anxiety (Fox et al., 2001), social threat words in individuals with 
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social phobia (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003) and emotional (angry and 
happy) faces in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety (Fox et al., 2002). In other 
words, anxious individuals (vs. non anxious individuals) were slower to respond to the 
target when it was preceded by an invalid threatening or emotional cue. These studies 
found no evidence to suggest that attention was captured by angry faces in individuals 
high in state or trait anxiety or individuals with social phobia (i.e. anxiety was not 
associated with faster responses to the target following valid threatening cues). Thus, in 
contrast with the findings reported from the dot probe paradigm, research from studies 
using the spatial cueing paradigm do not support the proposition that anxious 
individuals rapidly orient towards threatening stimuli at an early stage of stimulus 
processing.  
Further research by Koster and colleagues (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De 
Houwer, 2006; Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005) has highlighted 
similarities between the findings from the dot probe and spatial cueing paradigms. They 
raised the possibility that the anxiety-related attentional bias to threat in the dot probe 
paradigm could occur as a result of either rapid engagement with threat when the probe 
appeared in the location of the threat stimulus or slowed disengagement from threat 
when the probe appeared in the opposite location to the threat stimulus. In order to 
explore these two possibilities, they compared trials in which threat-neutral and neutral-
neutral stimulus pairs were presented. They argued that rapid engagement with threat 
would be reflected in responses that were faster when the probe replaced the threat 
stimulus in the threat-neutral condition compared with when the probe replaced a 
neutral stimulus in the neutral-neutral condition; slowed disengagement from threat 
would be reflected in responses that were slower when the probe replaced the neutral 
stimulus in the threat-neutral condition compared with the neutral-neutral condition. 
Using this rationale, they showed that high trait anxious individuals were slower to 
respond to the probe when it replaced the neutral picture in a stimulus pair containing a 
neutral and threatening picture compared with a stimulus pair containing two neutral 
pictures. They concluded that anxious individuals found it difficult to disengage their 
attention from threat.  
 As outlined above, it is important to present task-irrelevant threat stimuli when 
considering processes related to attentional control (i.e. attentional capture and 
disengagement). In the spatial cueing paradigm, the face is a cue that indicates the 
probable location of the subsequent target and, therefore, it is difficult to regard these 
stimuli as entirely task-irrelevant. However, eye movement methodologies have 
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recently been used in visual search studies to distinguish between attentional capture 
and slowed disengagement from threatening distractors in anxiety (Gerdes, Alpers, & 
Pauli, 2008; Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Trippe, & Weiss, 2004; Rinck, Reinecke, 
Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005). With respect to findings of attentional capture, 
Miltner et al., (2004) presented participants with displays containing either one target (a 
spider or mushroom) amongst 15 flower distractors or one target and one singleton 
distractor (a spider target and mushroom distractor or vice versa) amongst 14 flower 
distractors. Participants were instructed to make a manual keypress response when they 
detected a pre-specified target. Miltner et al (2004) found that participants with a spider 
phobia executed eye movements towards singleton spider distractors and singleton 
mushroom distractors before looking at a target on 30.2% and 10.8% of the trials 
respectively (12.2% and 14.1% respectively for non-phobic control participants). In line 
with this finding, they also reported that manual responses to detect a mushroom target 
were slower in participants with a spider phobia (vs. control participants) when a 
singleton spider distractor was present in the display (group differences were not 
observed in the other experimental conditions). These findings suggest that feared 
distractors captured overt attention (as indexed by eye movements) and interfered with 
ongoing performance (as indexed by manual detection responses) in anxious 
individuals. However, note that a recent eye tracking study by Derakshan and Koster 
(2010) found no evidence to suggest that trait anxiety was associated with facilitated 
initial orienting (i.e. attentional capture) of visual attention to threatening faces (see 
further details of this study in Section 3.1.1).  
Visual search studies have also reported evidence of a delay in disengaging from 
threatening distractors in anxious individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Gerdes et al., 
2008; Rinck et al., 2005). Rinck et al (2005), for example, asked participants to decide 
whether a target (a spider, beetle or butterfly) was present or absent in displays 
containing 20 items (the distractors within a display were all spiders, all beetles, or all 
butterflies). They found that, when a target was presented amongst spider distractors, 
spider fearful individuals fixated on the distractors for a longer duration and were 
slower to detect the target (in terms of manual RTs) compared with non-fearful controls. 
In contrast, when the target was presented amongst butterfly or beetle distractors, there 
was no significant difference in RTs or gaze duration between the fearful and non-
fearful groups. The authors concluded that individuals with high levels of anxiety were 
slower to disengage their attention from feared objects. Similarly, Byrne and Eysenck 
(1995) found evidence to suggest that elevated anxiety was associated with delayed 
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disengagement from threatening faces; high trait anxious individuals (vs. low trait 
anxious individuals) were significantly slower to detect a happy target when it was 
presented amongst angry distractors compared with neutral distractors. In contrast, 
Derakshan and Koster (2010) found no evidence to suggest that trait anxiety was 
associated with delayed disengagement of visual attention from angry faces (as indexed 
by eye movements; see Section 3.1.1). 
 In summary, there is accumulating evidence to suggest that anxiety is 
characterised by delayed disengagement from threat. Importantly, the consistency 
between studies raises the possibility that many of the findings of selective attention to 
threat outlined in Section 2.2.1 can be attributed to delayed disengagement from threat 
rather than rapid initial orienting towards threat. Thus, while cognitive models of 
selective attention typically suggest that anxious individuals rapidly allocate attentional 
resources towards threatening stimuli (e.g. Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & MacLeod, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997), the empirical evidence is more 
compatible with the notion that anxiety is associated with impaired attentional control 
(e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007) and that anxious individuals allocate attentional resources 
towards threatening stimuli for an extended duration of time and find it difficult to shift 
attention away from threat.  
 
2.3.3 Summary 
 This section has provided evidence to indicate that there is impaired attentional 
control in anxiety. The empirical research suggests that this impairment is associated 
with impaired inhibition of threat (Derakshan et al., 2009; Mogg et al., 2000), delayed 
disengagement from threat (Fox et al., 2001, 2002) and, to a lesser extent, attentional 
capture by threat (Miltner et al., 2004). These findings are largely consistent with recent 
theoretical models of anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001, 2002).  
This section has highlighted the importance of assessing these attentional 
processes by using task-irrelevant threat that is presented in a separate spatial location to 
the ongoing task to ensure that, in line with ACT, the stimulus-driven and goal-directed 
attentional systems are placed in direct competition. To date, the empirical evidence 
indicates that anxiety is associated with a greater allocation of attentional resources to 
threatening distractors (Bishop et al., 2007; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010). Research has, 
thus far, been unable to definitively distinguish between the possibility that that this 
effect is due to attentional capture by (Miltner et al., 2004) or delayed disengagement 
from (Rinck et al., 2005) threatening distractors.  
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In considering these attentional processes in greater detail, it is important to 
reiterate that attentional control has been defined as the ability to regulate orienting 
responses (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Chapter 1 emphasised that orienting is the 
mechanism by which stimuli are selected for further processing. Therefore, impairments 
in attentional control should be closely related to the ability to regulate selective 
attentional processes. Indeed, attentional capture by task-irrelevant threat in anxiety 
(Miltner et al., 2004) suggests that there is a difficulty in preventing the spotlight of 
attention landing on a threatening stimulus. A delay in disengaging attention from task-
irrelevant threat in anxiety (Rinck et al., 2005) implies that there is a difficulty in 
shifting the spotlight of attention once it falls on a threatening stimulus. A third 
possibility, and one that has received less consideration, is that anxiety may be 
characterised by a difficulty in focusing a spotlight of attention on a task-relevant 
neutral stimulus when task-irrelevant threatening stimuli are present within a broad 
attentional beam. Further work is required to directly compare these propositions. 
Importantly, the latter proposition would suggest that anxious individuals do not 
necessarily focus a spotlight of attention on task-irrelevant threat; instead, they can be 
distracted by threat across the visual field. It is likely that the function of this broad 
allocation of attention would be to remain vigilant for threat and facilitate threat 
detection (Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck, 1992).  
 
2.4 Anxiety, Hypervigilance and Threat Detection: Empirical Evidence 
 
Cognitive models propose that anxiety is characterised by enhanced threat 
detection (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). These models suggest that individuals 
with high levels of anxiety maximise the chances of detecting threat by being 
hypervigilant; this is achieved by either maintaining a broad focus of attention or by 
excessively scanning the environment with numerous eye movements (Beck et al., 
2005; Eysenck, 1992). To date, empirical research on threat detection and the 
distribution of attention in anxiety has been carried out in parallel as two separate lines 
of enquiry. Visual search studies have been utilised to consider the possibility that there 
is enhanced threat detection in anxious individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; 
Matsumoto, 2010). With respect to hypervigilance and the distribution of attention, 
theory and research have focused on the notion that a broad focus of attention leads to 
impairments in attentional control (i.e. increased distractibility; see review by Eysenck 
et al., 2007). There is, thus far, only a small body of literature considering the purpose 
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of a broad focus of attention in anxiety and the circumstances in which it has a 
beneficial effect (e.g., in the detection or recall of peripheral stimuli (Keogh & French, 
1999; Shapiro & Lim, 1989).  
 
2.4.1 Threat Detection 
The visual search paradigm has been employed relatively infrequently in anxiety 
research (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), yet it is a useful tool for exploring threat detection. 
There is evidence from RT studies to suggest that search for and detection of 
evolutionary threats (e.g. snakes and spiders) is enhanced in individuals reporting high 
levels of fear or phobia for these specific stimuli (Flykt & Caldara, 2006; Öhman, Flykt, 
& Esteves, 2001; Rinck et al., 2005; Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, & Öhman, 2009). 
However, the studies of primary interest in this section are those that have assessed 
search for threatening faces in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety or social 
anxiety. Before providing a detailed review of this literature, a preliminary outline of 
the basic visual search paradigm is required as a context for this research (Donnelly, 
Hadwin, Menneer, & Richards, 2010).  
The Basic Paradigm. In a typical visual search task, participants are asked to 
search for and indicate the presence or absence of a target stimulus which can be 
presented with different numbers of distractor stimuli to make displays of different set 
sizes. Visual search studies typically measure RTs to detect the target as a function of 
set size.  Alternatively, the accuracy of target detection can be considered if the display 
is presented for limited exposure durations (Müller & Krummenacher, 2006; Wolfe, 
1998). Traditional accounts of visual search suggest that a parallel search occurs when 
increases in set size do not impact upon the speed or accuracy of detecting the target 
item. In a serial search, locating the target requires the serial deployment of attention 
and the speed and accuracy of detecting the target item decreases as set size increases 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980).  
The Guided Search Model (Wolfe, 1994) provides a possible explanation for 
why some target stimuli are detected using parallel search processes whilst other target 
stimuli are detected using serial search processes. This model suggests that basic 
features (e.g. colour, orientation) are represented in parallel in separate feature maps. 
The level and location of activation in each feature map is dependent on bottom-up 
information (i.e. provided by distinctive items in a display) and top-down information 
(i.e. provided by a designated target). These feature maps are then combined to produce 
an overall activation map. Attention is initially deployed to the point of highest 
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activation in the activation map because this represents the most likely location of the 
target. A target stimulus that consistently produces the highest level of activation in the 
activation map, irrespective of set size, will always be the first item to attract attention 
in a display (i.e. a parallel search). The target will not be the first item to attract 
attention if the location of highest activation (i.e. the most likely target location) 
corresponds to a distractor. In this instance, attention is serially redeployed to locations 
with progressively lower activation until the target is located or the search is terminated.  
Typically, the gradient of the search slope (i.e. where RTs are regressed against 
set size) is used to define the search as either parallel or serial, where shallow search 
slopes (e.g. 0 ms per item) are believed to be indicative of a parallel search and steep 
search slopes reflect a serial search. Other researchers have argued that search slopes 
cannot be used to discriminate between parallel and serial search because search slope 
gradients lie on a continuum rather than falling into two dichotomous categories (Wolfe, 
1998). Furthermore, a shallow search slope can be produced by a serial search 
mechanism and a steep search slope can be produced by a limited-capacity parallel 
search mechanism. In the latter case, for example, all of the display items are processed 
simultaneously, but the fixed amount of attentional resources (or capacity) available 
means that the amount of resource per item decreases as set size increases. This 
limitation in resource per item leads to an increase in the time taken to accumulate 
information about each item and, therefore, RTs increase as set size increases (Wolfe, 
1998). Therefore, it is often argued that search slopes should only be used to consider 
search efficiency, where shallow slopes represent efficient search (Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 1998).  
 Visual Search for Threatening Faces. Studies employing RT measures have 
found that anxiety is associated with greater speed, accuracy and efficiency in searching 
for and detecting the presence and absence of angry target faces (Eastwood et al., 2005; 
Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; Hadwin et al., 2003; Juth, Lundqvist, 
Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005; Matsumoto, 2010; Perez-Olivas, Stevenson, & Hadwin, 
2008). 
 A number of anxiety studies have considered the overall speed and accuracy of 
detecting emotional target faces in displays of constant set size (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Juth et al., 2005). Byrne and Eysenck (1995) 
presented participants with 12 photographic faces; target present displays consisted of 
an angry or happy target presented amongst emotional or neutral distractors. It is 
important to note that, although Byrne and Eysenck (1995) interpret their findings in 
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terms of threat detection, they actually used a localisation task. Specifically, participants 
had to press one of twelve response keys that corresponded to the location of the target 
face or they had to press the space key to indicate the absence of a target. They found 
that participants with high levels of trait anxiety were faster to locate an angry target 
compared with low trait anxious participants (this effect was not observed for happy 
faces). Similarly, there is evidence to indicate that individuals with high levels of social 
anxiety detect angry faces with greater speed (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999) and 
accuracy (Juth et al., 2005, Experiment 5) compared with happy faces. However, as 
highlighted by the authors of these studies, it appeared possible that the findings were 
actually a consequence of slow localisation of the angry target in the participants with 
low levels of trait anxiety in Byrne and Eysenck’s (1995) study and by slowed or 
inaccurate detection of happy targets in the participants with high levels of social 
anxiety in the studies conducted by Gilboa-Schechtman et al (1999) and Juth et al 
(2005).  
 Further studies have extended these findings by varying set size in order to 
consider the effect of anxiety on search efficiency as indexed by the gradient and 
intercept of the search slope (Eastwood et al., 2005; Hadwin et al., 2003; Matsumoto, 
2010). These studies indicate that trait anxiety is associated with greater efficiency in 
detecting the absence of an angry face in high trait anxious children (Hadwin et al., 
2003) and; greater efficiency in detecting the presence of an angry face in high trait 
anxious adults (vs. low trait anxious; Matsumoto, 2010) and adults with social phobia 
and panic disorder (vs. control participants or individuals with OCD; Eastwood et al., 
2005). Matsumoto (2010), for example, presented displays containing 4, 8 or 12 
schematic faces and instructed participants to indicate the presence or absence of a 
discrepant face. Target absent displays contained faces of the same expression (angry, 
happy or neutral) and target present displays contained one angry or one happy target 
presented amongst emotional or neutral distractors. They found that, in the context of 
neutral distractors, the gradient of the search slope was significantly shallower for angry 
target faces compared with positive target faces in high trait anxious individuals (this 
effect was not observed in low trait anxious individuals). Furthermore, the search slope 
for the angry faces was shallower in the high trait anxious group compared with the low 
trait anxious group. Thus, these studies concur with the notion that there is enhanced 
threat detection in anxiety.   
Summary. The visual search paradigm has been used to consider threat detection 
in anxiety. There is converging evidence from measures of overall speed (Byrne & 
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Eysenck, 1995; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999), accuracy (Juth et al., 2005) and search 
slope gradients and intercepts (Eastwood et al., 2005; Hadwin et al., 2003; Matsumoto, 
2010) to indicate that anxiety is associated with greater efficiency in detecting the 
presence and absence of angry faces. However, it is important to note that the group 
based design used in many of these studies (i.e., high vs. low anxiety groups) can make 
it difficult, in some circumstances, to interpret whether these effects were driven by 
enhanced threat detection in the high anxious group, poor threat detection in the low 
anxious group, or poor detection of happy faces in the high anxious group (Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1995; Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Juth et al., 2005). A potentially more 
fruitful approach in distinguishing between these explanations is to consider anxiety as 
a dimensional construct and assess its relationship with target detection for each 
emotion (see Hadwin et al., 2003).  
 
2.4.2 Hypervigilance and the Breadth of Attention 
Few studies have addressed the hypothesis that, prior to threat detection, anxiety 
is associated with a broad focus of attention and scanning of the visual environment. 
Keogh and French (1999) considered the breadth of attention as a function of both trait 
and state anxiety. They presented participants with target stimuli (threatening and non-
threatening words) to parafoveal or peripheral regions of the visual field. The 
participants were instructed to maintain their gaze on the centre of the screen and 
indicate whether the target appeared in a parafoveal location (i.e., an eccentricity of 
2.8°) or a peripheral location (i.e., an eccentricity of 11.5°). Anxious mood state was 
enhanced in some of the participants; they were instructed to perform a mental 
arithmetic task and informed that they would take part in an intelligence test (the 
remaining participants acted as controls). The authors found that the control group were 
slower to locate peripherally presented targets compared with parafoveal targets. In 
contrast, RTs did not differ between the parafoveal and peripheral targets in the group 
that had taken part in the mood manipulation. This effect occurred irrespective of trait 
anxiety. They concluded that an elevation in anxious mood state is associated with a 
broadening of the attentional beam and a reduction in the preference to process central 
(and in this case parafoveal) stimuli. They argued that this broadening of attention is an 
adaptive response that would occur in high and low trait anxious individuals when 
exposed to a dangerous situation, with the purpose of enhancing the localisation of 
potential threats. One difficulty with this interpretation is that the participants exposed 
to the mood manipulation did not display enhanced localisation of threatening (vs. non-
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threatening) words; that is, a broad focus of attention offered no apparent benefit in 
threat localisation.  
Additional studies have found that an elevation in the anxious mood state is 
associated with a broad focus of attention and enhanced detection (Cornsweet, 1969; 
Shapiro & Johnson, 1987; Shapiro & Lim, 1989) and recall (Solso, Johnson, & Schatz, 
1968) of peripheral stimuli. Shapiro and Lim (1989), for example, played participants 
different pieces of music to manipulate mood and to create anxious and non-anxious 
groups. They instructed participants to maintain central fixation and presented one green 
circle in a parafoveal or peripheral location or presented two green circles 
simultaneously in a parafoveal and peripheral location. In the latter condition, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they detected the parafoveal or peripheral 
stimulus first. They found that the non-anxious group detected the parafoveal circle first 
on 89% of the trials, whereas the anxious group detected the parafoveal and peripheral 
circles first with equal frequency (51% vs. 49% of the trials). They concluded that 
central dominance did not occur in the anxious group; in other words, anxiety was 
associated with a broadening of attention.  
Early studies have argued that a broadening of attention in anxiety should be 
associated with an increased tendency to process task-irrelevant stimuli (Dusek, 
DeYaeger Kermis, & Mergler, 1975; Dusek, Mergler, & DeYaeger Kermis, 1976; 
Markowitz, 1969). Markowitz (1969), for example, instructed participants to 
intentionally learn 12 trigrams. Each trigram was presented with a task-irrelevant 
incidental stimulus (a positive, negative or neutral word). Anxious mood (i.e. state 
anxiety) was manipulated by informing participants either that their data would 
contribute to a measure of average performance on the task (low state anxiety condition) 
or that performance on the task was related to intelligence (high state anxiety condition). 
Markowitz (1969) found that high trait anxious participants (referred to as ‘sensitisers’ 
in this paper) demonstrated greater incidental learning under conditions of high (vs. 
low) state anxiety (i.e., they correctly recalled a greater number of the incidental word 
stimuli). He concluded that high trait anxious participants utilised environmental stimuli 
to a greater extent when exposed to stressful conditions.  
 In contrast to the notion of a broadening of attention, further research has 
assessed the hypothesis that anxious individuals excessively scan the visual 
environment with numerous eye movements (Freeman, Garety, & Phillips, 2000; 
Horley et al., 2004). Freeman et al., (2000) presented participants with four types of 
pictures: a potential threat scene (e.g. a person walking along a path at dusk), a direct 
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threat scene (e.g., a dog attacking a person), a hidden threat scene (e.g. a person by the 
side of a path under a bridge about to jump out at a passer-by) or a happy event (e.g., a 
smiling family scene). This was a free-viewing task in which visual scan paths were 
recorded as participants looked at the pictures. They hypothesised that anxiety would be 
associated with: excessive scanning (indexed by “the number of areas gazed upon”) on 
hidden and potential threat pictures and; enhanced threat detection (indexed by the time 
taken to look at the threat in the hidden threat trials). They found no evidence to support 
either of these hypotheses in individuals with GAD and concluded that there was neither 
excessive scanning nor enhanced threat detection in this group of anxious individuals. 
This finding is inconsistent with the notion that anxious individuals adopt a 
hypervigilant approach in which they scan the environment with numerous eye 
movements to enhance threat detection (Eysenck, 1992). It is also seemingly 
inconsistent with visual search studies, which indicate that anxiety is associated with 
greater efficiency in detecting threat (Matsumoto, 2010); one possible explanation for 
this discrepancy is that, unlike the majority of the visual search studies, the index of 
threat detection employed by Freeman et al. (2000) actually required that the participant 
had located the threat.  
Contradictory findings were reported in a further eye tracking study by Horley et 
al (2004) in which there was evidence of excessive scanning of some facial expressions 
in individuals with social phobia. In this study, participants were presented with a 
picture of a neutral, sad, angry or happy face for 10 seconds and instructed to look at it 
in any manner they chose. Horley et al (2004) found that the scanpath length (the total 
distance covered by the eyes) was greater for individuals with social phobia (vs. control 
participants) when viewing angry or neutral faces. They concluded that excessive 
scanning of negative faces in social phobia is likely to reflect hypervigilance for signs of 
negative social evaluation.  
In summary, there is evidence to indicate that anxious individuals adopt a broad 
focus of attention and that this is associated with enhanced localisation, detection and 
recall of peripheral stimuli (Keogh & French, 1999; Shapiro & Lim, 1989; Solso et al., 
1968). There is, thus far, mixed evidence related to the proposition that anxiety is 
associated with excessive scanning of the visual environment (Freeman et al., 2000; 
Horley et al., 2004).  
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2.4.3 Summary 
 This section highlighted evidence of enhanced threat detection in anxious 
individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Eastwood et al., 2005; Matsumoto, 2010). It also 
reviewed evidence to suggest that anxiety is associated with a broad focus of attention 
and that a potential benefit of distributed attention is the enhanced detection and recall 
of peripheral stimuli (Keogh & French, 1999; Markowitz, 1969; Shapiro & Lim, 1989). 
From an empirical perspective, the relationship between these two findings is unknown; 
specifically, it is currently unclear whether the broad focus of attention in anxiety is 
associated with enhanced threat detection. Furthermore, the cognitive mechanisms that 
might underlie enhanced threat detection within a broad attentional beam have not been 
considered. While Keogh and French (1999) found evidence of a broad focus of 
attention and enhanced localisation of peripheral stimuli, this effect occurred 
irrespective of whether the peripheral stimuli were threatening or non-threatening 
words. However, Keogh and French (1999) and the visual search studies outlined in this 
section considered detection and localisation of singleton threats. It is possible that the 
benefits of a broad focus of attention would be particularly apparent when threatening 
stimuli occur in multiple locations across the visual field. A broad (vs. narrow) focus of 
attention would allow information about the presence of threat to be accumulated from 
more than one location. Therefore, further work is required to consider the relationship 
between the breadth of attention and threat detection in anxiety in an attempt to 
understand the cognitive mechanisms and attentional processes that enable anxious 
individuals to monitor and detect threat with greater efficiency than non-anxious 
individuals.  
 
2.5 An Overview of the Current Programme of Work 
 
This chapter reviewed empirical evidence supporting the theoretical propositions 
that anxiety is associated with a selective attentional bias to threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997), impaired 
attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001, 2002) and hypervigilance for 
threat and enhanced threat detection (Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck, 1992). This chapter 
also highlighted that further work is required to consider these theoretical propositions 
in greater detail.  
In terms of selective attention to threat, it is relatively clear that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety preferentially allocate attentional resources to threatening (vs. 
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neutral) stimuli (Bradley et al., 1998; Garner et al., 2006; Mueller et al., 2009) and this 
is typically interpreted as evidence of a selective attentional bias. However, given that 
selection requires that the spotlight of attention is directed to the location of interest 
(Cave & Bichot, 1999; Posner et al., 1980), it is surprising that very few studies 
consider threat localisation in anxiety. Therefore, it is currently unclear whether anxiety 
influences the efficiency with which a limited capacity cognitive system locates high 
priority threat signals amongst competing visual inputs in order to select them for 
further processing.  
With respect to impaired attentional control, there is evidence to indicate that 
anxious individuals have difficulties inhibiting (Bishop et al., 2007; Derakshan et al., 
2009; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010; Mogg et al., 2000) or disengaging from threatening 
stimuli (Fox et al., 2001, 2002). The purpose of attentional control is to regulate 
orienting responses (Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and, by implication, selective attentional 
processes.  However, research with task-irrelevant threatening distractors (Miltner et al., 
2004; Rinck et al., 2005) has not conclusively identified the selective attentional 
processes that are critical to the association between anxiety and impaired attentional 
control. For example, it is possible that anxiety is associated with a difficulty in 
preventing the spotlight of attention being directed to threat (attentional capture), a 
difficulty in shifting the spotlight of attention away from threat (delayed 
disengagement) or a difficulty in focusing a spotlight of attention on task-relevant 
stimuli when threat is present in other locations (i.e., an inability to inhibit threat within 
a broad attentional beam).  
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that anxiety is associated with enhanced 
threat detection (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Matsumoto, 2010) and a broad focus of 
attention (Keogh & French, 1999; Markowitz, 1969; Shapiro & Lim, 1989). 
Empirically, the relationship between threat detection and the breadth of attention is 
unclear. For example, previous research has not considered how a broad focus of 
attention might facilitate threat detection in anxious individuals.  
Each of these issues can be addressed by considering the eye movement 
behaviour of anxious and non-anxious individuals. Moving the eyes to sample a visual 
scene is a default setting in cognitive-visual tasks and the natural environment 
(Liversedge & Findlay, 2000) and the relationship between overt and covert attention is 
well-established (Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995). In line with the spotlight metaphor 
of attention, the eye movement system serves as a location-based selection mechanism 
whereby visual stimuli within foveal vision receive the highest processing priority due 
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to enhanced visual acuity in this region. Indeed, due to the constraints of the retinal 
input to the visual system, it is a physiological necessity to direct foveal vision towards 
significant stimuli if selective attention is required to process these stimuli in greater 
detail (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003). Peripheral vision provides information about the 
location of potentially significant stimuli and, therefore, guides subsequent eye 
movements (Findlay & Gilchrist, 2003). Before generating predictions about how 
selective attention to threat, impaired attentional control and hypervigilance for threat 
might be reflected in eye movement behaviour, it is important to provide a 
physiological and conceptual account of the oculomotor system.  
 
2.5.1 The Oculomotor System 
The physiological characteristics of the oculomotor system and the brain activity 
associated with executing saccades and maintaining fixation have been described 
extensively. Saccades are fast rotations of the eye which occur 3-4 times per second and 
are interspersed with fixation periods in which the eye remains stationary (Findlay & 
Gilchrist, 2003). There are cells in the brainstem (burst cells and omnipause cells) 
related to saccades and fixations (Findlay & Walker, 1999; Liversedge & Findlay, 
2000); there is activity in burst cells during saccades and in omnipause cells during 
fixations. It is likely that this brainstem circuitry is related to automatic processes such 
as using the oculomotor muscles to rotate the eye (Findlay & Walker, 1999).  
A brain area that has received considerable attention as an important component 
in the oculomotor system is the superior colliculus of the midbrain, which receives 
inputs from cortical and sub-cortical visual regions and triggers saccades via its 
projections to the brainstem premotor circuitry (Trappenberg, Dorris, Munoz, & Klein, 
2001). Munoz and colleagues (Munoz & Istvan, 1998; Munoz & Wurtz, 1993a; Munoz 
& Wurtz, 1993b; Munoz & Wurtz, 1995a; Munoz & Wurtz, 1995b) considered the role 
of the superior colliculus in the generation and suppression of saccades in monkeys. 
They reported that fixation cells and two types of saccade-related cells, burst cells and 
buildup cells, could be found in the superior colliculus. Specifically, fixation cells were 
located in the rostral pole of the superior colliculus; burst cells and buildup cells were 
located in all regions of the superior colliculus except the rostral pole.  They suggested 
that, during periods of visual fixation, fixation cell activity suppressed the generation of 
saccades due to inhibitory connections between the fixation cells and saccade-related 
cells (see also, Trappenberg et al, 2001). The balance of activation between the fixation 
cells and buildup cells determined whether the animal fixated or made a saccade. 
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Related to the disengagement and engagement components of visual orienting, they 
proposed that saccade preparation would be associated with disengagement of attention 
from the current location (i.e. a gradual decrease in fixation cell activity) and 
engagement of attention at a new location (i.e. a simultaneous gradual increase in 
buildup cell activity approximately 100 ms prior to saccade onset). Due to the strong 
inhibitory connections between the fixation cells and the burst cells, the termination of 
fixation cell activity would lead to the disinhibition of saccade-related activity and, 
therefore, burst cell activity would occur approximately 25 ms prior to saccade onset. 
A number of computational models have been developed to account for the role 
of the superior colliculus in saccade generation (Meeter, Van der Stigchel, & Theeuwes, 
2010; Trappenberg et al., 2001). These models highlight that, due to its extensive 
connections with cortical and sub-cortical regions of the brain, the superior colliculus is 
able to integrate endogenous and exogenous inputs (Meeter et al., 2010; Trappenberg et 
al., 2001). Endogenous inputs are based on goal-directed factors such as task 
instructions and the intentions or expectations of the observer; exogenous inputs depend 
on low-level sensory properties of the stimuli in the visual environment (Meeter et al., 
2010; Trappenberg et al., 2001).  Meeter et al., (2010) argued that the integration of 
these endogenous and exogenous inputs is crucial in determining the target of the 
subsequent saccade. The target of an endogenous saccade will be a stimulus that is 
required for and relevant to the ongoing task and the target of an exogenous saccade 
will be a stimulus that captures oculomotor attention irrespective of the observer’s goals 
and expectations (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002).  
In a related model of saccade generation, Godijn and Theeuwes (2002) argued 
that it is essential to spatially separate endogenous and exogenous sources of 
information in order to determine whether a saccade is endogenous or exogenous. This 
Competitive Integration Model (Godijn and Theeuwes, 2002, 2003) suggests that 
mutual inhibition occurs when two spatially remote locations are activated by 
competing exogenous and endogenous sources of information. The activity associated 
with the endogenous and exogenous stimuli race to reach the threshold required for 
saccade generation and the winner of the race determines the location of the saccade. 
The endogenous stimulus can only reach the required level of activation if the 
exogenous stimulus is inhibited through top-down processes. Lateral inhibition of 
activation between the endogenous and exogenous stimuli extends the time required to 
reach the threshold level of activation and, therefore, saccade latencies to the 
endogenous stimulus are delayed.   
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 An alternative framework of saccade generation was proposed by Findlay and 
Walker (1999) in the form of a five-level information processing model (see Figure 
2.1). Although this model was set within the physiological background of saccadic eye 
movements (e.g., the brainstem circuitry and superior colliculus), its main focus was on 
describing a hierarchy of information processing levels, where automatic processes 
operate at the lower levels (Levels 1-3) and cognitive influences operate at the higher 
levels (Levels 4 and 5). Their model is comprised of descending influences such that 
higher levels can have an impact on lower levels, but not vice versa. They proposed that 
there are two parallel components of the oculomotor system: a ‘When’ system that 
influences the timing and duration of fixations and a ‘Where’ system that influences the 
direction and amplitude of saccades.  
 Level 1 of Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model involves the transmission of 
motor commands to the oculomotor muscles in the eye. At Level 2, there are inhibitory 
connections between a fixate centre and a move centre such that a decrease in fixate 
centre activity below a threshold results in the generation of a saccade. The direction 
and amplitude of the saccade is determined by activity in a spatial map. Specifically, 
inhibitory connections between different locations in the spatial map ensure that a 
salience peak occurs in one location in a winner-take-all manner and that the saccade is 
directed to this location. Visual events influence the oculomotor system at Level 3 of 
the model; central visual events affect the fixate centre with visual onsets promoting 
fixation and visual offsets promoting disengagement.  The move centre and the 
direction/amplitude of saccades are affected by peripheral visual events due to an 
increase in activity in the corresponding location in the spatial map. Findlay and Walker 
(1999) highlighted that peripheral visual events could also enhance activity in the fixate 
centre and they proposed that the physiological basis of this effect would be that 
peripheral stimuli activate fixation cells that exist beyond the rostral pole of the superior 
colliculus.  
Findlay and Walker (1999) proposed that although Level 4 of their model is 
affected by high level cognitive factors, it is ‘automated’ and occurs without conscious 
awareness. In the Level 4 ‘Where’ system, cognitive factors influence the spatial map 
such that it is more likely that saccades will be executed to particular locations (‘spatial 
selection’) or particular visual features (‘search selection’). In the Level 4 ‘When’ 
system, cognitive factors influence the duration of fixations to ensure that sufficient 
visual information is accumulated for the task at hand. Finally, Level 5 of the model 
involves the generation of voluntary saccades or the voluntary suppression of saccades 
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that have been programmed at lower automatic levels of the model. Decisions about the 
spatial locations or visual features that are of interest will be made at Level 5 and will 
have descending influences on Level 4 spatial selection and search selection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A model of saccade generation (from Findlay & Walker, 1999, p.662).  
Figure 2.1 has been removed for copyright purposes 
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2.5.2 Eye Movements and Attentional Biases to Threat in Anxiety 
Physiological and information processing accounts of oculomotor control and 
saccade generation can be used to explore how attentional biases in anxiety affect eye 
movements when there are threatening stimuli in the environment. This section will 
primarily use Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model to generate predictions about eye 
movement behaviour in individuals with high levels of anxiety in relation to selective 
attention to threat, impaired attentional control and hypervigilance for threat. Findlay 
and Walker’s (1999) model provides a useful framework because it highlights the role 
of cognitive factors (i.e., threat processing) in saccade generation. Additionally, the 
models of saccade generation that focus on the integration of exogenous and 
endogenous inputs to the superior colliculus (e.g., Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002, 2003; 
Meeter et al., 2010; Trappenberg et al., 2001) are likely to be especially pertinent in 
understanding the relationship between anxiety and impaired attentional control.  
If the anxiety-related threat bias is characterised by the selective allocation of 
attentional resources to threatening stimuli (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams et al., 
1997), then this should be evident in the search decisions that are generated at Level 4 
and Level 5 of Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model. Specifically, individuals with high 
levels of anxiety (vs. individuals with low levels of anxiety) should be biased to search 
for threat and this will influence activity in Findlay and Walker’s (1999) spatial map 
such that there is an enhanced or more rapid peak in activity at the locations 
corresponding to threatening stimuli. Given that saccade triggering is more likely if 
there is increased activity in the spatial map, this should lead to fast and accurate 
orienting to the source of threat in anxious individuals. If the peak in activity in the 
spatial map consistently corresponds to threatening stimuli irrespective of the 
complexity of the visual environment, then individuals with high levels of anxiety will 
demonstrate an increased ability to localise threat. This will ensure that the limited 
capacity cognitive system is more highly tuned to select high priority threat signals for 
further processing in anxiety. 
If the anxiety-related threat bias occurs as a consequence of impaired attentional 
control (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007), then this should be reflected in voluntary processes 
at Level 5 of Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model. Level 5 involves the voluntary 
generation or suppression of saccades and decisions about whether to move the eyes or 
fixate. In terms of the Competitive Integration Model of saccade generation (Godijn & 
Theeuwes, 2002, 2003; Meeters et al., 2010), these processes would involve using top-
down control to inhibit activation from exogenous threatening stimuli in order to make 
 53 
it possible to generate and execute an endogenous saccade to a task-relevant neutral 
stimulus.  
If the impairment in attentional control leads to attentional capture by threat, 
then individuals with high levels of anxiety should be unable to suppress exogenous 
saccades to threatening distractors presented in parafoveal or peripheral locations. 
Alternatively, individuals with high levels of anxiety may find it difficult to voluntarily 
execute endogenous saccades to task-relevant neutral stimuli in the presence of 
threatening distractors; this effect may be specific to threats presented within foveal 
vision or it may extend to threats in parafoveal and peripheral locations. Threatening 
distractors presented at central locations may promote fixation by enhancing fixation 
cell activity to a greater extent in anxious individuals and, therefore, lead to a difficulty 
disengaging from threat. Specifically, anxiety should be associated with a delay in 
suppressing this fixation cell activity below the threshold level required to generate an 
endogenous saccade to a task-relevant neutral stimulus. Threatening distractors 
presented outside foveal vision may delay voluntary saccades to task-relevant neutral 
stimuli for two reasons. Firstly, it is possible that the search decision and search 
selection mechanisms (Levels 4 and 5 in Findlay & Walker’s model) are still incorrectly 
biased towards searching for threat in anxiety despite the presence of conflicting task 
demands. Therefore, anxiety would be associated with a greater level of competition 
and more time-consuming conflict resolution between threatening distractors and task-
relevant neutral stimuli in Findlay and Walker’s (1999) spatial map. Secondly, it is 
possible that, like central threatening distractors, peripheral and parafoveal distractors 
also promote fixation to a greater extent in anxious individuals due to enhanced activity 
in the fixation cells that exist beyond the rostral pole of the superior colliculus.  
 If the anxiety-related threat bias is characterised by hypervigilance for threat 
(e.g., Eysenck, 1992), then this would be a strategy implemented at Levels 4 or 5 of 
Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model. Anxious individuals may voluntarily suppress 
saccades and promote fixation in order to maintain a broad focus of attention and ensure 
that, in terms of spatial selection, the entire visual field is selected. Alternatively, they 
might voluntarily execute numerous saccades in order to scan the environment for threat 
and ensure that the duration of fixations and the extent of cognitive processing is 
minimised until threat is located.  
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2.5.3 Summary and Research Questions 
 The vast majority of the literature on anxiety and attention has utilised RT 
measures in isolation; these measures are limited because they can only indicate the 
time taken to complete a task and they are unable to elucidate the processes or 
mechanisms that underlie the selection, inhibition and detection of threat. In contrast, a 
consideration of the eye movement behaviour of anxious individuals can provide further 
insight into the spatial and temporal characteristics of threat processing in anxiety. In 
relation to visual search tasks, for example, Zelinsky and Sheinberg (1997) argued that 
eye movements describe the spatiotemporal process of search, whereas RTs to detect 
the target only provide information about the completion of the search process. 
Although there is a growing literature on eye movements in anxiety (e.g., Derakshan et 
al., 2009; Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2000, 2007), this area remains relatively 
under-researched.  
 It is argued in this thesis that an understanding of the oculomotor system is 
likely to be both important and beneficial to testing and extending the conceptual 
frameworks of anxiety and attention. Eye movement measures, in conjunction with the 
use of appropriate paradigms, have the potential to provide information about the 
processes and mechanisms involved in the anxiety-related threat bias. It is argued that 
localisation is a mechanism that underlies attentional selection and, therefore, 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) considered selective attention to threat by assessing whether 
individuals with high levels of anxiety were able to rapidly and accurately move their 
eyes towards (i.e. locate) threatening stimuli. Experiment 2 (Chapter 4) used an eye 
movement paradigm to distinguish between the different attentional processes that 
could account for an inability to inhibit threat processing in anxiety (e.g., attentional 
capture or delayed disengagement from task-irrelevant threat). This experiment 
considered whether individuals with high levels of anxiety were unable to suppress 
exogenous saccades to threatening distractors and/or were slow to execute endogenous 
saccades towards task-relevant stimuli in the presence of threatening distractors. 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 5) aimed to establish whether enhanced threat detection in 
anxiety occurred within a broad focus of attention with few eye movements or a narrow 
focus of attention with numerous eye movements. This experiment considered the 
possibility that if anxious individuals maintain a broad focus of attention, then they may 
be able to integrate information from multiple threats presented in different locations 
across the visual field in order to facilitate threat detection. Experiment 4 (Chapter 6) 
explored the possibility that, contrary to the notion of selective attention to threat, 
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individuals with high levels of anxiety would find it difficult to rapidly and accurately 
move their eyes towards (i.e., locate) a single threat if multiple threats were present in 
the visual environment.  
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Chapter 3 : Anxiety and the Localisation of Threatening and Non-Threatening Faces 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Several conceptual frameworks of anxiety and attention propose that anxiety is 
associated with selective attention to threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). Selective attention 
involves orienting attentional resources to the location of interest (Yiend, 2010) and, 
therefore, a selective attentional bias to threat requires the rapid and accurate 
localisation of threatening stimuli. The principal aim of this study was to assess whether 
anxiety is associated with enhanced localisation of threatening stimuli using a visual 
search paradigm and an eye movement methodology.  
 
3.1.1 The Visual Search Paradigm 
Visual search studies in anxiety research have typically been used to assess 
threat detection by measuring RTs to make a key-press response (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995; Matsumoto, 2010). In contrast, eye movement measures have been employed in 
visual search studies outside the field of anxiety to assess target localisation (Brown, 
Huey, & Findlay, 1997; Findlay, 1997; McSorley & Findlay, 2001). This task requires 
participants to look at the target as quickly and accurately as possible, where the target 
is present on every trial. Some researchers suggest that target detection and target 
localisation involve similar search processes (Sagi & Julesz, 1985). Others suggest that 
target localisation provides a more accurate measure of search efficiency because it is 
not associated with a tendency to make premature decisions about the presence or 
absence of a target (Dukewich & Klein, 2009).  On a more practical level, Dukewich 
and Klein (2009) argued that searching in everyday situations typically involves 
locating an item that is known to be present, rather than deciding whether an item is 
present or absent.  
A number of visual search studies have used eye movement measures to 
consider search for threatening faces among healthy individuals (Calvo, Nummenmaa, 
& Avero, 2008; Reynolds, Eastwood, Partanen, Frischen, & Smilek, 2009) or search for 
spiders and snakes among individuals who are fearful of spiders/snakes (Miltner et al., 
2004; Rinck et al., 2005). Reynolds et al (2009), for example, presented participants 
with displays of different set sizes containing one negative or positive schematic target 
face presented amongst neutral distractors. Participants were instructed to indicate with 
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a manual response whether the discrepant face in each display was positive or negative. 
They measured the number of fixations and the time taken prior to first target fixation as 
a function of set size. They found that the number of fixations and the time taken prior 
to first target fixation increased with increasing set size. They also found that negative 
target faces were fixated more rapidly and after fewer fixations compared with positive 
target faces and that this difference increased with increasing set size; resulting in a 
shallower search slope for negative faces. The shallower search slope suggests that it is 
easier to orient towards and select a negative face compared with a positive face as the 
complexity of the visual environment and the demands on the selective attentional 
mechanism increase (i.e. with the addition of distractors). Indeed, Reynolds et al. (2009) 
concluded that negative faces guide attention more efficiently compared with positive 
faces.  
Increased search efficiency for angry faces has not always been replicated in eye 
movement studies (Calvo, Avero, & Lundqvist, 2006; Calvo et al., 2008; Hunt, Cooper, 
Hungr, & Kingstone, 2007). Calvo et al (2008), for example, presented an angry, happy, 
disgusted, surprised, fearful or sad target face amongst six neutral distractors. 
Participants were asked to indicate with a manual response whether a discrepant face 
was present or absent. They found that happy, disgusted and surprised target faces were 
fixated more rapidly and following fewer fixations compared with angry, sad and 
fearful target faces. Thus, there is currently insufficient evidence to conclude that 
healthy individuals orient to threatening faces with greater speed and accuracy 
compared with non-threatening faces (or vice versa). However, anxiety should moderate 
search for and localisation of threatening faces if there is a selective attentional bias to 
threat (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997; Williams et al., 1997).  
A recent study considered anxiety and concurrently measured eye movements 
during a visual search detection task (Derakshan & Koster, 2010). Derakshan and 
Koster (2010) presented eight faces (angry, happy or neutral) in peripheral locations and 
instructed participants to press a button if there was a discrepant face. They assessed 
whether anxiety affected initial orienting to threat by considering eye movements prior 
to the first fixation on the target face. They found that, although all participants fixated 
on emotional crowds more often and for longer compared with neutral crowds, this 
effect was not modulated by trait anxiety. Furthermore, they found no evidence to 
indicate that trait anxiety was related to the speed of fixating threatening targets. They 
concluded that the threat bias in anxiety is neither associated with delays in disengaging 
visual attention from threat nor does it facilitate initial orienting of visual attention to 
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threat. However, they did report that the time taken to manually respond to the target 
and the number of crowd fixations after the first target fixation was greater in high (vs. 
low) trait anxious individuals when an emotional target was presented amongst 
emotional distractors. They concluded that, following first fixation on the target, there 
was an impairment in target processing efficiency in anxiety. Although Derakshan and 
Koster (2010) found no evidence to indicate that anxiety affected initial orienting or 
disengagement of visual attention from threat during a detection task, it remained 
possible that these effects would be apparent under experimental conditions that 
explicitly require the localisation of threatening faces.   
 
3.1.2 The Current Study 
The current study tested the prediction that anxiety is associated with enhanced 
localisation of threatening (but not non-threatening faces). Individuals with high levels 
of anxiety should be able to locate threatening faces with greater speed, accuracy and 
efficiency compared with non-anxious individuals if anxiety is characterised by a 
selective attentional bias to threat. The purpose of enhanced localisation would be to 
ensure that the area of highest visual acuity, the fovea, was directed to high priority 
threat signals such that they could be processed in more detail. It would also ensure that 
low priority non-threat signals in the environment received minimal attentional 
processing. A visual search task was used to assess localisation; participants were 
presented with a single upright target face (threatening or non-threatening) presented 
amongst varying numbers of inverted distractor faces. In line with previous visual 
search studies measuring eye movements (e.g., Brown et al., 1997; Findlay, 1997), 
participants were required to look at the target as quickly and accurately as possible and 
the target was present on every trial.  
To consider localisation performance, the current study primarily focused on the 
accuracy and latency of first saccades that landed on target faces presented in peripheral 
regions of the visual field (see Findlay, 1997 for a similar approach). These initial eye 
movement measures were interpreted as indicators of search efficiency (in line with 
McSorley & Findlay, 2001; Wolfe, 1998) where fast and accurate first saccades were 
indicative of an efficient search. However, Reynolds et al (2009) argued that measures 
of first saccade accuracy are limited because enhanced attentional guidance by one 
target (e.g. an angry face) compared with another target (e.g. a neutral face) may emerge 
slowly over time. Therefore, the current study also considered individual differences in 
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global eye movement measures which encompassed all saccades within each trial (e.g. 
the total time taken to locate the target). 
There were two further manipulations that allowed a consideration of the 
parameters of enhanced localisation and selective attention to threat in anxiety. Firstly, 
by manipulating set size it was possible to assess search slope gradients as an additional 
measure of the efficiency of locating threatening and non-threatening faces. Search 
slope measures provide a particularly meaningful index of an individual’s ability to 
assign processing priority to a target and ignore non-targets as the complexity of the 
visual environment increases (i.e., as the number of non-targets increases). If anxiety is 
characterised by an ability to selectively attend to threat regardless of the complexity of 
the visual environment, then this should be reflected in a shallow search slope where the 
speed and accuracy of locating a threat is unaffected by the number of non-threats in the 
environment. 
Secondly, the eccentricity of the target was manipulated (i.e., parafoveal or 
peripheral targets) because it is widely acknowledged that visual search performance 
deteriorates, in terms of accuracy and RTs, as the retinal eccentricity of the target 
increases (Carrasco, Mclean, Katz, & Frieder, 1998; Meinecke & Donk, 2002; Wolfe, 
O'Neill, & Bennett, 1998).  Carrasco et al (1998) argued that this eccentricity effect can 
be explained by the physiological constraints of the visual system, such as a gradual 
decline in spatial resolution as a function of retinal eccentricity. These findings raise the 
possibility that the attentional bias to angry faces in anxious individuals will become 
more apparent as target eccentricity decreases because the quality and quantity of 
information extracted from threatening stimuli should be greater if they are presented in 
parafoveal locations compared with peripheral locations.   
Thus, the first aim of the study was to consider whether the speed and accuracy 
of locating threatening faces presented in peripheral regions of the visual field was 
influenced by anxiety as indexed by first saccade and global eye movement measures. It 
was predicted that anxiety would be associated with greater speed and accuracy in 
locating threatening (but not non-threatening faces) and, furthermore, that this would be 
evident as early as the first saccade. The second aim was to employ search slope 
measures to assess whether anxiety was related to an ability to localise threat 
irrespective of the number of distractors in the visual field. It was predicted that anxiety 
would be associated with shallower search slopes for threatening (but not non-
threatening) faces. The third aim was to assess the possibility that enhanced localisation 
of threatening faces in anxiety, as indexed by the accuracy and latency of the first 
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saccade, would be particularly evident in visual search displays in which targets were 
presented in parafoveal locations. 
 
3.2 General Method 
 
 Before providing specific methodological details related to the current 
experiment, this section will outline details that are consistent across the experiments 
presented in this thesis.  
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Healthy adults participated in all studies for course credit or a small monetary 
incentive. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
provided informed written consent (see Appendix A for examples of the consent and 
debriefing forms).  
 
3.2.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
Display items were photographic colour faces from the NimStim face set 
(Tottenham et al., 2009) displaying angry, happy and neutral expressions. The 16 most 
reliable models (8 male; 8 female) from this database were selected for inclusion in this 
work based on rating responses provided by 24 undergraduate students in a pilot study 
(see Appendix B for the rating responses associated with these 16 models). This subset 
of the NimStim faces included European-American, Asian-American, Latino-American 
and African-American models. Four additional models from the NimStim face set (2 
male; 2 female) were used as stimuli for practice trials. Each face was set into an oval 
template. Areas outside the oval and non-face features within the oval (for example, the 
neck, hair and shoulders) were replaced with a black background.  
Throughout the experiments, the faces could be presented in central, parafoveal 
or peripheral locations. In a pilot study with 4 postgraduate students (see Appendix C), 
it was found that the expression (angry, happy or neutral) of a face could be determined 
with 97.73% (SD = 1.56) and 94.97% (SD = 2.73) accuracy in parafoveal and peripheral 
locations, respectively. This is important as it indicates that threatening (angry) and 
non-threatening (happy and neutral) faces could be recognised with a high level of 
accuracy at the eccentricities used in the reported experiments.  
The experiments were created and implemented using Experiment Builder 
software (SR Research Ltd.) and presented on a 20 inch monitor (1280 x 1024 
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resolution). Although viewing was binocular, the vertical and horizontal movements of 
the right eye were sampled monocularly at a rate of 1000 Hz. The majority of the 
participants in Experiment 1 (n = 39, 74%) and Experiment 2 (n = 43, 72%) completed 
the tasks at a viewing distance of 57 cm using an Eyelink 1000 Tower Mount eye-
tracking system (SR Research Ltd.). Due to a change in the equipment at the University 
of Southampton, 14 participants in Experiment 1, 17 participants in Experiment 2 and 
all participants in Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 completed the tasks at a viewing 
distance of 70 cm using an Eyelink 1000 Desk Mount eye tracking system (SR 
Research Ltd.).  
In order to accommodate these equipment changes, the size of all display items 
(targets and distractors) and the distance between the display items, in pixels, was 
increased by 23% to ensure that they occupied the same horizontal and vertical visual 
angles and were presented at the same eccentricities at both viewing distances. The 
faces were 134 x 208 pixels in size (4.2° horizontally and 6.5° vertically) at a viewing 
distance of 57 cm and 165 x 256 pixels in size (4.2° horizontally and 6.5° vertically) at a 
viewing distance of 70 cm. Viewing distance (57 cm vs. 70 cm) did not have a 
significant effect on any of the dependent variables reported in Experiment 1 or 
Experiment 2 when the analyses were repeated with viewing distance entered as a 
covariate.  
The Eyelink 1000 system is video-based and uses corneal reflection tracking in 
combination with pupil tracking. This system uses an on-line parser to identify and 
analyse the components of the eye movement data stream (e.g., saccades and fixations). 
It uses saccade detection methods that identify saccades based on velocity, acceleration 
and motion thresholds. A saccade signal is generated if the eye movement velocity 
exceeds 30°/second or if the eye movement acceleration exceeds 8000°/second2. The 
motion threshold ensures that a saccade is only detected when the amplitude of the eye 
movement is greater than 0.1°.  
 
3.2.3 Materials 
Primarily, the empirical work presented throughout this thesis is concerned with 
the relationship between trait anxiety and threat processing as this is emphasised in the 
cognitive models of anxiety. However, Chapter 2 highlighted that there is evidence of a 
threat bias in trait anxious (Bradley et al., 1998; Byrne & Eysenck, 1995), state anxious 
(Mogg et al., 1997), socially anxious (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002) and clinically anxious (Eastwood et al., 2005; MacLeod et al., 1986) 
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individuals. Therefore, the existing empirical studies have provided no evidence to 
indicate that the threat bias is specific to a particular form of anxiety. In order to 
consider the specificity of the threat bias, the experiments reported in this thesis 
considered the effects of trait anxiety, state anxiety and social anxiety. In line with 
previous research, social anxiety was conceptualised as two distinct types of social fear: 
a fear of public scrutiny and negative evaluation and; fear and distress when interacting 
with other people (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). Participants completed the state and trait 
versions of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983), the full version of the 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) and the Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). It was not considered necessary to recruit 
clinical samples due to the dimensional nature of anxiety.  
Participants also completed the Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002) due to the emphasis placed on impaired attentional control in recent cognitive 
models of anxiety (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001, 2002),. In line with ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007), it was predicted that there would be an inverse relationship 
between anxiety and attentional control. It was further predicted that low levels of 
attentional control would have a negative effect on performance in each experiment (for 
threatening and non-threatening stimuli) due to an inability to focus attention on the 
task.  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory is a self-report measure of state and trait 
anxiety.  The state scale (STAI-S) consists of 20 items asking participants to rate how 
they feel ‘at this moment’ on a 4-point Likert response scale (ranging from ‘not at all’ to 
‘very much so’).  The trait scale (STAI-T) consists of 20 items asking participants to 
rate how they ‘generally feel’ on a 4-point Likert response scale (ranging from ‘almost 
never’ to ‘almost always’). The possible range of scores on each scale is 20-80. The 
STAI-S and STAI-T have good internal consistency with Cronbach’s α values ranging 
from .91 to .93 (Endler, Cox, Parker, & Bagby, 1992).    
The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNES) assesses the participant’s 
expectation of being negatively evaluated, their apprehension about receiving negative 
evaluation, and their avoidance of being evaluated. Participants are asked to rate 30 
statements as true or false. A total FNES score can range from 0-30. The FNES has 
good internal consistency (Kuder-Richardson 20 = .93 (Rodebaugh et al., 2004)).  
The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) is a 19-item instrument that 
assesses the extent to which the participant feels distress when interacting (e.g. meeting 
or talking) with other people. Participants are asked to indicate on a 5-point response 
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scale (ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’) how much each statement is 
characteristic of them. The possible range of scores on this questionnaire is 0-76. This 
scale has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .90 in a community sample 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998)).  
 The Attentional Control Scale (ACS) consists of 20 items which the participant 
rates on a 4-point response scale (ranging from ‘almost never’ to ‘always’) according to 
how much they feel the statement is true of them. The ACS assesses two forms of 
attentional control: attentional focusing (e.g., ‘When I need to concentrate and solve a 
problem, I have trouble focusing my attention’) and attentional shifting (e.g., ‘I can 
easily switch from one task to another’). The internal consistency of the total score is 
acceptable (Cronbach’s α = .88; (Derryberry & Reed, 2002)). Total scores on this scale 
can range from 20-80. 
 See Appendix D for the full list of questions and the response scales for these 
self-report questionnaires.  
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
In each study, the order of presentation of the experimental blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants following a Latin Square design. The order of trials 
within each block was fully randomised for each participant. Eye movement recording 
began after the completion of practice trials. The recording phase started with a 
calibration and validation process; participants sequentially fixated 9 dots presented in a 
3 x 3 array on the screen. 
Participants completed the SIAS prior to the day of testing. On the day of 
testing, participants completed the STAI-S immediately prior to the eye tracking task 
and the STAI-S, STAI-T, FNES and ACS immediately following the eye tracking task 
(the only exceptions were that the STAI-S was not completed prior to the eye tracking 
task in Experiment 1 and the FNES was not completed in Experiment 2). Participants 
were fully debriefed after completing the questionnaires. 
  
3.2.5 Data Preparation 
 Exclusion criteria. Data Viewer software (SR Research Ltd.) was used to view 
and prepare the data for analysis. Trials were removed from the data set if: 1) the 
fixation location at the beginning of the trial was more than one degree away from the 
centre of the screen; 2) an anticipatory eye movement occurred (defined as first 
saccades with latencies less than 80 ms (Wenban-Smith & Findlay, 1991)); 3) a blink 
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occurred. First saccades were defined as the earliest saccade in a trial with amplitude 
greater than one degree; if the initial saccade was less than one degree, then it was 
removed and replaced by the subsequent saccade.   
Participant characteristics. For purely descriptive purposes, the percentage of 
participants reporting ‘high’ levels of anxiety was calculated for each questionnaire 
measure in each experiment. There are no fixed clinical cut-off scores provided in the 
development of the self-report measures of anxiety used in this thesis. However, 
following conventions adopted in previous research (Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, & 
Liebowitz, 1992; Millar, Jelicic, Bonke, & Asbury, 1995), a cut-off was derived for 
each scale at one standard deviation above the mean. The mean and standard deviation 
used in these calculations were based on norms provided in the development of each 
scale from community samples. In a community sample of adults aged 19-39, 
Spielberger (1983) reported means on the STAI-T of 35.55 (SD = 9.76) for males and 
36.15 (SD = 9.53) for females and means on the STAI-S of 36.54 (SD = 10.22) for 
males and 36.17 (SD = 10.96) for females. Therefore, the cut-off value derived for the 
STAI-T and STAI-S was 46 based on a mean of 36 and a standard deviation of 10. 
Mattick and Clarke (1998) reported a mean of 18.8 and a standard deviation of 11.8 in a 
community sample and, therefore, the cut-off value on this scale was 31.  Finally, 
Watson and Friend (1969) reported a mean of 15.47 and a standard deviation of 8.62 in 
a sample of college students and, therefore, the cut-off value on this scale was 24. 
 
3.2.6 Data Analysis 
In each experiment, data analysis consisted of an analysis of the basic effects 
associated with the paradigm across participants and, more importantly, an analysis of 
the effects of anxiety and attentional control on task performance for threatening and 
non-threatening faces. The analysis of the basic effects was typically conducted using 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The effects of anxiety and 
attentional control were considered using multiple regression analyses. In all regression 
analyses, attentional control scores were the combined total from the attentional 
focusing and attentional shifting subscales. 
The inclusion of all anxiety measures within the regression models raised the 
possibility of high mulitcollinearity. Multicollinearity between the predictors should be 
regarded as too high if correlations between the predictors have a coefficient greater 
than .80, if the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for any single predictor is greater than 
10, if the average VIF across all predictors is substantially greater than 1 or if the 
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tolerance statistic (1/VIF) is below .2 (Field, 2005). For all multiple regression analyses 
conducted throughout the empirical studies, the correlation coefficients between the 
predictors were less than .80, all of the predictors had a VIF value below 3.80 and an 
average VIF less than 2.33 and the tolerance statistics for each predictor were greater 
than .26. Therefore, the level of multicollinearity between the predictors was acceptable 
for these analyses to be conducted in all experiments.  
Theoretical accounts of anxiety have raised the possibility that the attentional 
bias to threat in high trait anxious individuals is particularly apparent when there are 
also high levels of state anxiety (Eysenck, 1992; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) or low levels 
of attentional control (Lonigan et al., 2004). The current work made no attempt to 
manipulate state anxiety or to ensure that there were equivalent numbers of high trait 
anxious individuals with high and low levels of attentional control. However, 
exploratory correlational analyses were conducted to verify that the threat bias was 
consistent across individuals with high levels of anxiety rather than pertaining to a 
subsection of anxious individuals. Specifically, correlations were conducted between 
the dependent variables and the interaction terms for state anxiety x trait anxiety and for 
trait anxiety x attentional control. These interactions were not included in the regression 
analyses because they substantially increased the level of multicollinearity in the 
regression models. Exploratory correlations were also conducted to consider the 
associations between the dependent variables and the separate subscales of the ACS 
(i.e., attentional focusing and attentional shifting). 
An item analysis was conducted in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. For each of 
the 16 models, the dependent variables were calculated for each expression in every 
type of display. The basic analyses were repeated to assess the effects of the 
independent variables on the model means. The purpose of this analysis was to replicate 
the basic effects from the participant analysis, thereby confirming that the effects could 
not be attributed to any specific model(s).  
Note that all statistical tests were two-tailed with an alpha level of .05.   
 
3.3 Method for the Current Study 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
Fifty-three healthy adults participated in the experiment (mean age = 20.80 
years, SD = 3.22, range = 18-33 years; 11 males).  
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3.3.2 Stimuli  
The target and distractor stimuli used in this experiment were the 20 models 
described in Section 3.2.2 (i.e., consisting of 16 models for the experimental trials and 
four models for the practice trials). The visual search displays contained one target face 
(angry, happy or neutral) in an upright orientation set amongst one, three or seven 
distractor faces in an inverted orientation. Within each display, the distractors were 
identical to the target with the exception of the 180° rotation. The rationale for making 
the target and distractors identical was to eliminate low level feature differences 
between the display items (Cave & Batty, 2006). Eight-peripheral displays contained a 
circular array of eight faces; four of these were removed to create the four-peripheral 
displays; two-peripheral displays contained two faces positioned on the horizontal axis.  
Two-parafoveal displays were identical to two-peripheral displays with the exception of 
target eccentricity. When the viewing distance was 57 cm, the centre of each face was 
positioned at 144 pixels (4.5° eccentricity) from the centre of the display in the 
parafoveal condition, and at 288 pixels (9° eccentricity) from the centre of the display in 
the peripheral condition. When the viewing distance was 70 cm, the centre of the 
parafoveal and peripheral stimuli were presented at 177 pixels (4.5° eccentricity) and 
354 pixels (9° eccentricity), respectively, from the centre of the screen. See Figure 3.1A 
for an example of each type of display. 
 
3.3.3 Design  
Within-subject factors were set size (8, 4, 2), eccentricity (parafoveal and 
peripheral) and target expression (angry, happy, and neutral). Between-subject factors 
were self-reported anxiety and attentional control. 
The dependent variables were defined as follows: a) Percentage of accurate first 
saccades: accurate saccades were those that landed on or within one degree of the target; 
b) Latency of the accurate first saccades: the elapsed time between the onset of the 
visual search display and the initiation of the first saccade; c) Total time taken to locate 
the target: the elapsed time between the onset of the visual search display and the time 
at which the eye landed on the target; d) Success rate: the percentage of trials in which a 
saccade landed on or within 1 degree of the target, irrespective of how many saccades 
were executed in this process before the offset of the display; e) Gradient of the search 
slope (accuracy): search slopes were generated by regressing the percentage of accurate 
first saccades against set size for every participant and for each expression separately 
(using peripheral displays only); f) Gradient of the search slope (total time taken): 
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search slopes were generated by regressing the total time taken to locate the target 
against set size for every participant and for each expression separately (using 
peripheral displays only).  
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Figure 3.1. Example stimulus displays for each condition and an example of a trial 
sequence in the visual search task.   
Note: (A) Examples of: (1) eight-peripheral displays; (2) four-peripheral displays; (3) two-
peripheral displays; (4) two-parafoveal displays; (a) angry displays; (b) happy displays; (c) 
neutral displays. (B) An example of a trial sequence. 
Figure 3.1 has been removed for copyright purposes 
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3.3.4 Procedure 
Participants completed four blocks of trials, one block for each different set size 
for the peripheral displays and one block for the parafoveal displays. Each block 
contained 20 practice trials and 96 experimental trials. Within each block, there were an 
equal proportion of trials associated with each expression and the target appeared in 
every possible location with an equal frequency. Findlay and Walker (1999) 
distinguished between search selection (a tendency to execute saccades to a particular 
visual feature) and spatial selection (a tendency to execute saccades to a particular 
location) in Level 4 of their information processing model (see Figure 2.1). Therefore, 
the rationale for blocking by set size and eccentricity was to ensure that the region of 
space selected for search was constant within a block of trials (i.e. to minimise 
individual differences in spatial selection). Instead, the current study was primarily 
concerned with individual differences in search selection (e.g., a bias to execute 
saccades to angry faces in anxious individuals). 
A trial began with a centrally-located white fixation cross, presented on a black 
background until the participant had fixated within one degree of the centre of the 
screen for 200 ms (the fixation cross was presented for a minimum duration of 1000 
ms). A visual search display followed for 1000 ms. The inter-stimulus interval was 1000 
ms. See Figure 3.1B for an example of the trial sequence. Participants were instructed to 
look at the upright face as quickly and as accurately as possible in every trial. 
 
3.3.5 Data Preparation 
Exclusion criteria. In addition to the general exclusion criteria outlined in 
Section 3.2.5, trials were removed if the accurate or inaccurate first saccade latency was 
more than 3 standard deviations away from the participant’s mean accurate or 
inaccurate first saccade latency, respectively. Very long latency saccades are frequently 
discarded in eye movement studies because they are less likely to be elicited by the 
stimuli presented in the display and may, for example, reflect lapses in attention. Three 
participants were completely removed from the analysis because at least 2/3 of their 
trials had to be excluded from one or more experimental blocks. In the remaining 50 
participants (mean age = 20.58 years, SD = 3.10, range = 18-33; 10 males), 8.67% of 
the trials were removed based on the exclusion criteria. Furthermore, the amplitude of 
the initial saccade was smaller than 1 degree in 4.2% of the trials; in these cases, the 
initial saccade was removed and replaced by the subsequent saccade.  
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Participant characteristics.  The mean total scores and the internal consistency 
for each questionnaire are provided in Table 3.1. In the current sample, 14 participants 
(28%) scored 46 or more on the STAI-T, seven participants (14%) scored 46 or more on 
the STAI-S, 14 participants (28%) scored 31 or more on the SIAS and 14 participants 
(28%) scored 24 or more on the FNES.  
The inter-correlations between the measures of individual differences and age 
are presented in Table 3.2. Note that Spearman’s rank correlations were conducted with 
age due to the skewed distribution of this variable; Pearson’s product moment 
correlations were conducted in all other cases because the scores on the questionnaire 
measures were normally distributed. As expected, the anxiety measures were positively 
correlated with one another and negatively correlated with attentional control.  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency for the questionnaire measures and age.  
 
 
Table 3.2. Inter-correlations between self-reported anxiety and attentional control measures and age.  
 1 2  3 4  5  6 a 
1. Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) - .61*** .63*** .63*** -.61*** .12 
2. State Anxiety (STAI-S)   - .37** .39** -.57*** .17 
3. Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS)   - .64*** -. 50*** .20 
4. Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNES)    - -.40** .23 
5. Attentional Control (ACS)     - .17 
6. Age (in years) a      - 
a  A Spearman’s rs was calculated for this variable due to its skewed distribution (Pearson’s r was calculated for all other variables).  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, p < .10 
 
 M SD Minimum 
(lower limit) 
Maximum 
(upper limit) 
Cronbach’s α 
Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 39.66 10.22 20 (20) 62 (80) .93 
State Anxiety (STAI-S) 35.50 9.71 21 (20) 57 (80) .93 
Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) 23.32 13.56 0 (0) 57 (76) .94 
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNES) 17.68 7.69 1 (0) 29 (30) .92 
Attentional Control (ACS) 51.10 7.73 33 (20) 68 (80) .82 
Age (in years) 20.58 3.10 18 33 na 
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3.3.6 Data Analysis 
The principal question of interest was whether individual differences in anxiety 
or attentional control were associated with enhanced search efficiency and enhanced 
localisation for threatening (and not non-threatening) faces. Multiple regression 
analyses were conducted to consider the effects of anxiety and attentional control on 
search performance. The forced entry method was used for each multiple regression; 
that is, the five predictors (trait anxiety, state anxiety, social interaction anxiety, fear of 
negative evaluation and attentional control) were entered into the regression model 
simultaneously. This was an appropriate regression method because, while there were 
good theoretical reasons for including the five predictors, there was no rationale for 
assigning greater importance to one predictor over another. Furthermore, exploratory 
correlations were conducted between the dependent variables and the interaction term 
for state anxiety x trait anxiety, the interaction term for trait anxiety x attentional control 
and the separate attentional focusing and attentional shifting subscales of the ACS.   
There were three stages of data analysis, which corresponded to the three aims 
of the study. Analyses explored whether anxiety was associated with: 1) enhanced 
localisation of peripheral threat as indexed by the speed and accuracy of directing the 
eyes towards a peripheral angry face and; 2) enhanced search efficiency for angry faces 
as assessed by search slope gradients. In addition, it assessed whether enhanced 
localisation of threat in anxiety was more evident in parafoveal displays as indexed by 
the speed and accuracy of directing the eyes towards a parafoveal angry face. 
In addition to considering the effects of anxiety on search performance, it was 
important to test for the basic effects associated with the visual search paradigm. 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to establish whether the dependent 
variables were influenced by set size, target eccentricity or target expression across 
participants. The effect of set size was only considered in peripheral displays and the 
effect of eccentricity was only considered in displays containing two items because it 
would have been necessary to considerably reduce the size of the faces in order to 
construct parafoveal displays with four or eight display items.  
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3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Target Localisation in Peripheral Displays 
This analysis focused on the speed and accuracy of locating threatening and non-
threatening faces across participants and, critically, as a function of anxiety and 
attentional control.  
Basic effects. Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to assess 
the basic effects associated with the paradigm for the percentage of accurate first 
saccades and the total time taken to locate the target. Set size (eight-peripheral, four-
peripheral, two-peripheral) and expression (angry, happy, neutral) were entered as 
within-subject variables in each ANOVA. Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of accurate 
first saccades and the total time taken to locate the target for each expression and each 
set size. Note that it was not appropriate to consider the effect of set size on accurate 
first saccade latencies because the first saccade accuracy was at chance levels for a 
number of the participants on the eight-peripheral and four-peripheral displays. In 
addition, it was not appropriate to consider the effect of set size on success rate because 
performance in the four-peripheral and two-peripheral displays was close to ceiling 
levels across participants on this dependent variable (four-peripheral: M = 95.63%, SD 
= 4.17%; two-peripheral: M = 98.99%, SD = 0.68%).  
 Main effects were observed for set size on the percentage of accurate first 
saccades, F(2, 98) = 368.85, p < .001 and the total time taken to locate the target, F(2, 
98) = 335.18, p < .001. Table 3.3 shows the means for each set size. Accuracy of the 
first saccades decreased as set size increased and the total time taken to locate the target 
increased as set size increased (all pairwise comparisons were highly significant, ps < 
.001, ds > 1). This indicates that search performance deteriorated with increasing set 
size and that search for faces was carried out using inefficient search processes.  
There was a significant main effect of expression on the percentage of accurate 
first saccades, F(1.69, 82.57) = 6.26, p < .01 and the total time taken to locate the target, 
F(2, 98) = 20.21, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that: a) the percentage of 
accurate first saccades was significantly greater for angry faces compared with neutral 
faces (p < .01, d = 0.27) and; b) participants were significantly faster to locate angry 
faces compared with neutral faces (p < .001, d = 0.56), significantly faster to locate 
angry faces compared with happy faces (p < .01, d = 0.26) and significantly faster to 
locate happy faces compared with neutral faces (p < .01, d = 0.29). As outlined above, 
the success rate was not considered in displays containing four or two items. However, 
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a one-way ANOVA was conducted on eight-peripheral displays with expression entered 
as a within-subject variable. There was a main effect of expression on the success rate in 
eight-peripheral displays, F(2, 98) = 12.03, p < .001. This was due to a higher overall 
success rate for angry faces compared with neutral faces (p < .001, d = 0.58) and happy 
faces (p < .01, d = 0.48). Thus, angry faces were located with greater speed and 
accuracy compared with neutral faces and happy faces (although note that the 
percentage of accurate first saccades did not differ significantly for angry and happy 
targets). Furthermore, happy faces were located with greater speed than neutral faces. 
Table 3.4 presents the means for each expression. 
There were no significant interactions between expression and set size on the 
percentage of accurate first saccades or the total time taken to locate the target (all Fs < 
1.5, ns). This suggests that the effect of set size was consistent across all expressions 
and indicates that search efficiency was unaffected by the expression of the face.  
Anxiety. For each expression (collapsed across the peripheral set sizes), the 
percentage of accurate first saccades and the total time taken to locate the target in 
peripheral displays were regressed against the five predictors (trait anxiety, state 
anxiety, social interaction anxiety, fear of negative evaluation and attentional control). 
This analysis allowed a consideration of whether there was an overall effect of anxiety 
or attentional control on search performance; for example, it was predicted that anxiety 
would be associated with increased speed and accuracy in searching for angry faces, 
irrespective of set size. There were no significant regression models for any expression 
on either dependent variable, R2s < .11, Fs < 1, ns, and there were no significant 
predictors within the models, │βs│ < .32, ps > .10. This indicates that neither anxiety 
nor attentional control predicted the speed or accuracy of localising peripheral target 
faces, irrespective of expression. Spearman’s correlations between the interaction terms 
(trait anxiety x state anxiety and trait anxiety x attentional control) and the dependent 
variables were non-significant for each expression, ps > .10, ns, indicating that it is 
unlikely that enhanced localisation of threatening (or non-threatening) faces occurred in 
the specific subsections of high trait anxious individuals who were high in state anxiety 
or low in attentional control. Pearson’s correlations between the separate attentional 
control subscales (attentional shifting and attentional focusing) and the dependent 
variables were also non significant for each expression, ps > .10, ns. 
 
 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Set Size
Two Four Eight
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
r
a
t
e
 
(
%
 
o
f
 
t
r
i
a
l
s
)
60
70
80
90
100
Set size
Two Four Eight
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
s
a
c
c
a
d
e
s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Set size
Two Four Eight
T
o
t
a
l
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
t
o
 
l
o
c
a
t
e
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
(
m
s
)
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
Angry
Happy
Neutral
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Mean (+SE) for the percentage of accurate first saccades (left), the total time taken to locate the target (middle) and the success rate (right) 
as a function of target expression and set size. 
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Table 3.3. Summary of the mean (+SD) for the percentage of accurate first saccades and the total time taken to locate the target as a function of set 
size (collapsed across expressions and based on peripheral displays only). 
 Eight-peripherala Four-peripheralb Two- peripheralc   
  M SD  M SD  M SD  p* 
Percentage of accurate first saccades  13.92 11.03  27.59 13.01  57.14 12.73  <.001abc 
Time taken to locate target (in ms)  604.61 48.51  508.95 61.09  390.84 54.59  <.001abc 
* p-values to indicate statistically significant pairwise comparisons, abc represents a significant difference between every pair of set sizes. 
 
Table 3.4. Summary of the mean (+SD) for the percentage of accurate first saccades, total time taken to locate the target, success rate and search 
slope gradients as a function of target expression (collapsed across set size and based on peripheral displays only). 
 Angry facesa Happy facesb Neutral facesc   
  M SD  M SD  M SD  p** 
Percentage of accurate first saccades  34.57 12.30  32.50 10.11  31.57 10.18  <.01ac 
Total time taken to locate the target (in ms)  488.78 48.65  501.22 47.59  514.41 42.78  <.01abc 
Success rate (%)* 82.00 11.03 76.84 10.39 75.59 11.10 <.01ac,ab 
Gradient of the search slope (%/item) -6.81 2.47 -6.59 2.33 -6.59 2.40 ns 
Gradient of the search slope (ms/item) 
 
33.17 10.04 
 
33.62 12.80 
 
35.08 13.44 
 
ns 
*Based on eight-peripheral displays only.  ** p-values to indicate statistically significant pairwise comparisons, ac represents a significant difference between angry and neutral faces, 
 ab represents a significant difference between angry and happy faces, abc represents a significant difference between every pair of expressions. 
 
 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
3.4.2 Search Efficiency in Peripheral Displays 
 This analysis focused on the relationship between the measures of individual 
differences and the speed and accuracy of locating a target face as a function of set size. 
Specifically, the gradient of the slope of the line was calculated for the percentage of 
accurate first saccades and the total time taken to locate the target by regressing these 
variables against set size for each expression separately. It was unnecessary to consider 
the effect of expression on search slopes across participants (i.e. the basic effect) in this 
analysis because the non-significant interactions between set size and expression in the 
preceding ANOVAs indicated that the effect of set size was consistent across 
expressions. Descriptive statistics for the gradients of the search slopes are presented in 
Table 3.4.  
For each expression separately, the search slopes for the percentage of accurate 
first saccades and the total time taken to locate the target were regressed against the five 
anxiety and attentional control predictors.  There were no significant regression models 
for any expression on either dependent variable, R2s < .06, Fs < 1, ns, and there were no 
significant predictors within the models, │βs│ < .27, ps > .10. Thus, neither anxiety nor 
attentional control predicted search efficiency for any expression. Spearman’s 
correlations between the interaction terms (trait anxiety x state anxiety and trait anxiety 
x attentional control) and the dependent variables were non-significant for each 
expression, ps > .10, ns; thus, there was no evidence to indicate that enhanced efficiency 
in searching for threat occurred in the subsection of high trait anxious individuals who 
were high in state anxiety or low in attentional control. Pearson’s correlations between 
the separate attentional control subscales (attentional shifting and attentional focusing) 
and the dependent variables were also non significant for each expression, ps > .10, ns. 
 
3.4.3 Eccentricity and Target Localisation 
This analysis considered the speed and accuracy of locating threatening and non-
threatening faces as a function of target eccentricity across participants. It also 
considered whether anxiety or attentional control affected the speed and accuracy of 
locating target faces in parafoveal displays.  
Basic effects. Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted with eccentricity 
(two-peripheral, two-parafoveal) and expression as within-subject variables. Figure 3.3 
shows the percentage of accurate first saccades and the latency of the accurate first 
saccades as a function of expression and eccentricity. The time taken to locate the target 
and the success rate were not included as dependent variables in the eccentricity 
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analysis because the first saccade measures are the only dependent variables that elicit 
meaningful variation in a comparison of displays containing only two items. For two-
parafoveal displays, the success rate was greater than 97% for all target expressions and 
the mean time taken to locate the target was 336.86 ms (SD = 48.47), 336.50 ms (SD = 
53.53) and 344.81 ms (SD = 57.27) for angry, happy and neutral faces, respectively. 
There was a significant effect of eccentricity, F(1, 49) = 20.53, p < .001, d = 
0.61, on first saccade accuracy in which the percentage of accurate first saccades in two-
parafoveal displays (M = 63.79, SD = 8.70) was significantly greater compared with 
two-peripheral displays (M = 57.14, SD = 12.73). There was a marginal effect of 
eccentricity on the latency of the accurate first saccades, F(1, 49) = 3.24, p = .078, d = 
0.19, where the latency of the accurate first saccades in the two-parafoveal displays (M 
= 225.21, SD = 57.49) was shorter compared with the two-peripheral displays (M = 
237.53, SD = 73.61). Therefore, the accuracy of the first saccades increased and the 
latency of the accurate first saccades decreased as target eccentricity decreased.  
There was a trend towards an effect of expression on first saccade accuracy, F(2, 
98) = 3.02, p = .053, which could be explained by a higher percentage of accurate first 
saccades to angry faces (M = 62.02, SD = 11.95) compared with neutral faces (M = 
59.11, SD = 10.32, p = .081, d = 0.26). In accordance with the previous expression 
findings, the percentage of accurate first saccades for happy faces (M = 60.26, SD = 
9.90) did not differ from angry or neutral faces. There was neither an effect of 
expression on the latency of accurate first saccades (Angry: M = 230.77 ms, SD = 
63.14; Happy: M = 231.19 ms, SD = 59.75; Neutral: M = 232.16 ms, SD = 62.79) nor an 
interaction between eccentricity and expression for the percentage of accurate first 
saccades or the latency of accurate first saccades (all Fs < 1, ns).  
Anxiety. The percentage of accurate first saccades in two-parafoveal displays 
and the latency of the accurate first saccades in two-parafoveal displays were regressed 
against the five anxiety and attentional control predictors. There were no significant 
regression models for any expression on either dependent variable, R2s < .09, Fs < 1, ns, 
and there were no significant predictors within the models, │βs│ < .32, ps > .10. This 
indicates that neither anxiety nor attentional control predicted the speed or accuracy of 
localising parafoveal target faces, irrespective of expression. Spearman’s correlations 
between the interaction terms (trait anxiety x state anxiety and trait anxiety x attentional 
control) and the dependent variables were non-significant for each expression, ps > .10, 
ns. Pearson’s correlations between the separate attentional control subscales (attentional 
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shifting and attentional focusing) and the dependent variables were also non significant 
for each expression, ps > .10, ns. 
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Figure 3.3. Mean (+ SE) for the percentage of accurate first saccades (left) and the 
latency of accurate first saccades (right) as a function of target expression and 
eccentricity (for displays containing two items).  
 
3.4.4 Item Analysis 
All of the above ANOVAs were repeated on the model means rather than the 
participant means. All of the significant effects involving set size, eccentricity and 
expression found in the preceding analyses were replicated in the item analysis. 
Therefore, these significant effects cannot be attributed to individual models.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
The present study aimed to establish whether anxiety is associated with 
enhanced localisation of threat. Specifically, it considered whether individuals with high 
levels of anxiety were quicker, more accurate and more efficient when searching for 
threatening (but not non-threatening) faces in parafoveal and peripheral regions of the 
visual field.  
The current study found that there was a bias in orienting towards angry faces in 
all individuals; angry faces were located with greater speed and accuracy compared with 
neutral and happy faces. This is consistent with previous target detection research 
reporting a search advantage for angry faces in studies measuring RTs (Fox et al., 2000; 
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Horstmann & Bauland, 2006; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) and eye movements 
(Reynolds et al., 2009). Thus, it could be argued that there was a selective attentional 
bias towards angry faces across participants. Despite this bias, it is important to note 
that angry faces were not consistently located with the initial orienting response and, 
furthermore, the speed and accuracy of locating an angry face decreased as search 
demands increased (i.e., as set size or eccentricity increased). That is, the localisation of 
angry faces occurred after an inefficient search. A potential limitation in the study is 
that this effect of expression might be driven by crowd effects. For example, if inverted 
angry faces were less distracting than inverted happy faces, then it is plausible that an 
angry target would be easier to locate than a happy target. However, this interpretation 
is deemed unlikely given that recent findings suggest that inversion disrupts emotion 
recognition to a similar extent across all intense facial expressions (Bould & Morris, 
2008).  
Contrary to predictions, this study provided no evidence to suggest that the 
initial orienting response (i.e. the first eye movement) or subsequent eye movements to 
angry faces were affected by anxiety. These findings are inconsistent with previous 
visual search studies measuring RTs, which indicate that anxiety is associated with 
greater speed and accuracy in detecting the presence of angry faces (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995; Matsumoto, 2010). Interestingly, a recent study found that anxiety was not 
associated with facilitated orienting towards threatening faces (Derakshan & Koster, 
2010); a finding that is consistent with the results of the current study. Taken together, 
findings from the current localisation task and from eye movement measures during a 
detection task (Derakshan & Koster, 2010) concur in suggesting that anxiety is not 
linked to rapid orienting to threat.  
It was predicted that anxiety would be associated with shallower search slopes 
for threatening (but not non-threatening faces) because the selective attentional bias to 
threat would allow anxious individuals to efficiently locate angry faces regardless of the 
complexity of the visual environment (i.e. the number of distractors). Contrary to this 
prediction, anxiety was not linked to shallower search slopes for angry faces; an 
inefficient search occurred in anxious and non-anxious individuals for all expressions. 
Thus, following previous eye tracking research (Brown et al., 1997; Calvo et al., 2008) 
and RT research (Fox et al., 2000), the present study found that searching for neutral or 
emotional faces was an inefficient process across all participants. Here, the accuracy of 
the first saccades decreased and the total time taken to locate the target increased as set 
size increased, indicating that participants located peripheral targets through multiple 
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overt shifts in attention. In contrast with Reynolds et al., (2009), there was no evidence 
to suggest that the search advantage for angry faces increased as set size increased; the 
gradients of the search slopes were unaffected by the expression of the target face.  One 
possible explanation for the discrepancy in results between the current study and those 
provided by Reynolds et al. (2009) is that the former explicitly required localisation of 
targets and the latter concurrently measured eye movements during a detection task. 
Given that localisation and detection require distinct attentional processes, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that differences in orienting responses occurred between the studies.  
The current study also predicted that enhanced localisation of threat would be 
particularly apparent in parafoveal locations because it should be possible to extract 
threatening information of greater quality and quantity due to increased visual acuity in 
these regions of the visual field. The results from the eccentricity analysis provided no 
evidence to suggest that an anxiety-related bias in localising threat occurred in 
parafoveal regions. However, in line with previous research (Carrasco et al., 1998), the 
accuracy of the first saccade increased as retinal eccentricity decreased across 
participants. Despite enhanced performance with decreasing eccentricity, the results 
suggested that it was not possible to consistently locate the target with the first eye 
movement in parafoveal regions of the retina in displays containing only two items.  
The accuracy of the first saccade for the two-peripheral (57.79%) and two-
parafoveal (64.29%) displays was considerably lower than reported in previous studies 
using two stimuli (Crouzet, Kirchner, & Thorpe, 2010; Kirchner & Thorpe, 2006). 
Kirchner and Thorpe (2006) found that 90.1% of first saccades were accurate when 
participants were presented with two natural scenes for 20 ms and asked to make a 
saccade as quickly as possible to the side containing an animal. Similarly, Crouzet et al., 
(2010) found that 94.5% of first saccades were accurate when participants were 
presented with two natural scenes for 400 ms and asked to make a saccade as quickly as 
possible to the side containing a face. A plausible explanation for the discrepancy in 
these accuracy levels is that target-distractor similarity, which is known to increase 
search difficulty (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989), was considerably greater in the current 
study compared with the studies conducted by Kirchner and Thorpe (2006) and Crouzet 
et al (2010).  
In addition to considering anxiety, the current study assessed the effects of 
attentional control. It was predicted that attentional control would be inversely 
associated with anxiety and positively associated with performance in the visual search 
task. That is, low levels of attentional control should be linked to elevated anxiety and 
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decreased efficiency in locating threatening and non-threatening faces in parafoveal and 
peripheral regions of the visual field. There was evidence to suggest that high levels of 
anxiety were associated with low levels of attentional control. However, there was no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that low levels of attentional control lead to poor 
performance on the visual search task. It could be argued that this visual search task did 
not require attentional control because it was not necessary to regulate orienting 
responses; deficits in performance may be more evident in individuals reporting low 
levels of attentional control in tasks that require the suppression of exogenous saccades 
to task-irrelevant stimuli in order to execute endogenous saccades to task-relevant 
stimuli.  
In summary, the current study provided no evidence to indicate that anxiety is 
associated with a greater ability to direct the spotlight of attention towards threat. 
Anxious individuals were neither faster nor more accurate in selectively focusing 
attention on a threatening stimulus such that it received processing priority while other 
non-threatening stimuli were ignored. This finding lies in stark contrast to the notion of 
selective attention to threat in anxious individuals (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et 
al., 1997). One possible reason for finding no evidence of enhanced localisation of 
threat is that anxiety may be characterised by an inability to regulate orienting 
responses, rather than an enhanced ability to generate orienting responses, in the 
presence of threat. It is possible that selective attention to threat only occurs when 
anxious individuals are required to use goal-directed attentional mechanisms to inhibit 
orienting responses to task-irrelevant threat such that they can focus attention on 
ongoing neutral tasks. This hypothesis is addressed in the next experiment.  
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Chapter 4 : Anxiety and Distraction from Threatening and Non-Threatening Faces 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous experiment found no evidence to indicate that anxiety was 
associated with selective attention to threat and performance enhancement in a task that 
involved responding to threatening stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007). However, it remained 
possible that anxiety would be characterised by an inability to regulate orienting 
responses to threatening stimuli when they are task-irrelevant and disruptive to ongoing 
task performance. It might be that individuals with high levels of anxiety are unable to 
prevent the spotlight of attention shifting to task-irrelevant threat (i.e. attentional 
capture) or that they are unable to disengage the spotlight of attention from task-
irrelevant threat. That is, selective attention to threat may only occur in anxiety when 
the stimulus-driven and goal-directed attentional systems are placed in direct 
competition (see Eysenck et al., 2007) and where task-irrelevant threat stimuli and task-
relevant neutral stimuli compete for attentional resources.  
The current study used the remote distractor paradigm to consider the effect of 
anxiety on the ability to use the goal-directed attentional system to regulate orienting 
responses in the presence of task-irrelevant threatening distractors. It explored the extent 
to which threatening distractors capture attention and interfere with ongoing processing. 
Resisting distractor interference is a top-down inhibitory process which involves 
suppressing distracting information and/or enhancing target information (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004) and, therefore, it is of direct relevance to theories of anxiety which 
suggest that anxiety is characterised by impaired attentional control (Eysenck et al., 
2007).  
 
4.1.1 The Remote Distractor Paradigm 
The remote distractor paradigm has been used to consider how task-irrelevant 
stimuli affect the oculomotor system as a function of their eccentricity and their position 
in relation to the target (Benson, 2008b; Gilchrist, Brown, Findlay, & Clarke, 1998; 
Walker, Deubel, Schneider, & Findlay, 1997). Walker et al (1997) gave participants a 
top-down goal to execute a saccade to a target (a cross) as quickly as possible. They 
were instructed to ignore the single distractor (a circle), which was presented on the 
majority of the trials. The distractor appeared simultaneously with the target and was 
presented at central fixation or in the ipsilateral or contralateral hemifield to the target.  
 
 
90 
Walker et al’s., (1997) results indicated that, when the target and distractor 
appeared on the horizontal axis, a centrally presented distractor delayed the latency of 
the saccade to the target by 30-40 ms and a distractor presented in the contralateral 
hemifield led to an increase in saccade latency of 10-30 ms (compared with trials in 
which no distractor was presented). The latency of the saccades was unaffected by the 
presence of an ipsilateral distractor. There was a monotonic increase in saccade latency 
as the eccentricity of the distractor decreased. They also found that the amplitude of the 
saccade was only affected if the distractor was presented in the ipsilateral hemifield and, 
in these instances, the saccade landed between the target and distractor. More 
specifically, after presenting the target on the horizontal axis and the distractor on a 
variety of 2D axes, they found that the latency of the saccade increased when single 
distractors were presented in all locations with the exception of ipsilateral distractors 
presented within a region of ±20° around the target (the opposite pattern of results 
occurred with respect to saccade amplitude). They concluded that remote distractors 
affect the latency, but not the amplitude, of saccades. Neighbouring distractors affect 
the amplitude, but not the latency, of saccades.  
These findings suggest that remote distractors capture attention in an involuntary 
and stimulus-driven manner and this cannot be overridden by the top-down attentional 
goals of the participant. The remote distractor effect (RDE) is the delay in saccade 
latencies to the target in response to the addition of a remote distractor. The RDE is at 
its largest magnitude when the distractor is presented simultaneously with a target or 
within 50 ms after the target (Buonocore & McIntosh, 2008; Walker, Kentridge, & 
Findlay, 1995) and it has been argued that it is an automatic or low-level phenomenon 
that occurs even when the location of the target is known in advance (Benson, 2008a; 
Walker et al., 1995).  Furthermore, directional errors occur on approximately 10-30% of 
the trials in this paradigm (i.e., exogenous saccades directed towards the distractor 
instead of the target; Benson, 2008b).  
Thus far, the remote distractor paradigm has not been employed to consider the 
threat-related bias in anxiety. However, recent research has considered whether initial 
eye movements are differentially affected by meaningful and non-meaningful remote 
distractors (Benson, 2008b). Benson (2008b) used the remote distractor paradigm to 
consider the effect of lexical and non-lexical distractors. In Experiment 3, the target was 
a cross (+) and the distractors were words, orthographically illegal letter strings or non-
lexical shapes. The results indicated that saccade onset latencies to the target were 
slower in trials containing a lexical distractor (words or orthographically illegal letter 
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strings) compared with a non-lexical distractor at all distractor locations (central, 
parafoveal and peripheral). At parafoveal locations, the saccade onset latencies to the 
target were slower in trials containing words compared with orthographically illegal 
letter strings. These findings suggest that participants found it more difficult to inhibit 
the processing of meaningful (vs. non-meaningful stimuli) and, consequently, this 
delayed the initiation of an endogenous saccade to the target. Indeed, Benson (2008b) 
concluded that the saccade generating system was affected by the lexical status of the 
distractor. Given that meaningful distractors lead to greater interference in comparison 
with non-meaningful distractors, it seems plausible that threatening distractors should 
be particularly meaningful and should interfere with ongoing performance to a greater 
extent for anxious (vs. non-anxious) individuals.   
 
4.1.2 The Current Study 
The current study tested the prediction that anxiety is associated with an 
inability to regulate orienting responses in the presence of threatening distractors (i.e., 
impaired inhibition of threat). It utilised a modified version of the original remote 
distractor task in which the target was a neutral stimulus (a white square or a white 
diamond) and the distractor was a threatening or non-threatening face.  
An important advantage in using this paradigm was that the distractor and target 
were always presented in spatially distinct locations and, therefore, the distractor could 
be regarded as entirely task-irrelevant. In contrast, previous studies which have reported 
evidence of an inability to inhibit threat in anxiety have employed paradigms in which 
the threatening stimulus was either spatially coincident with the target (i.e. Stroop, 
Mogg et al., 2000) or in which the threatening stimulus served as a cue to the target 
location (e.g., the antisaccade paradigm; Derakshan et al., 2009). These studies required 
participants to inhibit processing of one attribute of the stimulus (e.g., the threatening 
meaning) and process another attribute of the same stimulus (e.g., the colour of the 
stimulus in the Stroop paradigm or the location of the stimulus in the antisaccade 
paradigm) in order to generate the necessary response. In this respect, the goal-directed 
and stimulus-driven attentional systems were not clearly delineated in these studies 
because it was not possible to completely suppress or ignore the threatening stimulus in 
order to enhance processing of the task-relevant component of the task. In the remote 
distractor paradigm, the target and task-irrelevant threat were attributes of different 
stimuli and, therefore, it was possible to inhibit the threatening distractor without 
detrimental effects to ongoing performance. In relation to eye movements and the 
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Competitive Integration Model of saccade generation (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002, 
2003), the separation of the target and distractor ensured that endogenous and 
exogenous saccades wee programmed to different locations in the visual field. 
Therefore, it was possible to consider whether anxious individuals were able to inhibit 
exogenous saccades to the location of a threatening distractor in order to execute an 
endogenous saccade to the location of a task-relevant neutral target.  
Primarily, the current study aimed to elucidate the specific attentional processes 
that underlie the relationship between anxiety and distraction from threat. By 
manipulating the eccentricity of the distractor (i.e., central, parafoveal or peripheral), it 
was possible to generate a series of predictions related to these different attentional 
processes. Firstly, if individuals with high levels of anxiety involuntarily shift the 
spotlight of attention to task-irrelevant threatening stimuli in preference to task-relevant 
neutral stimuli, then anxiety would be associated with frequent and rapid saccades (i.e., 
directional errors) towards threatening distractors located in parafoveal and peripheral 
regions of the visual field. Secondly, if individuals with high levels of anxiety find it 
difficult to disengage the spotlight of attention from threat, then anxiety would be 
associated with a delay in moving the eyes away from central threatening distractors. 
Thirdly, this paradigm allowed an exploration of the possibility that anxiety is 
characterised by a broad focus of attention rather than a selective attentional bias to 
threat. In this case, an inability to regulate orienting responses would manifest itself as a 
delay in moving the eyes and the spotlight of attention to the task-relevant target when 
task-irrelevant threatening distractors are presented in central, parafoveal or peripheral 
locations.  
In order to provide a direct comparison with previous RT (Fox, 1993, 1994, 
1996; Georgiou et al., 2005) and anti-saccade research (Derakshan et al., 2009), a 
secondary aim of the study was to assess the relationship between anxiety and distractor 
interference in the context of a manual response task measuring RTs. Participants were 
asked to discriminate the target and indicate whether it was a square or a diamond. 
Previous RT studies (Fox, 1996; Georgiou et al., 2005) indicate that anxious individuals 
only demonstrate impaired inhibition of task-irrelevant threat that is presented within 
focal vision (i.e. central locations). However, predictions for the RT data were identical 
to the eye movement predictions in the current study.   
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4.2 Method 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
Sixty healthy adults participated in the experiment (mean age = 18.52 years, SD 
= 1.94, range = 16-27 years; 8 males).  
 
4.2.2 Stimuli  
The distractor stimuli used in this experiment were the 20 models described in 
Section 3.2.2 (i.e., 16 models for the experimental trials and four models for the practice 
trials). The target stimuli were a white square and a white diamond. The square and 
diamond were identical with the exception of a 45 degree rotation. Target stimuli were 
presented against a black background and were 48 x 48 pixels in size (1.5° x 1.5° of 
visual angle) at a viewing distance of 57 cm and 59 x 59 pixels in size (1.5° x 1.5° of 
visual angle) at a viewing distance of 70 cm.  
 The displays contained one target stimulus which was either presented on its 
own (single target trials) or with a task-irrelevant distractor (distractor trials). In the 
single target trials, the target was either presented at a parafoveal or peripheral location 
on the right or left of central fixation, corresponding to 128 pixels (4° eccentricity) or 
256 pixels (8° eccentricity) respectively at a viewing distance of 57 cm. In the distractor 
trials, the distractor (angry, happy or neutral) could either appear in a central location 
(0° eccentricity), a parafoveal location (128 pixels; 4° eccentricity), or a peripheral 
location (256 pixels; 8° eccentricity) at a viewing distance of 57 cm. The centre of the 
parafoveal and peripheral stimuli (targets and distractors) were presented at 157.5 pixels 
(4° eccentricity) and 315 pixels (8° eccentricity) respectively from the centre of the 
screen at a viewing distance of 70 cm. Targets could appear at 4° or 8° eccentricity in 
trials containing central distractors. The target was always presented at 4° eccentricity in 
the contralateral hemifield to the parafoveal distractors and at 8° eccentricity in the 
contralateral hemifield to the peripheral distractors.  See Figure 4.1A and 4.1B for an 
example of each type of display. 
 
4.2.3 Design  
Within-subject variables were trial type (single target trial, distractor trial), 
distractor eccentricity (central, parafoveal, peripheral) and distractor expression (angry, 
happy, neutral). Between-subject variables were self-reported anxiety and attentional 
control.  
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The dependent variables were defined as follows: a) Percentage of directional 
errors: errors were inaccurate first saccades that were directed towards parafoveal or 
peripheral distractor faces with an amplitude greater than two degrees; b) Latency of 
accurate first saccades: the elapsed time between the onset of the display and the 
initiation of the first saccade, where accurate first saccades were those directed towards 
the target with an amplitude greater than two degrees (note that first saccades, as 
defined in this experiment and whether accurate or inaccurate, occurred in at least 
98.5% of the trials1); c) The reciprocal of the RTs to discriminate the target: the RT was 
the elapsed time between the onset of the display and the time at which the participant 
made the keypress response (for correct responses only; note that the reciprocal of the 
RTs was used to reduce the influence of outlier response times (Ratcliff, 1993)).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
          
                                                 
1 The definition of accurate saccades and errors meant that a small proportion of the first saccades were 
neither categorised as accurate nor as errors. Specifically, this applied to: 1) 0.61% of the single target 
trials and 1.16% of the central distractor trials in which the first saccade was either directed towards the 
target with an amplitude less than 2° or was directed away from the target and; 2) 1.26% of the parafoveal 
distractor trials and 0.39% of the peripheral distractor trials in which the amplitude of the first saccade 
was less than 2°, regardless of whether it was directed towards or away from the target. The rationale for 
using 2° amplitude as a cut off was that the horizontal visual angle of a face was 4.2°. Therefore, only 
amplitudes greater than 2° could be regarded as accurate on central distractor trials. For consistency, the 
same criteria were maintained in the single target, parafoveal distractor and peripheral distractor trials. 
Statistical tests were not carried out on these unclassified first saccades because there were less than 1% 
differences across conditions and, furthermore, there were very few trials in which an unclassified first 
saccade occurred.  
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Figure 4.1. Example stimulus displays for each condition and an example of a trial 
sequence in the remote distractor task. 
Note: (A) An example of a single target display (B) Examples of the distractor trials: (1) central 
distractor; (2) parafoveal distractor at 4° eccentricity; (3) peripheral distractor at 8° eccentricity; 
(a) angry distractor; (b) happy distractor; (c) neutral distractor. (C) An example of one trial 
sequence. 
Figure 4.1 has been removed for copyright purposes 
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4.2.4 Procedure 
Participants completed a practice block of 24 single target trials, followed by an 
experimental block of 48 single target trials (the block of single target trials served as a 
measure of baseline performance). Participants were instructed to look at the target as 
quickly and accurately as possible and to make a key-press response to indicate whether 
the target was a square or a diamond.   
Participants then completed a practice block of 24 distractor trials (i.e., with the 
faces), as well as three experimental blocks (one for each distractor expression) 
containing 48 single target trials and 96 distractor trials (32 central distractor trials, 32 
parafoveal distractor trials and 32 peripheral distractor trials). In this phase of the 
experiment, participants were instructed to look at the target as quickly and accurately 
as possible and to make a key-press response to indicate whether the target was a square 
or a diamond; they were informed that a face would appear on some of the trials and 
that they should ignore it. Previous research indicates that processing of the distractor 
can carryover from distractor trials to single target trials within the same block (Benson, 
2008b). Therefore, the rationale for blocking by expression was to ensure that any 
carryover effects were attributable to only one type of emotional distractor within a 
block of trials. 
  For every condition, half of the trials contained a target square and the other half 
contained a target diamond. Both targets (square and diamond) appeared in each of the 
four possible target locations with an equal frequency (i.e. 4° or 8° to the right or left of 
central fixation).  The square was associated with a left key-press response and the 
diamond was associated with a right key-press response for half of the participants (and 
vice versa for the other half of the participants).  
  A trial began with a centrally-located white fixation cross, presented on a black 
background until the participant had fixated within one degree of the centre of the 
screen for 200 ms (the fixation cross was presented for a minimum duration of 1000 
ms). The stimulus display was presented for 2000 ms or until a key-press response was 
made to discriminate the target (whichever occurred earliest). The inter-stimulus 
interval was 1000 ms. See Figure 4.1C for an example of the trial sequence.    
 
4.2.5 Data Preparation 
Exclusion criteria. In addition to the general exclusion criteria outlined in 
Section 3.2.5, trials were also removed if the accurate or inaccurate first saccade latency 
was more than 3 standard deviations away from the participant’s mean accurate or 
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inaccurate first saccade latency, respectively. 7.55% of the trials were removed based on 
the exclusion criteria. The amplitude of the initial saccade was smaller than 1 degree in 
3.65% of the trials; in these cases, the initial saccade was removed and replaced by the 
subsequent saccade.  
 For the manual responses, the percentage of target discrimination errors was 
calculated in each condition for every participant. Following this, each inaccurate 
manual response RT was paired with a corresponding accurate manual response RT (for 
each participant). These correct responses were removed from further analyses to 
eliminate the effect of fast guesses (Eriksen, 1988); 2.41% of the correct responses were 
excluded from the RT analysis on the above criteria.  
Participant characteristics.  The mean total scores and the internal consistency 
for each questionnaire measure are provided in Table 4.1. Three participants were 
regarded as outliers; there were two outliers on the pre-test state anxiety measure (pre 
STAI-S) and there was one age outlier. All of the significant effects reported in the 
results section were replicated when the analyses were repeated following the removal 
of these outliers. Therefore, these participants were retained in all of the analyses 
outlined below. Independent t-tests revealed that there were no significant differences 
between males and females in the scores on any of the questionnaires, ts < 1.5, ns. In the 
current sample, 17 participants (28%) scored equal to or more than 46 on the STAI-T, 4 
participants (7%) scored equal to or more than 46 on the pre-test measure of the STAI-
S, 2 participants (3%) scored equal to or more than 46 on the post-test measure of the 
STAI-S and 18 participants (30%) scored equal to or more than 31 on the SIAS. 
The inter-correlations between the measures of individual differences and age 
are presented in Table 4.2. Note that Spearman’s correlations were conducted with age, 
pre STAI-S, SIAS and ACS due to their skewed distribution; Pearson’s correlations 
were conducted in all other cases because the scores on the remaining questionnaire 
measures were normally distributed. As expected, the anxiety measures were positively 
correlated with one another and negatively correlated with attentional control.  
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency for the questionnaire measures and age.  
 M SD Minimum 
(lower limit) 
Maximum 
(upper limit) 
Cronbach’s α 
Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 39.93 9.72 24 (20) 65 (80) .92 
State Anxiety (pre STAI-S) 32.73 8.08 20 (20) 61 (80) .91 
State Anxiety (post STAI-S)  31.47 6.78 20 (20) 50 (80) .85 
Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) 23.05 12.90 3 (0) 55 (76) .95 
Attentional Control (ACS) 51.37 7.90 38 (20) 72 (80) .83 
Age (in years) 18.52 1.94 16 27 na 
 
Table 4.2. Inter-correlations between self-reported anxiety and attentional control measures and age 
 1 2 a 3 4 a 5 a 6 a 
1. Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) - .55*** .45*** .64*** -.37** .01 
2. State Anxiety (pre STAI-S) a  - .72*** .35** -.38** -.05 
3. State Anxiety (post STAI-S)   - .27* -.39** .07 
4. Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) a    - -.23† .04 
5. Attentional Control (ACS) a     - .00 
6. Age (in years) a      - 
a Spearman’s rs was calculated with these variables due to their skewed distribution (Pearson’s r was calculated for all other variables).  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
4.2.6 Data Analysis 
Separate analyses were conducted for the eye movement and RT data. The 
analysis considered whether anxiety was associated with an inability to regulate 
orienting responses using eye movement data. In addition, the analysis provided a 
comparison with previous studies considering the relationship between anxiety and 
interference from threatening distractors using RT data.  
Multiple regression analyses were conducted to assess whether anxiety or 
attentional control predicted the percentage of directional errors executed to threatening 
distractors (i.e., attentional capture by threat) or the delay in first saccade latencies to 
the target in the presence of threatening distractors. Significant effects were followed up 
with post-hoc regression analyses to establish whether they were observed across 
distractor eccentricities. These post-hoc analyses provided a means of identifying the 
selective attentional mechanisms underlying an inability to regulate orienting responses 
in anxiety (i.e. delayed disengagement from central threat or impaired inhibition of 
threat at all distractor eccentricities). The forced entry method was used; the five 
predictors (trait anxiety, state anxiety (pre-test), state anxiety (post-test), social 
interaction anxiety and attentional control) were entered into the regression model 
simultaneously. Finally, exploratory correlations were conducted between the dependent 
variables and the interaction term for state anxiety x trait anxiety (for the pre- and post-
test measures of state anxiety separately), the interaction term for trait anxiety x 
attentional control and the separate attentional focusing and attentional shifting 
subscales of the ACS.  These analyses were also repeated with the RT data. 
The basic effects associated with the remote distractor paradigm were 
considered using repeated measures ANOVAs and paired-sample t-tests to establish 
whether the dependent variables were influenced by distractor presence (vs. absence), 
distractor eccentricity and distractor expression across participants.  
 
4.3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Directional Errors  
This analysis focused on the percentage of directional errors in the presence of 
threatening and non-threatening distractors across participants and as a function of 
anxiety and attentional control. Directional errors could only occur in parafoveal and 
peripheral distractor trials because these were the only conditions in which a first 
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saccade could be directed towards a distractor face. Therefore, the single target and 
central distractor trials were excluded from the following analysis. 
Basic effects. The error rate (i.e. the percentage of directional errors) was 
negatively skewed across experimental conditions due to near ceiling performance in 
many participants and this could not be corrected by transforming the data. Therefore 
non-parametric tests were used.  The Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that the error 
rate was significantly higher in the peripheral distractor condition (Mdn = 4.79%) 
compared with the parafoveal distractor condition (Mdn = 2.19%), z = 4.10, p < .001, rw 
= 0.53. A Friedman’s ANOVA revealed that the error rate did not differ between 
expressions, χ2(2) = 1.38, ns (Angry Mdn = 3.18%; Happy Mdn = 3.71%; Neutral Mdn 
= 3.81%). 
Anxiety. It was not appropriate to conduct multiple regressions on the directional 
error data because the assumptions of regression analyses were not met. Specifically, 
there was a violation of the assumption of normally distributed residuals. Therefore, 
Spearman’s correlations were conducted to assess the relationship between the measures 
of individual differences and the directional error rates for parafoveal and peripheral 
distractors separately and for each expression separately. There were no significant 
correlations in any experimental condition or for any measure of individual differences, 
│rs│< .25, ps > .05. This suggests that neither anxiety nor attentional control were 
associated with attentional capture by threatening or non-threatening distractors. 
Spearman’s correlations between the interaction terms (trait anxiety x pre state anxiety, 
trait anxiety x post state anxiety and trait anxiety x attentional control) and the 
directional errors for each expression were non-significant, ps > .10, ns. Spearman’s 
correlations between the separate attentional control subscales (attentional shifting and 
attentional focusing) and the dependent variables were also non significant for each 
expression, ps > .10, ns. 
 
4.3.2 Latency of Accurate First Saccades to the Target 
 This analysis focused on the time taken to initiate an accurate saccade to the 
target in the presence and absence of threatening and non-threatening distractors across 
participants and as a function of anxiety and attentional control.  
Single target trials. It was important to verify that performance was consistent in 
the single target trials across each of the experimental blocks; the experiment was 
blocked by distractor expression and this raised the possibility that the effect of a 
particular type of distractor could carryover from the distractor trials to the single target 
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trials within an experimental block.  A one-way (single target condition: angry block, 
happy block, neutral block) repeated measures ANOVA on the latency of the first 
saccade to the target revealed that the first saccade latencies did not significantly differ 
(F < 1.1, ns) between the single target trials in the angry (M = 209.91, SD = 39.19), 
happy (M = 203.95, SD = 36.10) and neutral (M = 208.33, SD = 46.24) blocks.  
Remote Distractor Effect (RDE). The statistical significance of the RDE was 
assessed across participants by conducting paired samples t-tests. For each distractor 
expression and each distractor eccentricity, the latency of the accurate first saccades in 
the distractor trials was compared with the single target trials embedded within the same 
block. First saccade latencies were significantly shorter in the single target trials 
compared with all of the distractor conditions (all ts > 5, all ps < .001, all ds > 0.33). 
The presence of a distractor delayed the first saccade to the target, irrespective of the 
expression or the eccentricity of the distractor, indicating a reliable RDE. The presence 
of this RDE highlights the validity of this modified version of the remote distractor 
paradigm. Figure 4.2 shows the magnitude of the RDE for each distractor expression at 
every distractor eccentricity.  
 
Distractor Eccentricity
Central Parafoveal Peripheral
Re
m
ot
e 
Di
st
ra
ct
or
 E
ffe
ct
 (m
s)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Angry
Happy
Neutral
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Mean (+SE) for the remote distractor effect (RDE) as a function of 
distractor eccentricity and distractor expression.  
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Distractor trials. A 3 (distractor eccentricity) x 3 (distractor expression) 
repeated measures ANOVA on the latency of the accurate first saccades to the target 
revealed a main effect of eccentricity that approached significance, F(1.70, 100.01) = 
3.14, p = .056. Pairwise comparisons showed that first saccade latencies were longer in 
the presence of central distractors (M = 227.46, SD = 30.60) compared with peripheral 
distractors (M = 222.59, SD = 31.68, p < .05, d = 0.16). First saccade latencies to the 
target in the presence of parafoveal distractors (M = 225.26, SD = 33.23) did not differ 
significantly from central or peripheral distractors. Thus, first saccade latencies 
increased as distractor eccentricity decreased.  
There was a trend towards a main effect of expression, F(2, 118) = 2.39, p = 
.096, where first saccade latencies were longer for angry distractors (M = 228.61, SD = 
31.45) compared with happy distractors (M = 220.72, SD = 34.24, p = .061, d = 0.24). 
First saccade latencies to the target in the presence of neutral distractors (M = 225.98, 
SD = 38.27) did not significantly differ from angry or happy distractors and, therefore, it 
remains unclear whether the effect of expression was driven by greater distractor 
interference from angry faces or reduced distractor interference from happy faces. The 
interaction between expression and eccentricity was not significant, F < 1.5, ns. See 
Figure 4.3 for the latency of the first saccade to the target as a function of distractor 
eccentricity and distractor expression.  
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Figure 4.3. Mean (+SE) for the latency of accurate first saccades as a function of 
distractor eccentricity and distractor expression.  
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Anxiety. In order to assess whether anxiety or attentional control affected 
baseline eye movement performance, the latency of the first saccades to the target in the 
baseline single target trials was regressed against the five predictors (trait anxiety, state 
anxiety (pre-test), state anxiety (post-test), social interaction anxiety and attentional 
control). The regression model was not significant R2 = .10, F = 1.16, ns and there were 
no significant predictors within the model │βs│ < .27, ps > .05. However, there was a 
trend towards higher levels of attentional control predicting a decrease in first saccade 
latencies; that is, an increased ability to focus and shift attention was associated with 
faster initiation of an eye movement to the target (see Table 4.3).  
In order to consider the relationship between the measures of individual 
differences and distractor interference from threatening and non-threatening faces, the 
five predictors were regressed against the latency of the accurate first saccades to the 
target in the distractor trials for each expression separately (see Table 4.3). Table 4.3 
shows that the regression models were non-significant for happy distractor trials and 
neutral distractor trials, R2s < .12, Fs < 1.3, ns and, furthermore, there were no 
significant predictors within these models, │βs│ < .30, ps > .05. However, in line with 
the baseline single target trials, there was a trend towards higher levels of attentional 
control predicting a decrease in first saccade latencies to the target.  
Importantly, the regression model was significant for angry distractor trials, R2 = 
.21, F(5, 54) = 2.80, p < .05, and trait anxiety was a significant predictor within this 
model, β = .42, p < .05 (see Table 4.3). In addition, there was a further trend towards 
higher levels of attentional control predicting a decrease in first saccade latencies to the 
target. The regression analysis on the angry distractor trials was repeated after excluding 
the statistically redundant variables (Field, 2005) such that trait anxiety was entered as 
the only predictor and the latency of the accurate first saccades was entered as the 
dependent variable. Trait anxiety was still a statistically significant predictor of the 
latency of the accurate first saccades in the angry distractor trials, R2 = .08, F(1, 58) = 
4.77, β = .28, p < .05, indicating that the latency of accurate first saccades increased as 
trait anxiety increased, but only in the presence of an angry distractor. That is, 
increasing anxiety was associated with greater interference from threatening distractors.  
Further analyses considered whether the relationship between trait anxiety and 
distractor interference from threat occurred at all distractor eccentricities. The latency of 
the accurate first saccades in the presence of angry distractors was regressed against 
trait anxiety for each of the three distractor eccentricities separately (see Figure 4.4). 
Trait anxiety was a significant predictor of the latency of the accurate first saccades in 
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the presence of central angry distractors, R2 = .10, F(1, 58) = 6.33, β = .31, p <.05. 
There was also a trend towards trait anxiety predicting the latency of the accurate first 
saccades in the presence of parafoveal angry distractors, R2= .05, F(1, 58) = 3.22, β = 
.23, p = .078 and peripheral angry distractors, R2 = .06, F(1, 58) = 3.57, β = .24, p = 
.064. A follow-up regression analysis was conducted in which the latency of the 
accurate first saccades from the single target trials in the angry block was regressed 
against trait anxiety. Trait anxiety did not reach criterion for statistical significance, R2 = 
.02, F < 1.5, β = .16, ns, highlighting that the relationship between anxiety and eye 
movements to the target did not occur in the single target trials embedded in the angry 
block.  
Spearman’s correlations between the interaction terms (trait anxiety x pre state 
anxiety, trait anxiety x post state anxiety and trait anxiety x attentional control) and the 
dependent variables for the distractor trials for each expression were non-significant, ps 
> .10, ns, indicating that enhanced distractor interference from threat was not specific to 
high trait anxious individuals who were high in state anxiety or low in attentional 
control.  
The regression analyses revealed a trend towards high levels of attentional 
control predicting a decrease in first saccade latencies to the target; therefore, it was of 
particular interest to conduct exploratory correlations between the two separate 
subscales from the ACS (attentional shifting and attentional focusing) and the latency of 
accurate first saccades for the baseline single target trials and the distractor trials for 
each expression separately. There were no significant correlations between attentional 
focusing scores and the latency of accurate first saccades for any condition, rs > -.23, ps 
> .05, ns. In contrast, there were significant correlations between attentional shifting 
scores and the latency of accurate first saccades to the target in the baseline single target 
trials (r = -.30, p < .05), angry distractor trials (r = -.31, p < .05), happy distractor trials 
(r = -.33, p < .05) and neutral distractor trials (r = -.29, p < .05). Therefore, the 
relationship between attentional control and the latency of the first saccade to the target 
was specific to attentional shifting; that is, high levels of self-reported attentional 
shifting abilities were associated with rapid shifts in overt attention (i.e. faster first 
saccade latencies) towards the target, irrespective of the presence or absence of a 
distractor.  
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4.3.3 Target Discrimination Reaction Times 
 This analysis focused on the time taken to make a target discrimination response 
in the presence and absence of threatening and non-threatening distractors across 
participants and as a function of anxiety and attentional control (for correct responses 
only; note that the error rates were less than 4% in all conditions). 
Single target trials. In order to confirm that single target performance was 
consistent across the experimental blocks, a one-way (single target condition; angry 
block, happy block, neutral block) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
reciprocal of the RT to discriminate the target and revealed that RTs did not 
significantly differ, F < 1, ns, between single target trials in the angry (M = 0.00151, SD 
= 0.00027), happy (M = 0.00152, SD = 0.00025) and neutral (M = 0.00149, SD = 
0.00023) blocks. See Table 4.4 for descriptive statistics on the RTs in the single target 
conditions.  
 Distractor interference. Paired samples t-tests were conducted to assess whether 
the presence of a distractor delayed RTs to discriminate the target in comparison with 
the single target trials.  For each distractor expression and each distractor eccentricity, 
the reciprocal of the RTs in the distractor trials was compared with the single target 
trials embedded within the same block. RTs were significantly longer in trials 
containing central and peripheral distractors compared with single target trials, 
irrespective of distractor expression (all ts > 3, all ps < .01, all ds > 0.11). However, 
RTs did not significantly differ between parafoveal distractor trials and single target 
trials for any expression, ts < 2.5, ns. The presence of a distractor delayed RTs to 
discriminate the target but only for distractors presented at central or peripheral regions 
of the visual field. 
Distractor trials. A 3 (distractor eccentricity) x 3 (distractor expression) 
repeated measures ANOVA on the reciprocal of the RT to discriminate the target 
revealed a main effect of eccentricity, F(2, 118) = 16.98, p < .001. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that RTs were shorter in the presence of parafoveal distractors (M 
= 0.00150, SD = 0.00024) compared with central distractors (M = 0.00147, SD = 
0.00022, p < .001, d = 0.13) and peripheral distractors (M = 0.00147, SD = 0.00023, p < 
.001, d = 0.13). The effect of expression and the interaction between expression and 
eccentricity were non-significant, Fs < 1.5, ns. See Table 4.4 for descriptive statistics on 
the RTs in the distractor conditions.    
Anxiety. Finally, the reciprocal of the RTs was regressed against the five anxiety 
and attentional control predictors for the baseline block of single target trials and the 
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distractor trials for each expression separately. There were no significant regression 
models, R2 < .13, Fs < 2, ns, and no significant predictors within the models, │βs│< 
.30, ps > .05. Spearman’s correlations between the interaction terms (trait anxiety x pre 
state anxiety, trait anxiety x post state anxiety and trait anxiety x attentional control) and 
the dependent variables were non-significant for each expression, ps > .10, ns. 
Pearson’s correlations were also conducted between the two separate subscales 
of the ACS (attentional shifting and attentional focusing) and the reciprocal of the RTs 
for the baseline block of single target trials and the distractor trials for each expression 
separately. There were no significant correlations between scores on the attentional 
shifting subscale and the reciprocal of the RTs for any condition, ps > .10, ns. Scores on 
the attentional focusing subscale did not correlate significantly with the reciprocal of the 
RTs in the baseline single target trials (r = .21, p > .10); however attentional focusing 
was correlated with the reciprocal of the RTs in the angry distractor trials (r = .32, p < 
.05), happy distractor trials (r = .28, p < .05) and, albeit non-significantly, the neutral 
distractor trials (r = .25, p = .051). Thus, the time taken to discriminate the target with a 
manual response decreased with increasing levels of self-reported attentional focusing 
abilities, but only in the presence of a distractor. That is, distractor interference was 
greater for individuals reporting low levels of attentional focusing abilities.  
 
4.3.4 Item Analysis 
All of the above ANOVAs/ non parametric tests were repeated on the model means 
rather than the participant means. All of the significant effects involving eccentricity 
and expression reported in the preceding analyses were replicated in the item analysis. 
Therefore, the significant effects reported here cannot be attributed to individual 
models. 
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Table 4.3. Regression analyses on the latency of the accurate first saccades to the target.  
 Angry Distractors a  Happy Distractorsb  Neutral Distractorsc  Baseline Single Targetd 
 B SE  β   b SE  Β  b SE  β  b SE  Β 
Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 1.37 0.58 .42*   0.48 0.68 .14  1.13 0.75 .29  0.39 0.97 .08 
State Anxiety (pre STAI-S)  -1.25 0.67 -.32†   -0.16 0.78 -.04  -0.54 0.87 -.11  -1.51 1.12 -.25 
State Anxiety (post STAI-S) 0.91 0.78 .20  0.77 0.91 .15  -0.35 1.01 -.06  0.80 1.31 .11 
Social Anxiety (SIAS) -0.52 0.39 -.21   -0.38 0.46 -.14  -0.53 0.51 -.18  -0.46 0.66 -.12 
Attentional Control (ACS) -0.95 0.53 -.24†   -0.78 0.62 -.18  -1.19 0.69 -.25†  -1.64 0.89 -.26† 
aR2 = .21, F(5, 54) = 2.80, p < .05;  b,c,d R2 < .12, F < 1.3, ns; *p < .05; †p < .10 
 
Table 4.4. Mean (+SD) for the reaction times (ms) to discriminate the target as a function of experimental block and distractor condition.  
 
Baseline Block Angry Block Happy Block Neutral  Block  
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
M SD 
 
Single target 781.89 146.82  710.13 130.54  705.11 127.94  716.82 129.72  
Central distractor - -  723.63 125.84  723.71 135.02  729.17 127.25  
Parafoveal distractor - -  710.27 140.74  718.39 144.92  709.46 135.34  
Peripheral distractor - -  724.21 136.35  717.77 136.04  734.56 132.70  
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Figure 4.4. Mean latency of accurate first saccades to the target as a function of trait anxiety and the eccentricity of the angry distractor (vs. single 
target trials).    
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4.4 Discussion 
 
The current study explored the possibility that anxiety is associated with greater 
interference from threatening (but not non-threatening) distractors. The eccentricity of 
the threatening distractor was manipulated to distinguish between two propositions:  
firstly, that anxious individuals selectively focus attention on threat when it is task-
irrelevant and where it competes for attentional resources with task-relevant neutral 
stimuli and; secondly, that anxiety is associated with a broad focus of attention and an 
inability to focus attention on an ongoing task when threats are present in the 
environment. Finally, the current study aimed to provide a comparison with previous 
literature on anxiety and the ability to inhibit threat processing by considering the effect 
of threatening and non-threatening distractors on manual RTs to discriminate the target.  
 In line with previous eye movement research using the remote distractor 
paradigm (Benson, 2008b; Walker et al., 1997), there was a reliable RDE in the current 
study; the latency of the first saccade to the target was shorter in the single target trials 
compared with the distractor trials, irrespective of the eccentricity or the expression of 
the distractor face. Furthermore, the latency of the first saccade to the target and the 
magnitude of the RDE increased as the eccentricity of the distractor decreased (Walker 
et al., 1997). The percentage of directional errors was greater for peripheral distractors 
compared with parafoveal distractors (see also Benson, 2008b).  
The primary aim of the current study was to assess whether anxiety was 
associated with an inability to regulate orienting responses in the presence of 
threatening distractors and to identify the attentional processes that are impaired as a 
consequence of a failure to inhibit threat processing. There was evidence to suggest that 
trait anxiety was linked to greater interference from threatening distractors. However, 
the percentage of directional errors to threatening faces was not influenced by anxiety, 
suggesting that anxious individuals were able to suppress exogenous saccades towards 
threatening distractors in parafoveal and peripheral regions of the visual field.  
Trait anxiety was associated with longer latencies to initiate a saccade to the 
target, but only in the presence of threatening distractors. This finding suggests that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety found it difficult to inhibit threat processing and, 
consequently, were slow to voluntarily execute an endogenous saccade to the target in 
the presence of threat. Although the relationship between anxiety and interference from 
threat was particularly evident when the angry distractor was presented in central 
locations, there was also a tendency for the relationship to occur when the angry 
 
 
114 
distractor was presented in parafoveal and peripheral regions. It is possible that the 
relationship between anxiety and interference from threat was at its greatest magnitude 
for central distractors because it is more difficult to ignore stimuli that fall within foveal 
vision. Alternatively, given that visual acuity is enhanced in the fovea (Findlay & 
Gilchrist, 2003; Liversedge & Findlay, 2000), it is possible that threatening information 
of a higher quantity and quality was extracted from central regions of the visual field. 
However, the results are important in suggesting that interference from threat occurred 
across the visual field and was not dependent on foveal processing.  
 Taken together, the current findings are highly consistent with those reported by 
Derakshan et al., (2009), who found that angry face cues delayed the latency of 
antisaccades, but did not affect the proportion of incorrect prosaccades, in high trait 
anxious individuals. They concluded that there was a difficulty in inhibiting threat 
processing in high trait anxious individuals. The current study extended this work by 
considering interference from threat in a task where threatening stimuli were task-
irrelevant and competed for attention with a task-relevant neutral stimulus. By adopting 
this approach, the current study replicated the finding that anxiety is associated with a 
delay in inhibiting threat processing and that it is not associated with involuntary eye 
movements towards threat.  
The approach used in the current work also extended the existing empirical 
literature by providing an account of the attentional processes that underlie the inability 
to regulate orienting responses in the presence of task-irrelevant threat. In line with the 
previous experiment, the current results were inconsistent with the notion that anxious 
individuals selectively attend to threat with a narrow focus of attention (e.g., Williams 
et al., 1997). Anxiety was not characterised by an inability to prevent the spotlight of 
attention moving towards threatening distractors (i.e. attentional capture). Although 
there was evidence to support the proposition that individuals with high levels of 
anxiety find it particularly difficult to disengage attention from threat presented in 
central regions of the visual field (Fox, 1996; Fox et al., 2001, 2002; Georgiou et al., 
2005), this distractor interference from threat also extended to peripheral regions of the 
visual field. Therefore, the findings suggest links between anxiety and an ability to 
extract threatening information from a broad attentional beam. The zoom lens metaphor 
of attention suggests that a broad distribution of attention enhances processing of a 
target stimulus (Cave & Bichot, 1999; Eriksen & St James, 1986) and facilitates threat 
detection in anxious individuals (Eysenck et al., 2007) when the location of the 
target/threat stimulus is not known in advance. The presence/absence and location of the 
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threatening distractor varied from trial-to-trial in the current study and, therefore, 
maintaining a broad distribution of attention would facilitate threat processing in this 
context.  
The current study considered the effect of attentional control. Consistent with 
predictions, attentional control was inversely related to anxiety. It has been proposed 
that attentional control is related to the ability to regulate orienting responses 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and that it is involved in functions such as inhibition (i.e. 
inhibiting distractor interference; Eysenck et al., 2007).  Therefore, it was expected that 
low levels of attentional control would lead to greater distractor interference. 
Interestingly, the results showed a dissociation between eye movement and RT 
measures and, furthermore, a dissociation between the attentional focusing and 
attentional shifting subscales of the ACS. The results indicated that low levels of 
attentional shifting abilities were related to slower orienting to the target, irrespective of 
the presence or absence of a distractor. In contrast, low levels of attentional focusing 
abilities were associated with greater distractor interference such that RTs to respond to 
the target were slowed, but only in the presence of a distractor. The results are important 
in suggesting that low levels of attentional control have a negative effect on task 
performance. Therefore, the current study highlights the validity of the separate 
subscales of the ACS as measures of attentional shifting and attentional focusing 
abilities.  
 The results also showed that RTs were generally delayed by the presence of a 
distractor. There was no evidence to suggest that anxiety was associated with greater 
interference from threatening (or non-threatening) distractors on the manual response 
task. In contrast, a small number of RT studies have provided some evidence to suggest 
that threatening distractors delay RTs to respond to a target, but only if they are 
presented within focal vision (Fox, 1993, 1994, 1996; Georgiou et al., 2005). One 
explanation for the difference between these studies is that in the current experiment, 
the primary task in each trial was to direct the eyes to a particular object and the 
subsequent task was to discriminate the target once the eyes landed on this object. In 
this study the manual response can be regarded as a secondary component of the task. In 
contrast, the manual response was the only task requirement in the studies by Fox et al. 
(Fox, 1993, 1994, 1996; Georgiou et al., 2005). However, the interpretation of these 
previous RT studies is complicated by the fact that the participants were required to 
maintain central fixation, thereby enhancing processing of the stimuli presented within 
foveal vision and reducing processing of the stimuli presented outside foveal vision.  
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One potential limitation in the current experiment was that although the basic 
eye movement effects associated with the paradigm were significant and in the 
anticipated direction, the magnitude of these effects was smaller than has previously 
been reported (Walker et al., 1997). Firstly, the effect of eccentricity was small 
(approximately a 5 ms difference between central and peripheral distractors). The RDE 
for distractors at all eccentricities was between 10 ms and 30 ms. While this is a typical 
RDE for parafoveal and peripheral distractors, central distractors typically delay eye 
movements to the target by 30-40 ms (Walker et al., 1997). Secondly, there were a low 
percentage of directional errors in the present data (2% for parafoveal distractors and 
5% for peripheral distractors). Benson (2008b; Experiment 3) reported directional error 
rates of 20% for parafoveal distractors and 28% for peripheral distractors. One possible 
explanation for the small effects in the current study is that the target and distractors 
were easily identifiable and highly dissimilar in terms of size, shape and colour. 
Therefore, it was easy to identify and discriminate between the target and distractors 
quickly and without moving the eyes to the distractor.  
 In summary, the findings from the current study concur with the notion that 
anxiety is associated with greater distractibility from threatening stimuli. The results 
were consistent with the proposition that there is hypervigilance for threat and a broad 
focus of attention in anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). The current study highlighted that, for 
anxious individuals, the cost of a broad focus of attention is greater distractibility in the 
presence of task-irrelevant threat. However, from an empirical perspective, it remains 
unclear whether there is a benefit in maintaining a broad focus of attention in anxiety. 
Theoretical models of anxiety, for example, would suggest that a broad distribution of 
attention facilitates threat detection (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). These issues 
are considered in the following experiment.  
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Chapter 5 : Anxiety and Processing Capacity for Threat Detection 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Hypervigilance theory (Eysenck, 1991) and ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) propose 
that individuals with high levels of anxiety adopt a hypervigilant attentional style, which 
reduces attentional focus on the ongoing task in order to facilitate threat detection. 
Specifically, Eysenck et al., (1992, 2007) raised the possibility that, prior to threat 
detection, anxious individuals are hypervigilant for threat across the visual field, where 
this is accomplished by adopting a broad focus of attention with few eye movements or 
alternatively by scanning the environment with a narrow focus of attention.  
Visual search studies measuring RTs provide evidence of enhanced detection of 
singleton threat in anxious individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Matsumoto, 2010). In 
these studies, it is unclear whether this improved performance occurs in the context of a 
broad focus of attention. It is possible that the benefits of a broad focus of attention 
would be particularly apparent when there is a possibility that multiple threats could 
occur simultaneously in different locations. In this scenario, a broadly tuned attentional 
system should allow monitoring for threat across the visual field and the integration of 
threatening stimuli from multiple locations.  The current study used an RT redundant 
signals paradigm and concurrent eye movement measures to consider the relationship 
between threat detection and the breadth of attention in anxiety in the context of single 
and multiple threats. Importantly, this study aimed to understand the cognitive 
mechanisms that allow anxious individuals to detect threat with greater efficiency.  
 
5.1.1 The Redundant Signals Paradigm 
 The redundant signals paradigm has been used to consider target detection in the 
presence of single and multiple targets. In this paradigm, displays are presented in 
which there are no targets present (target absent condition), one target present (single 
target condition) or two targets present (redundant target condition). Participants are 
asked to make a target present response if they see at least one target and to make a 
target absent response if there are no targets in the display. In other words, one target is 
adequate for a target present response. A typical finding is that there is a redundancy 
gain (or redundant signals effect), which is an improvement in accuracy or RTs with the 
addition of a redundant target (Grice & Canham, 1990; Zehetleitner, Müller, & 
Krummenacher, 2008). The RT redundancy gain can occur as a result of statistical 
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facilitation (e.g. race models (Raab, 1962)) or co-activation of target signals (Miller, 
1982). In distinguishing between these accounts, it is necessary to analyse the RT 
distribution (Miller, 1982) and, specifically, to consider whether the fastest RTs in the 
redundant target condition can be predicted from the fastest RTs in the faster of the 
single target conditions.  
Race models (Raab, 1962) assume that a redundant target trial is comprised of a 
parallel race between two independent signals. These models propose that the RT 
distribution associated with each independent signal in the redundant target condition is 
equivalent to the RT distributions for the corresponding signals in the two separate 
single target conditions (Zehetleitner et al., 2008). In the redundant target trial, the 
detection response is triggered when the quicker of the two independent signals exceeds 
a threshold level of activation. Therefore, the response on any one redundant target trial 
is never faster than the minimum time taken to respond to either of the single targets 
separately. However, on average, RTs will be faster in the redundant target condition 
because this average is based on the quickest responses from the two single target 
conditions. Thus, the redundancy gain at the level of the mean RT occurs as a result of 
statistical facilitation (Raab, 1962).  
Co-activation models suggest that information from the two target signals is 
combined prior to the response and, therefore, activation accumulates and exceeds the 
threshold required for response initiation at a greater rate in redundant target trials 
(Miller, 1982; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995). The integration of activation from two 
signals produces responses that are faster than the minimum time taken to respond to 
either of the single targets separately. Thus, co-activation models predict that the 
redundancy gain will be greater than that expected by statistical facilitation. Miller 
(1982) developed the race model inequality to distinguish between co-activation and 
race model accounts of the redundancy gain. This inequality is based on the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of RTs and provides the upper bound of the redundancy 
gain that can occur due to statistical facilitation. Specifically, the race model inequality 
states that the CDF of the RTs in the redundant target condition should not exceed the 
sum of the CDFs for the single target conditions at any point in time. In other words, the 
probability of responding at or before time T should not be greater in the redundant 
target condition compared with the sum of the single target conditions for all values of 
T. A violation of the inequality indicates that the fastest responses in the redundant 
target condition were faster than the fastest responses in the single target conditions; this 
finding is consistent with co-activation models.  
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The lower bound of the race models is provided by the Grice inequality (Grice, 
Canham, & Gwynne, 1984). Race models predict that the processing time in the 
redundant target condition should be at least as fast as the processing time in the fastest 
of the single target conditions. The Grice inequality states that the CDF for the 
redundant target condition should be greater than or equal to the CDF from the faster of 
the single target conditions. In other words, the probability of responding at or before 
time T in the redundant target condition should be greater than or equal to the fastest 
single target condition for all values of T. A violation of the Grice inequality indicates 
that RTs are slower in the redundant target condition compared with at least one of the 
single target conditions and, therefore, performance in the redundant target condition is 
worse than that predicted by race models.  
 Recently, the mathematical inequalities developed by Miller and Grice have 
been extended to consider processing capacity (Townsend & Nozawa, 1995). It has 
been argued that mean RTs only provide coarse information about the capacity of a 
system to complete a task and the average time taken to respond (Wenger & Gibson, 
2004). They suggested that a more appropriate measure of processing capacity is to 
consider the work required to complete a task at each point in time across the RT 
distribution. Processing capacity refers to the amount of work that a system can perform 
at each point in time and, furthermore, the efficiency and speed with which the system 
can carry out a task with changes in workload (Townsend & Ashby, 1978; Townsend & 
Nozawa, 1995; Townsend & Wenger, 2004a; Townsend & Wenger, 2004b; Wenger & 
Gibson, 2004). In this case, the addition of a redundant target represents an increase in 
the amount of relevant information that needs to be processed (i.e., an increase in 
workload). Capacity is assessed by considering the change in processing efficiency 
associated with an increase in workload. Super-capacity processing occurs when 
processing efficiency improves with an increase in workload (e.g., speed of processing 
increases with the addition of a redundant target); limited capacity processing occurs 
when processing efficiency decreases with an increase in workload (e.g. speed of 
processing decreases with the addition of a redundant target) and; unlimited capacity 
processing occurs when processing efficiency neither improves nor deteriorates with an 
increase in workload. It has been argued that super-capacity processing should be 
associated with violations of the Miller inequality and very limited capacity processing 
should be associated with violations of the Grice inequality (Townsend & Nozawa, 
1995).  
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 The redundant signals paradigm has been used across a wide spectrum of 
research such as letter search (Miller, 1982; Müller, Humphreys, & Donnelly, 1994), 
face processing (Ingvalson & Wenger, 2005) and semantic word processing (Eidels, 
Townsend, & Algom, 2010). Miller (1982), for example, instructed participants to 
detect the presence of the target letter A in displays containing two distractors, a single 
target with a distractor, or two targets. There was a redundancy gain at the level of the 
mean RT and, furthermore, there were violations of the race model inequality at early 
time points in the RT distribution; providing evidence of co-activation of targets in 
letter search.  
Similarly, Eidels et al., (2010) used the Miller inequality, Grice inequality and 
measures of processing capacity to consider whether Stroop interference occurred as a 
result of an interaction (i.e., co-activation) between the semantic content of a word and 
the colour it was printed in. Participants completed a redundant signals variant of the 
Stroop task in which the participant had to divide their attention between the colour and 
semantic content of the word. Participants were presented with a single word (RED or 
GREEN) which was either printed in the colour red or green. The participant had to 
detect the presence of red; target present trials could contain a single target (RED 
printed in green or GREEN printed in red) or two targets (RED printed in red). Target 
absent trials contained the word GREEN printed in green. Although there was evidence 
of a redundancy gain at the level of the mean RT, Eidels et al., (2010) found no 
violations of the Miller or Grice inequalities and measures of processing capacity were 
consistent with unlimited capacity processing. They concluded that, in the divided 
attention variant of the Stroop paradigm, the meaning of the word and print colour did 
not interact to co-activate a response despite their strong semantic connection.  
The redundant signals methodology has also recently been used with facial 
expressions of emotion to address the possibility that the cerebral hemispheres interact 
in the perception of emotions (Tamietto, Adenzato, Geminiani, & de Gelder, 2007; 
Tamietto, Latini Corazzini, de Gelder, & Geminiani, 2006; Schweinberger, Baird, 
Blumler, Kaufmann, & Mohr, 2003).  Tamietto et al. (2006, 2007), for example, 
presented an emotional expression in the right visual field only (RVF), the left visual 
field only (LVF), or the same emotional expression to both visual fields simultaneously 
(BVF) and instructed participants to press a button when a face expressed the target 
emotion and to withhold a response when it expressed a non-target emotion (i.e., a 
go/no-go paradigm). They argued that if the two hemispheres operate independently in 
the perception of emotional expressions, then a race will occur in which each 
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hemisphere processes a face separately and the task will be completed when the faster 
hemisphere finishes processing. If the two hemispheres interact, then performance 
should be enhanced in the bilateral condition compared with the unilateral conditions. 
They found a bilateral advantage (i.e. redundancy gain) such that RTs to detect happy, 
fearful, flirtatious and arrogant facial expressions were faster in the BVF condition 
compared with the RVF and LVF conditions. Furthermore, this bilateral advantage 
violated the race model inequality and, therefore, was consistent with co-activation 
models, suggesting that the two hemispheres interact in the perception of emotions 
rather than processing the faces independently. (But see Schweinberger et al., 2003, 
who found no evidence of a bilateral gain in the recognition of happy and neutral faces).  
    
5.1.2 The Current Study 
  The redundant signals paradigm was used in the current work to consider the 
relationship between the breadth of attention and threat detection in the presence of 
multiple (vs. single) threats in anxious and non-anxious individuals. Participants were 
asked to indicate whether an emotional face (threatening or non-threatening) was 
present or absent in displays containing no targets, one target or two targets. The 
primary aim of the study was to consider the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
enhanced threat detection in individuals with high levels of anxiety. Of particular 
interest was whether anxious individuals were able to pool evidence about the presence 
of threat from across the visual field by co-activation of target signals. A further 
important aim was to assess whether enhanced threat detection in anxiety occurred 
within a broad focus of attention (as indexed by eye movements).  
It was predicted that there would be a redundancy gain for threatening targets in 
individuals with high levels of anxiety; that is, RTs to detect a target would be faster 
when multiple (vs. single) threats were present because anxious individuals would be 
hypervigilant for threat in multiple locations across the visual field. This redundancy 
gain could occur within a broad attentional beam or as a result of excessively scanning 
the visual field with numerous eye movements.  A broad focus of attention would allow 
a co-active processing system to integrate information from multiple locations prior to 
threat detection and, therefore, the threshold for threat detection would be exceeded 
more rapidly if evidence of threat could be accumulated from multiple (vs. single) threat 
stimuli across the visual field. However, target redundancy would also lead to faster 
threat detection responses in a system that operates by scanning the environment with 
rapid eye movements because, on average, less scanning would be required before the 
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eyes land on a threat when there are multiple (vs. single) threats in the visual field. 
Therefore, the redundancy gain cannot be used in isolation to distinguish between the 
possible attentional processes and cognitive mechanisms underlying threat detection in 
anxiety.  
In the current study, processing capacity was measured across the RT 
distribution in order to further consider the possibility of a co-active processing 
architecture for threat detection in anxiety. By considering the RT distribution, 
processing capacity measures move beyond measures of average speed to provide 
information about the work required to detect a target at each point in time (Wenger & 
Gibson, 2004). If threatening information can be integrated from across the visual field, 
then less work should be required to detect threat at each point in time when there are 
multiple targets compared with single targets because evidence for the presence of 
threat will accumulate more rapidly in the former condition. This is consistent with 
super-capacity processing, where an increase in workload (i.e. an increase in the number 
of threats to be processed) is associated with greater processing efficiency.  
Processing capacity was assessed at the level of the hazard function of the RT 
distribution. This approach is an extension of survival analysis. The hazard function of 
the RT distribution gives the probability that a task will be completed in the next instant 
of time, given that it has not already been completed. The hazard function provides a 
measure of instantaneous capacity to complete a task at each point in time across the RT 
distribution and, as such, provides greater detail than the average time taken to complete 
a task (i.e. mean RT; see Townsend & Ashby, 1978; Wenger & Gibson, 2004). Given a 
sufficiently large number of observations per participant and per experimental 
condition, the hazard function can be used to make qualitative distinctions between 
limited, unlimited and super-capacity processing. If there are fewer observations, as is 
the case in the current study, then a different approach is required. Specifically, semi-
parametric regression models (e.g., the Cox Proportional Hazards Model) are used to 
assess the effect of independent variables on the orderings of the hazard functions 
(Wenger & Gibson, 2004; Wenger, Negash, Petersen, & Petersen, 2010). See further 
details in Section 5.2.6.  
Predictions concerning the relationship between anxiety and processing capacity 
for threat detection depend on whether individuals with high levels of anxiety adopt a 
broad focus of attention or excessively scan the environment with a narrow focus of 
attention (i.e. using rapid eye movements). Based on the evidence from the previous 
experiment, it was predicted that the optimal strategy for threat detection would be to 
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maintain a broad focus of attention rather than to narrow attention onto individual 
targets. Evidence for this broadening can be highlighted from eye movement measures; 
if anxious individuals maintain a broad focus of attention in order to facilitate threat 
detection and processing from all possible locations, then they should be more inclined 
to keep their eyes still in order to allocate attentional resources widely. Therefore, 
anxiety would be associated with a decrease in the frequency of eye movements and 
increased processing capacity to detect multiple (vs. single) threats due to co-activation 
of target signals across the visual field. A contradictory prediction was that anxious 
individuals would excessively scan the environment with a narrow focus of attention 
and that this would lead to an increase in the frequency of eye movements and no 
evidence of increased processing capacity to detect multiple (vs. single) threats because 
it would not be possible to co-activate target signals falling outside the focus of 
attention.   
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
 Forty healthy adults participated in the experiment (mean age = 22.00 years, SD 
= 3.34, range = 18-29 years; 11 males). 
 
5.2.2 Stimuli  
The faces used in this experiment were a subset of eight of the models described 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 displaying angry, happy and neutral expressions. This subset 
included only European-American models in order to reduce heterogeneity between 
models within each trial display (unlike Experiments 1 and 2, the identity of the model 
could differ between items within a display in this experiment).  The displays contained 
two faces presented at 177 pixels (4.5° eccentricity) to the right and left of central 
fixation. There were three types of display: 1) Target absent trials contained two neutral 
faces; 2) Single target trials contained one emotional target face (angry or happy) and 
one neutral face; 3) Redundant target trials contained two emotional target faces (either 
two angry faces or two happy faces). For all displays, the identity of the model in the 
left position was independent of the identity of the model in the right position (i.e., each 
model presented in the left position could appear with any of the eight models in the 
right position). See Figure 5.1A and 5.1B for an example of each type of display. 
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5.2.3 Design  
Within-subject variables were load (one target, two targets) and target 
expression (angry, happy). Note that ‘load’ refers to the workload in each target present 
trial (i.e., the number of targets that need to processed in a display). Between-subject 
variables were self-reported anxiety and attentional control.  
The dependent variables were defined as follows: a) Error rate: the percentage of 
trials in which an inaccurate present/absent keypress response occurred; b) Reciprocal 
of the RTs: the elapsed time between the onset of the display and the time at which the 
participant made the keypress response (for correct responses only). The reciprocal of 
the RTs was used to reduce the influence of outlier response times (Ratcliff, 1993); c) 
Processing capacity: this was quantified at the level of the hazard function of the RT 
distribution, which provides a measure of the capacity to complete a task at each point 
in time (see Section 5.2.6 for further details); d) Percentage of trials in which an eye 
movement occurred: defined as those trials where at least one eye movement was 
executed towards a target or distractor face with an amplitude greater than one degree 
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Figure 5.1. Example stimulus displays for each condition and an example of a trial 
sequence in the redundant signals task.  
Note: (A) An example of a target absent display. (B) An example of: (1) a single target angry 
display; (2) a single target happy display; (3) a redundant target angry display; (4) a redundant 
target happy display. (C) An example of one trial sequence 
Figure 5.1 has been removed for copyright purposes 
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5.2.4 Procedure 
 Participants completed two practice blocks of 32 trials each (one angry; one 
happy). This was followed by four experimental blocks of 128 trials each (two angry, 
two happy). The expression of the emotional face was constant within a block of trials. 
At the beginning of each block of trials, participants were informed whether they were 
searching for angry or happy faces. The rationale for blocking by expression was to 
ensure that participants were explicitly instructed to search for ‘angry’ or ‘happy’ faces. 
In contrast, it would be necessary to provide an instruction to search for ‘emotional’ 
faces if target expressions were mixed within a block of trials; under these conditions, it 
is likely that responses would be particularly slow in trials containing a neutral non-
target due to the emotional ambiguity of these stimuli.  Participants were instructed to 
indicate the presence or absence of at least one target emotional face in every trial 
display with a keypress response. The key associated with the present or absent 
response was counterbalanced across participants. Within each block, half of the trials 
were target absent and half of the trials contained at least one target. Half of the target 
present displays were single target trials and half were redundant target trials.  The 
target appeared in both locations with equal frequency in the single target trials.  
A trial began with a centrally-located white fixation cross, presented on a black 
background until the participant had fixated within one degree of the centre of the 
screen for 200 ms (the fixation cross was presented for a minimum duration of 1000 
ms). The stimulus display was presented for 1500 ms or until a key-press response was 
made (whichever occurred earliest). The inter-stimulus interval was 1000 ms. See 
Figure 5.1C for an example of the trial sequence. 
 
5.2.5 Data Preparation 
Exclusion criteria. For the manual responses, the error rate was calculated for 
each condition. Following this, each false alarm RT was paired with a corresponding 
RT from the correct responses in present trials (this was carried out for each participant 
separately). These correct responses were removed from further analysis to eliminate 
the effect of fast guesses (Eriksen, 1988); 1.63% of the correct responses were excluded 
from the RT analysis on the above criteria. For the eye movement analysis, 10.48% of 
the trials were excluded based on the criteria described in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.5. 
Participant characteristics.  The mean total scores and the internal consistency 
for each questionnaire are provided in Table 5.1. Independent t-tests revealed that there 
were no significant differences between males and females in the scores on any of the 
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questionnaires, ts < 2, ns. In the current sample, 14 participants (35%) scored equal to or 
more than the cut-off of 46 on the STAI-T, 4 participants (10%) scored equal to or more 
than the cut-off of 46 on the pre-test measure of the STAI-S, 6 participants (15%) 
scored equal to or more than the cut-off of 46 on the post-test measure of the STAI-S, 
10 participants (25%) scored equal to or more than the cut-off of 31 on the SIAS and 12 
participants (30%) scored equal to or more than the cut-off of 24 on the FNES. 
The inter-correlations between the measures of individual differences and age 
are presented in Table 5.2. Note that Spearman’s correlations were conducted with age 
and SIAS due to their skewed distribution; Pearson’s correlations were conducted in all 
other cases because the scores on the remaining questionnaire measures were normally 
distributed.  As expected, the anxiety measures were positively correlated with one 
another and negatively correlated with attentional control.  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency for the questionnaire measures and age.  
 
 M SD Minimum  
(lower limit) 
Maximum  
(upper limit) 
Cronbach’s α 
Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 41.15 10.90 21 (20) 62 (80) .93 
State Anxiety (pre STAI-S) 31.50 8.23 20 (20) 49 (80) .89 
State Anxiety (post STAI-S)  32.98 9.40 20 (20) 55 (80) .92 
Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) 23.48 12.07 7 (0) 57 (76) .91 
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNES) 18.18 7.64 3 (0) 29 (30) .92 
Attentional Control (ACS) 52.08 9.26 32 (20) 75 (80) .85 
Age (in years) 22.00 3.34 18 29 na 
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Table 5.2. Inter-correlations between self-reported anxiety and attentional control measures and age. 
 1 2  3 4 a 5  6 7 a 
1. Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) - .54*** .53*** .51** .76*** -.46** -.05 
2. State Anxiety (pre STAI-S)   - .69*** .45** .39* -.23 .07 
3. State Anxiety (post STAI-S)   - .39* .34* -.30† .02 
4. Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) a    - .47** -.42** .03 
5. Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNES)     - -.58*** -.20 
6. Attentional Control (ACS)       - .33* 
7. Age (in years) a       - 
a Spearman’s rs was calculated with these variables due to their skewed distribution (Pearson’s r was calculated for all other variables).  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10  
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5.2.6 Data Analysis 
There were three stages of data analysis. The first stage tested the basic effects 
associated with the redundant signals paradigm (i.e., it assessed whether there was a 
redundancy gain in the error rate and at the level of the mean RT). A repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted to establish whether the error rate or reciprocal of the RTs were 
influenced by load or target expression across participants. Furthermore, the Cox 
Proportional Hazards Model was used to consider whether there was an effect of load or 
target expression on processing capacity across participants. The Cox method is a semi-
parametric regression model that tests for the effects of independent variables on 
orderings of the hazard functions. Specifically, the Cox model outputs a hazard ratio 
which gives the predicted change in the hazard function with a unit change in the 
independent variable. ‘Proportional hazards’ refers to the assumption that the hazard 
ratio should be invariant over time. In the current study, the Schoenfeld residuals were 
used to consider the assumption of constant proportionality. Schoenfeld residuals 
represent the difference between the actual and expected effect of the independent 
variable. The line that best fits the plot of the Schoenfeld residuals against time should 
have zero slope if the effect of the independent variable is invariant over time. A 
stratified Cox model was used in the current study in which ‘participant’ was entered as 
a stratification variable to control for heterogeneity across participants (Allison, 1995; 
Therneau & Grambsch, 2000; Wenger & Gibson, 2004).  
The second stage of analysis aimed to consider the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying enhanced threat detection in anxiety. Specifically, multiple regression 
analyses were conducted to consider whether anxiety or attentional control predicted the 
change in processing capacity associated with an increase in load (i.e. an increase from 
one to two targets) for the detection of threatening faces and non-threatening faces. In 
the context of anxiety research, using processing capacity as a dependent variable is a 
novel approach. Therefore, it was not considered appropriate to conduct multiple 
regression analyses using the forced entry method because this approach requires that 
there is a strong theoretical rationale for including each predictor in the regression 
model. Instead, a more exploratory approach was employed using stepwise regression. 
In this method, predictors are entered into and removed from the model on the basis of 
mathematical criteria. It results in the selection of the smallest set of predictors that can 
account for the largest proportion of the variance. Furthermore, exploratory correlations 
were also conducted between the change in processing capacity and the interaction term 
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for state anxiety x trait anxiety, the interaction term for trait anxiety x attentional control 
and the separate attentional focusing and attentional shifting subscales of the ACS.  
In the third stage of analysis and provided that there was a relationship between 
anxiety and threat detection, it was important to establish whether this effect occurred in 
the context of a broad or narrow focus of attention (as assessed by the frequency of eye 
movements executed in the task). Therefore, post-hoc correlations were conducted to 
assess whether anxiety was associated with the percentage of trials in which an eye 
movement occurred for each load and target expression. If anxiety is associated with a 
broad focus of attention, then individuals with high levels of anxiety should execute 
fewer eye movements.  
 
5.3 Results 
 
5.3.1 Basic Effects 
Error rates. The mean error rate was 2.55% (SD = 2.64), 4.81% (SD = 3.28) and 
3.53% (SD = 3.36) for the target absent, single target and redundant target conditions, 
respectively. See Table 5.3 for error rate descriptive statistics for each expression 
separately. This dependent variable was skewed in all conditions due to near ceiling 
performance in many participants and this could not be corrected by transforming the 
data. Therefore, the Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to consider the effect of load 
(one vs. two targets) for each expression separately. For angry faces, the error rate was 
significantly higher in the one target condition (Mdn = 3.91%) compared with the two 
target condition (Mdn = 2.34%), z = 2.00, p < .05, rw = 0.32. For happy faces, the error 
rate was significantly higher in the one target condition (Mdn = 4.69%) compared with 
the two target condition (Mdn = 1.95%), z = 3.28, p < .01, rw = 0.52. The Wilcoxon 
signed rank test was also used to consider the effect of expression on error rate for each 
load separately; there was no significant difference between the expressions in the one 
or two target conditions (z < 1, ns). This indicates that there was a redundancy gain in 
the error rate irrespective of the expression of the face (i.e. fewer errors occurred in the 
redundant target condition).  
RT redundancy gain. A 2 (load: one target vs. two targets) by 2 (expression: 
angry vs. happy) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the reciprocal of the 
RTs for correct present responses. There was a main effect of load, F(1, 39) = 102.95, p 
< .001, where RTs were significantly faster in the two target condition (M = 0.00169, 
SD = 0.00020) compared with the one target condition (M = 0.00160, SD = 0.00019). 
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See Table 5.3 for RT descriptive statistics. The effects of expression and the interaction 
between expression and load were not significant, Fs < 2, ns. These results indicate that 
there was a redundancy gain, where an increase in load from one to two targets resulted 
in an increase in the overall speed of processing. This effect was observed irrespective 
of the expression of the target face.  
 
Table 5.3. Mean (+SD) for the error rates (%), reaction times (ms) and percentage of 
eye movement trials as a function of load and target expression.  
Angry targets  Happy targets  
M SD  M SD 
Error rates (%)     
Target absent 2.81 3.29 
 
2.29 2.42 
Single target 4.92 4.63  4.69 3.26 
Redundant target 3.96 4.88 3.09 3.16 
Reaction times (ms)     
Target absent 669.61 95.48 666.04 94.69 
Single target 662.32 81.82 656.86 86.11 
Redundant target 626.44 74.66 615.52 80.99 
Percentage of trials in which an 
eye movement occurred 
    
Target absent 66.84 34.64 66.44 34.00 
Single target 71.59 32.67 69.62 33.63 
Redundant target 65.73 36.28 
 
65.91 36.78 
 
 
Processing capacity. The Cox Proportional Hazards Model was used to assess 
the effect of load, expression and the load x expression interaction on the orderings of 
the hazard functions for correct present responses only. Figure 5.2 shows the plots of 
the Schoenfeld residuals against RTs for load and expression separately. The residuals 
fall into two distinct groups on either side of zero because load (one target vs. two 
targets) and expression (angry vs. happy) were both dichotomous variables. Figure 5.2 
also shows the best fitting regression lines, which should have zero slope if the 
assumption of constant proportionality is satisfied. The graph indicates that the 
regression line for load has a negative slope. A regression analysis in which RT was 
entered as the predictor and the residuals for load were entered as the dependent 
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variable revealed that the slope of the line was significantly different from zero, F(1, 
9812) = 24.11, p < .001. By examining Figure 5.2 and conducting tests for non-zero 
slopes (i.e. further regression analyses), it became apparent that the departure from 
constant proportionality occurred for the very shortest (< 400 ms) and the very longest 
(> 725 ms) RTs in the sample. Therefore, the residuals for load were regressed against 
RT between 400 and 725 ms and the slope of the regression line did not significantly 
differ from zero, F < 1, ns. That is, the assumption of constant proportionality was 
satisfied between 400 and 725 ms.  
Figure 5.2 shows that the best fitting regression line for expression had a near 
zero slope. Regression analyses in which RT was entered as the predictor and the 
Schoenfeld residuals for expression were entered as the dependent variable revealed that 
the slope of the line did not significantly differ from zero for the entire RT distribution 
or for the censored 400-725 ms time interval, Fs < 2.5, ns. See Wenger and Gibson 
(2004) for a similar treatment of the Schoenfeld residuals. In all of the following 
analyses, the RT distribution was right and left censored from 400-725 ms; this region 
of the RT distribution included 77.69% of the correct responses in the target present 
trials. 
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Figure 5.2. Schoenfeld residuals for load (left) and expression (right) as a function of 
reaction times.   
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The analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model was conducted for RTs 
between 400 and 725 ms with load, target expression, and the load x expression 
interaction as predictors. The results indicated that load was a significant predictor of 
processing capacity at the level of the hazard function of the RT distribution, χ2(1) = 
14.46, p < .001 (see Table 5.4). Specifically, the hazard ratio revealed that the 
magnitude of the hazard for two targets was 1.32 times that for one target across the 
censored time period. In other words, target redundancy resulted in an overall 32% 
increase in processing capacity. There was a trend towards expression significantly 
predicting processing capacity, χ2(1) = 3.25, p = .072. The hazard ratio revealed that the 
magnitude of the hazard for happy faces was 1.15 times greater than that for the angry 
faces. There was a 15% increase in processing capacity for happy (vs. angry) faces. 
Table 5.4 also shows that the load x expression interaction was not a significant 
predictor of processing capacity.  
 
Table 5.4. Results of fitting the proportional hazards model to the left- and right-
censored RT data, stratifying across participants.  
Predictor df β SE χ 2 % change 
Load (L) 1 0.28 0.07 14.46 32*** 
Expression (E) 1 0.14 0.07 3.25 15† 
L x E 1 -0.05 0.05 1.15 -4.9 
*** p < .001, † p < .10 
 
5.3.2 Processing Capacity and Anxiety.  
The following analysis assessed whether anxiety or attentional control predicted 
the change in processing capacity associated with an increase in load from one to two 
targets.  Cox’s proportional hazards model was applied to each participant and each 
expression separately with load entered as the independent variable. This provided a 
beta estimate of the change in capacity associated with an increase in load for each 
participant and each expression.  These beta estimates were regressed onto the six 
predictors (trait anxiety, state anxiety (pre-test), state anxiety (post-test), social 
interaction anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, attentional control). For the happy faces, 
there were no significant predictors of the change in capacity as a function of load. In 
contrast, for the angry faces, trait anxiety was a significant predictor of capacity changes 
due to an increase in load (β = 0.195, R2 = 0.57, p < .05, see Figure 5.3). Note that none 
of the other five variables significantly predicted capacity changes for the angry faces. 
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Thus, the increase in processing capacity associated with the addition of a redundant 
angry target was greater in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety. In other words, 
less work was required to detect angry faces in the presence of multiple (vs. single) 
targets and the magnitude of this effect increased with increasing trait anxiety.  In 
contrast, there was no effect of anxiety or attentional control on the increase in 
processing capacity associated with the addition of a redundant happy target.  
Exploratory correlations showed that there was no relationship between the 
interaction terms (pre state anxiety x trait anxiety, post state anxiety x trait anxiety or 
attentional control x trait anxiety) and the change in processing capacity as a function of 
load for either expression. Therefore, the effect of trait anxiety was not specific to 
individuals with high levels of state anxiety or low levels of attentional control. 
Pearson’s correlations between the separate attentional control subscales (attentional 
shifting and attentional focusing) and the change in processing capacity as a function of 
load were also non significant for each expression, ps > .10, ns. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Change in capacity (due to an increase in load) as a function of trait anxiety 
for angry faces.  
Note. ∆Capacity values are the predicted change in the hazard function with an increase in load. 
∆Capacity values greater than 0 indicate that processing capacity increased with an increase in 
load from one to two targets. ∆Capacity values less than 0 indicate that processing capacity 
decreased with an increase in load from one to two targets. 
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5.3.3 Eye movements and Trait Anxiety 
Table 5.3 presents the mean percentage of trials in which an eye movement 
occurred for each condition. The table indicates that eye movements were not necessary 
to acquire information about the presence or absence of a target (i.e., the eyes remained 
still on up to 35% of the trials). In order to provide further insight into the relationship 
between trait anxiety and processing capacity, it was important to establish whether the 
effect occurred in the context of a broad or narrow focus of attention. Therefore, eye 
movements were analysed to consider whether trait anxiety was associated with the 
percentage of trials in which an eye movement occurred. It was important to conduct 
this analysis for every experimental condition because it was unclear whether any 
relationship between trait anxiety and eye movements would occur across conditions or 
whether it would be specific to trials containing angry targets. It was not appropriate to 
conduct regression analyses on the eye movement data because there was a violation of 
the assumption of normally distributed residuals. Spearman correlations were conducted 
between scores on the STAI-T and the percentage of eye movement trials, considering 
each target condition (target absent, single target, redundant target) and each expression 
separately. For trials containing angry target faces, there were significant negative 
correlations between trait anxiety and the percentage of eye movement trials for each 
load, rs < -.38, ps < .05. This effect was also observed in trials containing happy target 
faces for each load, rs < -.36, ps < .05 and for target absent trials in the angry and happy 
experimental blocks, rs < -.39, ps < .05. Thus, higher levels of trait anxiety were 
associated with fewer eye movements in all experimental conditions (see Figure 5.4).   
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Figure 5.4. The mean percentage of trials in which an eye movement occurred as a 
function of trait anxiety (collapsed across all experimental conditions).  
 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
 The present study considered the cognitive mechanisms and attentional 
processes underlying threat detection in anxiety. It explored the possibility that, prior to 
threat detection, anxiety is associated with an increased ability to integrate threats from 
multiple locations across the visual field within a broad focus of attention. It also 
considered the alternative possibility that anxiety is associated with excessively 
scanning the environment with a narrow focus of attention prior to threat detection.  
The present study found that there was a redundancy gain; participants were 
faster and more accurate at detecting a target in the redundant target condition compared 
with the single target condition. Furthermore, there was a 32% increase in processing 
capacity in the redundant target condition compared with the single target condition. 
Thus, target redundancy was associated with an increase in the speed of processing at 
the level of the mean RT and an increase in processing capacity at the level of the RT 
distribution, irrespective of the expression of the target. These finding are consistent 
with previous work using the redundant signals paradigm (Grice & Canham, 1990; 
Miller, 1982; Müller et al., 1994; Zehetleitner et al., 2008). In particular, the finding of 
increased processing capacity to detect multiple (vs. single) emotional faces is 
consistent with previous research reporting co-active processing in the perception of 
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emotional expressions. Tamietto et al. (2006, 2007) reported a violation of the race 
model inequality (i.e. evidence of co-activation) when two (vs. one) emotional faces 
were presented. One limitation associated with the race model inequality is that it can 
only be used to detect co-activation at very early time points. In contrast, measures of 
processing capacity can be used across the entire RT distribution. Therefore, the 
processing capacity measures used in this experiment extend the findings from the 
Tamietto et al. (2006, 2007) studies to indicate that co-active processing occurred for a 
substantial portion of the RT distribution.  
The results also highlighted that trait anxiety was associated with increased 
processing capacity to detect multiple (vs. single) threats.  This finding suggests that 
there is increasing efficiency in detecting threat as the number of threats in the 
environment increases in individuals with high levels of anxiety. A further finding was 
that high trait anxious individuals executed fewer eye movements and this effect was 
observed irrespective of the presence or absence, number and expression of the target 
face. This finding is consistent with the proposition of hypervigilance in anxiety. It 
suggests that anxious individuals keep their eyes still in order to allocate attentional 
resources widely across the visual field. It is interesting to note that this tendency to 
keep the eyes still was adopted by anxious individuals irrespective of whether they were 
asked to detect the presence of angry or happy faces. This raises the possibility that the 
default strategy in anxiety is to maintain a broad focus of attention even in the absence 
of threat. The long-term purpose of this strategy would be to facilitate the detection of 
threatening or potentially threatening stimuli in multiple locations across the visual field 
and to minimise the potential danger associated with focusing attention on one object or 
location (see Eysenck et al., 2007).  Taken together, the finding that trait anxiety was 
associated with increased processing capacity and fewer eye movements suggests that 
anxious individuals can distribute attentional resources widely to facilitate threat 
detection even when the threatening stimuli are presented outside foveal vision.  
The present findings are consistent with previous research highlighting enhanced 
detection of singleton threat (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Matsumoto, 2010), a broad focus 
of attention and an increased ability to detect or locate peripheral stimuli (e.g., Keogh & 
French, 1999) in anxiety. In line with previous research, there was no evidence to 
suggest that anxious individuals excessively scan the visual environment (Freeman et 
al., 2000). The current findings extend this previous work by providing an explanation 
for how anxiety affects threat detection and highlighting the conditions in which a broad 
focus of attention is particularly likely to facilitate threat detection. Specifically, this 
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study raises the possibility that enhanced threat detection in anxiety occurs in the 
context of a broad focus of attention, which allows information from multiple threats to 
be integrated via co-activation from across the visual field such that responses to the 
presence of multiple threats are faster than to a single threat. The integration of 
threatening information means that less work is required to detect the presence of threat 
when it occurs in multiple locations. While previous research indicates that a broad 
focus of attention leads to greater distractibility and poor attentional control (Eysenck et 
al., 2007), the current study emphasises the beneficial effects of this strategy on threat 
detection. However, while a broad focus of attention was an optimal strategy for threat 
detection in the current study, it remains possible that scanning the environment with a 
narrow focus of attention and rapid eye movements would be a beneficial strategy for 
threat detection under different experimental conditions (i.e., when there are more than 
two stimuli). Therefore, the parameters of the relationship between distributed attention 
and co-active threat detection in anxiety require further research (see Section 7.5). 
It has been argued that data consistent with super-capacity processing can occur 
in a parallel (Eidels, Townsend, & Pomerantz, 2008; Townsend, 1990) or serial 
exhaustive (Townsend & Nozawa, 1997) processing architecture and need not be 
produced by a co-active processing architecture. These alternative interpretations 
require that the increase in processing capacity in the redundant target condition is due 
to the absence of the non-target rather than co-activation between the targets. In other 
words, the non-targets slow performance on the single target trials and the level of 
interference depends on factors such as target-distractor similarity (Eidels et al., 2008). 
The current study cannot definitively determine whether the relationship between trait 
anxiety and increased processing capacity to detect threat occurs as a result of co-
activation of threat signals in the redundant target trials or slowed processing of the 
non-target in the single target trials. However, there are reasons to favour the former 
interpretation. In the context of the present findings, the parallel or serial-exhaustive 
interpretations would imply that increasing anxiety is associated with decreasing 
capacity to detect threat in the single target trials due to interference from the neutral 
non-targets. This is inconsistent with previous research indicating that anxious 
individuals detect threatening faces (presented amongst neutral distractors) with greater 
efficiency than non-anxious individuals (Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Matsumoto, 2010). 
From a theoretical perspective, this interpretation is also inconsistent with conceptual 
frameworks of anxiety and attention, which suggest that trait anxiety is characterised by 
the rapid detection of threat (see Eysenck, 1991, 1992).  
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Furthermore, the interactive race model (Mordkoff & Yantis, 1991) suggests 
that data consistent with co-activation can occur in a parallel processing architecture 
that allows inter-channel crosstalk. Interactive race models state that target processing is 
carried out in parallel on independent channels in the redundant target condition, where 
the first channel to complete this processing wins the race and determines the response. 
In this respect, interactive race models are identical to independent race models. 
However, the interactive race models also allow for the exchange of information 
between the channels. It is important to note that, despite this inter-channel crosstalk, 
decisions on the presence of the target are carried out separately on the two channels. In 
contrast, co-activation models suggest that target signals are pooled prior to a decision 
about the presence of a target. Mordkoff and Yantis (1991) argued that inter-channel 
crosstalk can produce findings consistent with co-activation if the identity of an item on 
one channel provides probabilistic information about the identity of the item on the 
other channel.  
Given the design of the current study, it is possible that inter-channel crosstalk 
occurred between the channels. Specifically, 50% of the trials were target absent, 12.5% 
of the trials were single target left, 12.5% of the trials were single target right and 25% 
of the trials were redundant target. Therefore, if a non-target appeared in the left 
position, then probabilistic evidence would indicate that it was more likely that the right 
position would contain a non-target compared with a target. Similarly, if a target 
appeared in the left position, then probabilistic evidence would indicate that it was more 
likely that the right position would contain a target compared with a non-target. 
According to Mordkoff and Yantis (1991), these particular inter-stimulus contingencies 
could lead to the inhibition of target identification in the single target trials and the 
facilitation of target identification in the redundant target trials.  Although this 
interpretation is logically possible, it is highly unlikely that it can account for the 
relationship between trait anxiety and processing capacity. The inter-stimulus 
contingencies were identical in the angry and happy blocks and, therefore, the 
relationship between trait anxiety and processing capacity would have occurred for both 
target expressions if the effect was driven by inter-channel crosstalk. Therefore, a co-
activation model remains the most likely explanation for the relationship between trait 
anxiety and increased processing capacity to detect threat.   
In summary, the findings from this study raise the possibility that anxiety affects 
the efficiency of a co-active threat detection system, where this is likely to arise as a 
consequence of increased sensitivity to threat and a broad focus of attention. This 
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informs current theoretical models to suggest that neither attentional focusing (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998) nor lowered attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007) provide a 
comprehensive account of the relationship between anxiety and attention.  
Moreover, to summarise the findings presented thus far, Experiments 1 and 2 
found no evidence to suggest that anxiety was characterised by selective attention to 
threat in orienting responses. Instead, Experiments 2 and 3 highlighted that anxiety is 
associated with a broad focus of attention that leads to distractibility by task-irrelevant 
threat and enhanced threat detection. These findings raise a further question that lies in 
stark contrast to theories of selective attention to threat in anxiety. It seems possible that 
a broad focus of attention in anxiety may actually be associated with difficulties in 
localising and focusing attention on an individual threat when there are multiple threats 
in the environment.  Specifically, anxious individuals may regard it as potentially 
dangerous to narrow attention onto one threat when it is known that additional threats 
are present in other locations. This is considered in the following experiment. 
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Chapter 6 : Anxiety and Processing Capacity for Threat Localisation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the current study was to revisit and extend each of the questions 
raised in the previous empirical experiments using a localisation version of the 
redundant signals paradigm. This paradigm was used to assess the hypothesis that the 
tendency to maintain a broad focus of attention in anxiety would adversely affect the 
localisation of individual threats when multiple threats are present in the visual 
environment. This can be regarded as an adaptive response because it ensures that all 
sources of threat are monitored (i.e., an angry crowd) and avoids the potential danger 
associated with focusing attention on a single threat (i.e. an angry individual) when 
multiple threats are known to be present.   
A recent study used a localisation version of the redundant signals paradigm to 
consider the latency of initiating an eye movement to a single target in displays 
containing one or two targets (Nelson & Hughes, 2007). Nelson and Hughes (2007) 
highlighted that two types of saccades occur when participants are presented with 
multiple targets and asked to look at one of them as quickly as possible: averaging 
saccades and bistable saccades. Averaging saccades land in an intermediate location 
between the targets and are proposed to occur when activation from each target is 
pooled prior to the saccadic response. Bistable saccades land on one of the targets; in 
order to execute a saccade to one target it is necessary to resolve the response conflict 
between multiple saccade programs by inhibiting activation from the other competing 
targets (i.e. similar to the remote distractor effect; Walker et al., 1997).  
Nelson and Hughes (2007) aimed to identify the processing architectures 
underlying averaging and bistable saccades. They predicted that, in the presence of 
multiple targets, saccade latencies would be shorter for averaging saccades compared 
with bistable saccades due to the sensory pooling of target activation. Furthermore, they 
suggested that sensory pooling on averaging saccades would lead to a violation of the 
race model inequality when comparing single and multiple targets (i.e. co-activation). In 
contrast, they suggested that lateral inhibition (i.e., where neural activity in one region 
suppresses neural activity in another region) and response conflict occur in the 
execution of bistable saccades; this should lead to slowed performance in the multiple 
(vs. single) target condition. They instructed participants to execute an eye movement to 
a single target as quickly and accurately as possible in displays containing one or two 
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targets. Their results indicated that the first saccade latency was longer in the redundant 
target condition compared with the single target condition. Furthermore, they found that 
there were substantial violations of the Grice inequality, which indicates that redundant 
target performance was slower than would be predicted by a race model (i.e., very 
limited capacity processing). These findings were observed for averaging and bistable 
saccades and Nelson and Hughes (2007) concluded that both types of saccades were 
initiated within the same processing architecture. Specifically, they suggested that their 
results were compatible with a parallel processing architecture in which there was very 
limited capacity due to response competition and inhibitory interactions between 
competing saccade programs. They found no evidence to support the notion that 
averaging saccades were initiated within a co-active processing architecture.  
 Thus, the existing literature indicates that target redundancy may have distinct 
effects on detection responses (Miller, 1982) and localisation responses (Nelson & 
Hughes, 2007); redundancy facilitates target detection and impairs target localisation. 
These differences are likely to exist because multiple target signals provide converging 
evidence about the presence of a target in a detection task, whereas multiple target 
signals provide conflicting information about the location of a target in a localisation 
task.  
The current study used a localisation version of the redundant signals paradigm 
from Experiment 3. Participants were asked to look at (i.e. initiate an eye movement 
towards) a threatening or non-threatening target face as quickly and accurately as 
possible in displays containing one or two targets. The principal aim of the study was to 
consider the relationship between anxiety and the ability to locate and focus attention on 
an individual threat when multiple threats are present in the environment. In line with 
previous eye movement findings (Nelson & Hughes, 2007), it was predicted that 
redundant targets would delay saccadic responses across participants due to inhibitory 
interactions between the two target signals. If this were the case, then target redundancy 
would be associated with decreased processing capacity to locate the target; specifically, 
the work required to generate and execute a saccade would be greater in the redundant 
target condition compared with the single target condition because, in the former case, 
additional processing would be needed to resolve the response conflict between the two 
targets.  
In relation to anxiety, it was predicted that the delay in locating the target and 
the decrease in processing capacity in the redundant (vs. single) target condition would 
be greater for anxious individuals when locating threat. This prediction was based on 
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the results from the previous experiments, which indicated that individuals with high 
levels of anxiety maintain a broad focus of attention (Experiment 3) rather than 
orienting to singleton threat with high speed and accuracy (Experiment 1). This broad 
focus of attention allows anxious individuals to acquire and co-activate information 
about the presence of threat from across the visual field, thus enhancing threat detection 
(Experiment 3). In the current study, it was predicted that, in addition to acquiring 
information about the presence of multiple threats, the tendency to maintain a broad 
focus of attention would also allow anxious individuals to acquire conflicting 
information about the possible location of multiple threats across the visual field.  Given 
that anxiety is associated with difficulties inhibiting threat processing (Experiment 2), it 
was predicted that anxious individuals would demonstrate a reduced ability to inhibit 
the processing of a redundant threat in order to execute a saccade to another threat.  This 
impairment in the localisation of singleton threat would further demonstrate that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety are inclined to monitor for multiple threats 
within a broad attentional beam rather than allocating attentional resources to a specific 
location.  
  
6.2 Method 
 
6.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-six healthy adults participated in the experiment (mean age = 24.72 years, 
SD = 2.94, range = 19-30 years; 8 males). 
 
6.2.2 Stimuli  
The faces used in this experiment were identical to those faces used in 
Experiment 3. The displays contained two faces presented at 177 pixels (4.5° 
eccentricity) to the right and left of central fixation. There were two types of display: 1) 
Single target trials contained one emotional target face (angry or happy) and one neutral 
face; 2) Redundant target trials contained two emotional target faces (either two angry 
faces or two happy faces). The single target and redundant target displays used in the 
current study were identical to those used in Experiment 3. See Figure 6.1A for an 
example of each type of display. 
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Figure 6.1. Example stimulus displays for each condition and an example of a trial 
sequence in the localisation version of the redundant signals task.  
Note: (A) An example of: (1) a single target angry display; (2) a single target happy display; (3) 
a redundant target angry display; (4) a redundant target happy display. (B) An example of one 
trial sequence. 
Figure 6.1 has been removed for copyright purposes 
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6.2.3 Design  
Within-subject variables were load (one target, two targets) and target 
expression (angry, happy). Between-subject variables were self-reported anxiety and 
attentional control.  
The dependent variables were: a) Percentage of accurate first saccades in the 
single target trials: accurate saccades were defined as those that landed on or within one 
degree of the target; b) The reciprocal of the latency of accurate first saccades2: first 
saccade latencies were the elapsed time between the onset of the display and the 
initiation of the first saccade; c) Processing capacity: this was quantified at the level of 
the hazard function of the latency distribution, which provides a measure of the capacity 
to initiate a saccade to the target at each point in time.  
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
Participants completed two practice blocks of 32 trials each (one angry; one 
happy). This was followed by four experimental blocks of 128 trials each (two angry, 
two happy). The expression of the emotional face was constant within a block of trials. 
At the beginning of each block of trials, participants were informed whether they were 
searching for angry or happy faces. The rationale for blocking by expression was 
identical to the previous experiment (see Section 5.2.4). Participants were instructed to 
look at a target emotional face as quickly and accurately as possible in every trial 
display. Participants were informed that it was sufficient to look at one face in displays 
containing two targets.  
Within each block, half of the displays were single target trials and half were 
redundant target trials.  The target appeared in both locations with equal frequency in 
the single target trials. A trial began with a centrally-located white fixation cross, 
presented on a black background until the participant had fixated within one degree of 
the centre of the screen for 200 ms (the fixation cross was presented for a minimum 
                                                 
2 Note that, for consistency with Experiment 3, the reciprocal of the first saccade latency was used to 
reduce the influence of outlier responses in all analyses at the level of the mean. This is not a traditional 
approach to use in the analysis of eye movement data. In contrast, outlier responses were defined as first 
saccade latencies above or below 3 standard deviations from the mean in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2; 
these outlier responses were removed from the analysis. This approach of removing very short and very 
long latencies based on standard deviations is not appropriate in the current study because these outlier 
responses need to be included in the analysis of the latency distribution. However, in order to check that 
these methods of dealing with outliers led to converging results, the mean first saccade analyses were 
repeated on the raw latencies (i.e., with no reciprocal transformation) and outlier responses were removed 
based on the 3 standard deviation cut-off. All of the results reported in Section 6.3 related to the mean 
first saccade latency were replicated when outliers were removed from the analysis.  
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duration of 1000 ms). The stimulus display was presented for 1000 ms. The inter-
stimulus interval was 1000 ms. See Figure 6.1B for an example of the trial sequence. 
 
6.2.5 Data Preparation 
Exclusion criteria. Based on the eye movement exclusion criteria outlined in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.5, 6.04% of the trials were excluded from the analysis. In 0.57% 
of the trials, the amplitude of the initial saccade was smaller than 1 degree; in these 
cases the initial saccade was removed and replaced by the subsequent saccade. The 
percentage of accurate first saccades was calculated for each single target condition. 
Following this, each inaccurate first saccade from the single target trials was matched 
for latency with a trial from the redundant target condition (for each participant). These 
redundant target trials were removed from further analysis to eliminate the effect of fast 
guesses (Eriksen, 1988); 37.07% of the redundant target trials were excluded on the 
above criteria3. 
Participant characteristics.  The mean total scores and the internal consistency 
for each questionnaire are provided in Table 6.1. There was one outlier on the post-test 
state anxiety scale. The removal of this outlier did not affect any of the results or 
conclusions reported below and, therefore, this participant was retained in all analyses. 
Independent t-tests revealed that there were no significant differences between males 
and females in the scores on any of the questionnaires, ts < 1.5, ns. 
In the current sample, 8 participants (22%) scored equal to or more than 46 on 
the STAI-T, 3 participants (8%) scored equal to or more than 46 on the pre-test measure 
of the STAI-S, 2 participants (6%) scored equal to or more than 46 on the post-test 
measure of the STAI-S, 4 participants (8%) scored equal to or more than 31 on the 
SIAS and 8 participants (22%) scored equal to or more than 24 on the FNES. 
The inter-correlations between the measures of individual differences and age 
are presented in Table 6.2. Note that Spearman’s correlations were conducted with post 
STAI-S and SIAS due to their skewed distribution; Pearson’s correlations were 
conducted in all other cases because the remaining variables were normally distributed.  
As with the previous studies, the measures of anxiety were positively correlated with 
one another. In contrast with predictions and the findings from the previous studies, the 
correlations between attentional control and the measures of anxiety were non-
significant in this study  
                                                 
3 Note that a further 0.3% of the redundant target trials were removed from the analysis because first 
saccades did not land within one degree of a target face.  
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Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency for the questionnaire measures and age.  
 
 M SD Minimum 
(lower limit) 
Maximum 
(upper limit) 
Cronbach’s α 
Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 38.44 9.34 22 (20) 57 (80) .92 
State Anxiety (pre STAI-S) 31.06 8.21 20 (20) 50 (80) .90 
State Anxiety (post STAI-S)  31.19 8.84 20 (20) 59 (80) .91 
Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) 17.03 10.39 5 (0) 48 (76) .92 
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNES) 15.36 7.73 0 (0) 28 (30) .92 
Attentional Control (ACS) 53.97 6.21 38 (20) 68 (80) .75 
Age (years) 24.72 2.94 19 30 na 
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Table 6.2. Inter-correlations between self-reported anxiety and attentional control measures and age 
 1 2  3 a 4 a 5  6 7  
1. Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) - .56*** .60*** .70*** .65*** -.24 -.25 
2. State Anxiety (pre STAI-S)   - .71*** .41* .49** -.20 -.34* 
3. State Anxiety (post STAI-S) a   - .49** .41* -.07 -.27 
4. Social Interaction Anxiety (SIAS) a    - .48** -.05 -.28 
5. Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNES)     - -.04 -.10 
6. Attentional Control (ACS)       - .20 
7. Age (in years)        - 
a Spearman’s rs was calculated with these variables due to their skewed distribution (Pearson’s r was calculated for all other variables).  
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10    
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6.2.6 Data Analysis 
The first stage of data analysis tested the basic effects associated with the 
localisation version of the redundant signals paradigm. The accuracy of the first saccade 
was considered in the single target trials. Furthermore, a repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted to establish whether target redundancy or target expression affected the 
mean first saccade latencies to the target. The Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
(stratified by participant) was used to consider whether target redundancy or target 
expression affected processing capacity (i.e. work done) to initiate a saccade to the 
target.  The Schoenfeld residuals were assessed to consider the assumption of constant 
proportionality in the Cox Proportional Hazards Model.  
Secondly, as a point of comparison and extension to the visual search study in 
Experiment 1, multiple regression analyses were conducted to consider whether anxiety 
or attentional control predicted the mean latency or the accuracy of localising 
threatening and non-threatening faces in the single and redundant target trials 
separately. A forced entry regression method was used in which the six predictors (trait 
anxiety, state anxiety (pre-test), state anxiety (post-test), social interaction anxiety, fear 
of negative evaluation and attentional control) were entered into the regression model 
simultaneously. This method was used to ensure that the analysis in the current study 
was directly comparable to the analysis in the visual search study (Experiment 1). The 
requirement to look at the emotional face in the single target trials was analogous to the 
requirement to look at the upright face in the two-parafoveal displays in the visual 
search study (the eccentricity and position of the two faces was identical across the two 
experiments). Therefore, it was predicted that the relationship between anxiety and 
threat localisation in the single target trials would replicate the findings from 
Experiment 1. However, it was predicted that anxiety would be associated with slower 
localisation of threat in the redundant target trials.  
As a comparison and extension to the detection version of the redundant signals 
paradigm (Experiment 3), the third stage of analysis assessed whether individual 
differences in anxiety or attentional control were associated with decreased processing 
capacity to initiate a saccade to the target at the level of the latency distribution for 
multiple (vs. single) threatening faces. Specifically, multiple regression analyses were 
conducted to consider whether anxiety or attentional control predicted processing 
capacity as a function of load for threatening and non-threatening faces.  A stepwise 
regression procedure was used in which the six predictors (trait anxiety, state anxiety 
(pre-test), state anxiety (post-test), social interaction anxiety, fear of negative evaluation 
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and attentional control) were entered and removed from the model based on 
mathematical criteria.  This stepwise method was used to ensure that the analysis in the 
current study was directly comparable to the analysis conducted in the RT redundant 
signals study.  
Finally, exploratory correlations were conducted between the dependent 
variables and the interaction term for state anxiety x trait anxiety (for the pre- and post-
test measures of state anxiety separately), the interaction term for trait anxiety x 
attentional control and the separate attentional focusing and attentional shifting 
subscales of the ACS.   
 
6.3 Results 
 
6.3.1 Basic Effects 
 Accuracy. A paired samples t-test was conducted on the percentage of accurate 
first saccades in the single target trials. There was a trend towards a main effect of 
expression, t(34) = 2.01, p = .053, d = 0.18, where the percentage of accurate first 
saccades was greater for angry target faces (M = 63.08, SD = 11.84) compared with 
happy target faces (M = 61.04, SD = 10.53).  
Latency of accurate first saccades. After correcting for fast guesses, a 2 (load) 
by 2 (expression) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the reciprocal of the 
accurate first saccade latencies. There were no significant main effects or interactions, 
all Fs < 1, ns. Thus, target redundancy neither had an adverse effect on target 
localisation nor did it result in a redundancy gain. See Table 6.3 for descriptive statistics 
on the first saccade latencies in each experimental condition. 
 
Table 6.3. Mean (+SD) for accurate first saccade latencies (in ms) as a function of load 
and target expression. 
Angry targets  Happy targets  
M SD  M SD 
Single target 243.75 69.61  240.47 67.27 
Redundant target 247.78 76.52  244.33 70.37 
 
 
Processing capacity. After correcting for fast guesses, the Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model was used to assess the effect of load, expression and the load x 
 159 
expression interaction on the orderings of the hazard functions for accurate first 
saccades only. Figure 6.2 shows the plots of the Schoenfeld residuals against first 
saccade latency for load and expression separately. This figure indicates that the best 
fitting regression line for the Schoenfeld residuals for load has a negative slope. A 
regression analysis in which latency was entered as the predictor and the Schoenfeld 
residuals for load were entered as the dependent variable revealed that the slope of the 
line was significantly different from zero, F(1, 10807) = 31.18, p < .001. Thus, the 
assumption of constant proportionality was not satisfied across the entire latency 
distribution. Tests for non-zero slopes and an examination of Figure 6.2 indicated that 
the departure from constant proportionality occurred for the very shortest (< 100 ms) 
and the very longest (> 280 ms) latencies in the sample. Therefore, the residuals for load 
were regressed against latency between 100 and 280 ms and the slope of the regression 
line did not significantly differ from zero, F < 3.5, p > .05. This indicates that the 
assumption of constant proportionality was satisfied between 100 and 280 ms.  
Figure 6.2 also shows the Schoenfeld residuals for expression across the latency 
distribution and reveals that the best fitting regression line had a near zero slope. 
Regression analyses in which latency was entered as the predictor and the Schoenfeld 
residuals for expression were entered as the dependent variable revealed that the slope 
of the line did not significantly differ from zero for the entire latency distribution or for 
the censored 100-280 ms time interval, Fs < 2.5, ns. In all of the following analyses, the 
latency distribution was right and left censored from 100-280 ms; this region of the 
latency distribution included 72.98% of the accurate first saccades. 
The analysis using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model was conducted for 
accurate first saccade latencies between 100 and 280 ms with load, target expression, 
and the load x expression interaction as predictors. Table 6.4 shows that there were no 
significant predictors of processing capacity. Target redundancy did not result in a 
decrease (or increase) in processing capacity to locate the target irrespective of the 
expression of the target face.  
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Figure 6.2. Schoenfeld residuals for load (left) and expression (right) as a function of 
the latency of the accurate first saccades.  
 
 
Table 6.4. Results of fitting the proportional hazards model to the left- and right-
censored first saccade latency data, stratifying across participants.  
Predictor df Β SE χ 2 % change 
Load (L) 1 0.10 0.06 2.37 10 
Expression (E) 1 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -1 
L x E 1 0.02 0.04 0.15 1.5 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10    
 
 
6.3.2 Localisation Performance and Anxiety 
The following analysis considered whether anxiety or attentional control were 
associated with the speed or accuracy of locating angry (and happy) faces in displays 
containing single or multiple targets. The percentage of accurate first saccades in the 
single target trials was regressed against the six predictors (trait anxiety, state anxiety 
(pre-test), state anxiety (post-test), social interaction anxiety, fear of negative evaluation 
and attentional control) for each expression separately. The regression models were not 
significant for either expression, R2s < .05, Fs < 1, ns and there were no significant 
predictors within the models, │βs│ < .22, ps > .10. The reciprocal of the latency was 
regressed against the six predictors for each load and each expression separately. The 
regression models were not significant for either load or either expression, R2s < .07, Fs 
< 1, ns and there were no significant predictors within the models │βs│ < .26, ps > .10. 
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Furthermore, exploratory correlations showed that there was no relationship between 
the interaction terms (pre state anxiety x trait anxiety, post state anxiety x trait anxiety 
or trait anxiety x attentional control) and the speed or accuracy of localisation responses 
for angry or happy faces in the presence of single or multiple targets, ps > .10, ns. The 
speed and accuracy of localisation were also unrelated to scores on the attentional 
focusing and attentional shifting subscales of the ACS for all conditions, ps > .10, ns.  
 
6.3.3 Processing Capacity and Anxiety 
The following analysis assessed whether anxiety or attentional control predicted 
the change in processing capacity associated with an increase in load from one to two 
targets.  Cox’s proportional hazards model was applied to each participant and each 
expression separately with load entered as the independent variable. This provided a 
beta estimate of the change in capacity associated with an increase in load for each 
participant and each expression.  These beta estimates were regressed onto the six 
anxiety and attentional control predictors for angry and happy faces separately. The 
results indicated that no variables reached statistical criterion for entry into the 
regression model for either expression and, therefore, there were no significant 
predictors of the change in capacity as a function of load for angry or happy faces. 
Furthermore, exploratory correlations showed that there was no relationship between 
the interaction terms (pre state anxiety x trait anxiety, post state anxiety x trait anxiety 
or attentional control x trait anxiety) and the change in processing capacity as a function 
of load for either expression, ps > .10, ns. Pearson’s correlations between the separate 
attentional control subscales (attentional shifting and attentional focusing) and the 
change in capacity were also non significant for each expression, ps > .10, ns. 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
The current study utilised a localisation version of the redundant signals 
paradigm to consider the relationship between anxiety and the ability to locate an 
individual threat when multiple threats are present in the environment. It was predicted 
that anxious individuals would find it difficult to focus attention on one threat when 
there was an additional threat in a separate location. Specifically, it was predicted that 
the conflicting information from multiple threats would lead to greater interference in 
individuals with high levels of anxiety due to their inability to inhibit threat processing.  
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Contrary to these predictions, anxiety was unrelated to the localisation of 
threatening faces regardless of whether single or multiple threats were presented. In line 
with the visual search experiment (Experiment 1), there was no evidence to suggest that 
anxious individuals were quicker or more accurate in orienting towards singleton 
threats. More importantly in this study, anxiety neither influenced the speed of locating 
an angry face in the presence of multiple threats nor did it affect processing capacity to 
locate threat in the presence of multiple (vs. single) targets.  
These results extend the findings from the remote distractor paradigm 
(Experiment 2) to suggest that there are only particular experimental conditions in 
which anxiety is associated with an inability to inhibit processing of one threatening 
stimulus in order to orient to a different stimulus in the environment. Specifically, 
although anxious individuals were slow to locate a neutral target in the presence of 
threatening distractors in Experiment 2, they were able to locate a single threat when 
multiple threats were presented in the current study. Thus, the inability to inhibit threat 
processing in anxiety may be specific to situations in which neutral and threatening 
stimuli (rather than multiple threats) compete for attentional resources. In terms of the 
eye movement system, this would imply that anxiety is associated with an impairment 
in voluntarily executing an endogenous saccade to a neutral stimulus in the presence of 
threat. This is consistent with cognitive theories suggesting that an attentional bias to 
threat in anxiety only occurs when there is competition between a threatening and non-
threatening stimulus (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998).  
The results were unexpected because they indicated that target redundancy did 
not affect the overall speed of orienting towards a target face at the level of the mean or 
processing capacity to locate a target at the level of the hazard function of the latency 
distribution. This is inconsistent with the findings of Nelson and Hughes (2007), which 
showed that the initiation of saccades occurred within a limited capacity processing 
system in which saccade latencies to a target were slower in the presence of two targets 
compared with one target. The current findings are seemingly incompatible with the 
notion that there is response conflict and inhibitory interactions between redundant 
signals that leads to a slowing of saccadic responses. However, there is a critical 
difference in the single target stimulus displays used in the two studies that could 
provide an explanation for the discrepancy in the results. Nelson and Hughes (2007) 
used single target displays containing one target only (i.e., there were no non-targets). 
Therefore, there was no response conflict in their single target condition. In contrast, the 
single target displays used in the current study always contained two items (one target; 
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one non-target); this was a necessary feature of the design which ensured that 
participants were actively searching for the emotional face. Although it was necessary 
to resolve response conflict in the single target and redundant target conditions, it was 
expected that response conflict would be greater when the two display items shared the 
same emotional expression. Instead, the results suggest that the response conflict and 
inhibitory interactions between the two items was equivalent regardless of the 
expression of each face in the display.  
It is important to note that the findings from the single target trials in the current 
study were similar to the findings from the two-parafoveal condition in the visual search 
study (Experiment 1). Both types of display contained one target face and one non-
target face presented at 4.5 degrees eccentricity to the right and left of central fixation. 
A similar proportion of the first saccades were accurate in both experiments and there 
was a tendency for angry faces to be located with greater accuracy compared with 
happy and neutral faces. However, neither study provided evidence to suggest that the 
expression of the face affected the speed of orienting towards the target.   
A number of limitations should be noted in relation to the current study. Firstly, 
and most importantly, it is possible that the attentional processes required to locate the 
target differed in the redundant and single target conditions. Participants needed to 
make a decision about which target to look at in the redundant target condition; in 
contrast, it was necessary to discriminate between the target and distractor in the single 
target condition in order to generate an accurate localisation response. It seems plausible 
that these different attentional processes were completed within different time frames. 
Secondly, the accuracy of localisation was very low in the single target condition, 
suggesting that the similarity between the target and distractor was too high; the 
implication of this poor performance was that an equivalent proportion of trials (37%) 
were also removed from the redundant target condition in order to correct for fast 
guesses. In a related point, it was unclear whether the trials that were removed from the 
redundant target condition were actually fast guesses because the displays contained 
only two items and, therefore, responses could not be inaccurate in this condition as a 
target occupied both display positions. Finally, it is possible that participants were 
unclear about the task instructions in the redundant target condition; although they were 
told that it was sufficient to locate one target, they may have felt it necessary to look at 
both targets. The design of the current study could be significantly improved by 
systematically manipulating the number of non-targets in the display such that 
redundant targets were always presented amongst distractors.  Under this design, a 
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discrimination process between targets and distractors would be required and inaccurate 
responses would be possible in the redundant target condition.    
In summary, the current study replicated the visual search findings from 
Experiment 1 to indicate that anxiety was not associated with enhanced localisation of 
singleton threat; these findings are inconsistent with theories highlighting a selective 
attentional bias to threat in anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, it extended the findings from the remote distractor paradigm (Experiment 
2) and the RT redundant signals paradigm (Experiment 3) to suggest that the ability to 
inhibit threat processing in one location in order to orient attention to threat in a 
different location is not associated with anxiety. In conjunction with the findings from 
the remote distractor experiment, this informs current theories of anxiety (e.g., Eysenck 
et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001, 2002) by implying that impaired attentional control in 
anxiety may be specific to situations in which there is competition between threatening 
and neutral stimuli.  
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Chapter 7 : General Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
  
Cognitive models of anxiety postulate that the processing and selection of 
information from the environment differs between anxious and non-anxious individuals. 
These models have focused on different components of attention including selective 
attention to threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997), impaired attentional control (Eysenck et al., 
2007; Fox et al., 2001, 2002) and hypervigilance and enhanced threat detection (Beck et 
al., 2005; Eysenck, 1992).   
Empirical research in the area of anxiety, attention and the threat-related bias is 
extensive, yet limited by the fact that it has primarily focused on behavioural indices of 
attention (i.e., RTs; see reviews by Bar-Haim et al., 2007 and Yiend, 2010).  While this 
measure can provide information about the average speed of completing a task in the 
presence of task-relevant or task-irrelevant threat, it cannot provide information about 
the timing or nature of the attentional processes that occur prior to the completion of a 
task. Recent studies have begun to utilise eye movement (e.g., Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Derakshan & Koster, 2010; Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2000, 2007) and ERP 
techniques (Fox et al., 2008; MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010;Mueller et al., 2009) to 
consider the spatial and temporal characteristics of threat processing in anxiety. 
However, this is an area that remains relatively under-researched, even though it has the 
potential to address a number of important research questions related to attentional 
processes and mechanisms underlying the threat-related bias.  
The primary motivation for the empirical studies presented in this thesis was to 
capture the spatial and temporal characteristics of threat processing and the deployment 
of attention in anxiety. The experiments utilised eye movement measures and measures 
of the entire RT distribution; the benefit of these measures is that they can provide a 
detailed picture of threat processing from the onset of a threatening stimulus until the 
completion of a task. The current research explored whether anxiety affects the 
mechanisms and processes that underlie selective attention to threat, impaired 
attentional control and hypervigilance and threat detection.  
Experiment 1 addressed the proposition that anxiety is associated with selective 
attention to threat (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997); where localisation was identified as a mechanism 
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underlying attentional selection (Posner et al., 1980).  It was predicted that a selective 
attentional bias in anxiety would be reflected in an enhanced ability to locate threat. A 
localisation version of the visual search paradigm was used to assess whether anxiety 
was linked to the rapid, accurate and efficient allocation of attentional resources (in this 
case, eye movements) towards threatening stimuli. However, the results provided no 
evidence of a relationship between anxiety and the speed or accuracy of locating threat.  
Experiment 2 examined the theoretical proposition that anxiety is characterised 
by impairments in attentional control and, specifically, an inability to inhibit threat 
processing (Eysenck et al., 2007).  Impaired attentional control was defined as an 
inability to regulate orienting responses (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and, given that 
orienting enables the localisation and selection of high priority stimuli, it was expected 
that these impairments would affect selective attentional processes. It was predicted that 
impaired attentional control would lead to an inability to prevent the spotlight of 
attention moving towards task-irrelevant threat (i.e., attentional capture as indexed by 
exogenous saccades to a threatening distractor), an inability to shift the spotlight of 
attention away from task-irrelevant threat (i.e., delayed disengagement as indexed by 
the slower initiation of endogenous saccades to a target) or an inability to move the 
spotlight of attention to a task-relevant neutral stimulus in the presence of task-
irrelevant threat (i.e., an inability to inhibit threat within a broad attentional beam). The 
remote distractor paradigm was used to distinguish between these possibilities. The 
findings from this experiment showed that high levels of trait anxiety were linked to 
delays in initiating an endogenous saccade to a target when threatening distractors were 
presented at a variety of locations across the visual field.  
Experiment 3 assessed the proposition that individuals with high levels of 
anxiety are hypervigilant for threat and that this strategy involves maintaining a broad 
distribution of attention (Eysenck, 1992). It was expected that threat detection would be 
facilitated if an individual was hypervigilant for threat, if signal strength increased (i.e., 
from a single threat to multiple threats) and if there was a low criterion for deciding that 
threat was present in the environment. Experiment 3 considered the cognitive 
architecture that would allow these factors to enhance threat detection in anxiety. An RT 
redundant signals paradigm, with concurrent eye movement measures, was employed in 
Experiment 3 to consider speed and processing capacity to detect multiple and single 
threats. In this experiment, individuals with high levels of trait anxiety executed fewer 
eye movements and, thus, were able to efficiently pool evidence for the presence of 
threat from multiple locations across the visual field.   
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  Experiment 4 used a localisation version of the redundant signals paradigm to 
revisit each of the research questions raised in the previous studies. It extended the 
visual search experiment by considering whether anxiety was associated with the ability 
to locate threat when multiple threats were present in the visual field. It extended the 
remote distractor experiment by exploring whether individuals with high levels of 
anxiety were able to inhibit a redundant threat in order to orient attention towards a 
spatially separate threat target. Finally, it extended the RT redundant signals experiment 
by considering processing capacity to locate threat in the presence of multiple (vs. 
single) threatening stimuli in anxiety.  This experiment provided no evidence to indicate 
that there was a relationship between anxiety and the ability to locate threat (as indexed 
by RTs and processing capacity), regardless of whether a single threat or multiple 
threats were presented.  
The following discussion will initially consider the empirical findings from 
Experiments 1-4 in the context of the predominant theories of anxiety and attention and, 
additionally, in the context of models of saccade generation (Findlay & Walker, 1999; 
Godijn & Theeuwes, 2003). The discussion will then move on to explore the theoretical 
implications of the empirical findings from Experiments 1-4. Specifically, it will use the 
findings to identify the attentional processes that are likely to be central to threat 
processing in anxiety.  Finally, the discussion will consider the limitations associated 
with the current work and the potential directions for future research.  
 
7.2 Attentional Biases to Threat in Anxiety 
 
7.2.1 Selective Attention to Threat in Anxiety 
Several conceptual frameworks suggest that anxiety is characterised by selective 
attention to threat, where attentional resources are allocated to threatening stimuli in 
preference to non-threatening stimuli at an early stage of processing (Beck & Clark, 
1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1997). In 
terms of the oculomotor system, stimuli that fall within foveal vision receive the highest 
processing priority due to enhanced visual acuity in this region. Therefore, selective 
attention to threat should typically be accomplished by overtly orienting visual attention 
to the threatening stimulus. This would not only enhance threat processing due to 
greater visual acuity in the fovea, but it would also minimise processing of non-threat 
stimuli due to the decline in visual acuity in parafoveal and peripheral regions of the 
visual field.  
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Based on Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model of saccade generation (see Figure 
2.1), it was predicted that voluntary search decisions (Level 5) and automated search 
selection (Level 4) would be biased towards locating threat such that the threshold level 
of activation required to generate a saccade would be exceeded with greater speed and 
frequency in anxious (vs. non-anxious) individuals when presented with threats in 
peripheral or parafoveal locations. This enhanced activation would increase the 
likelihood of a saccade being triggered and, thus, would ensure that foveal vision was 
selectively directed to the threatening stimulus in individuals with high levels of 
anxiety. Contrary to these predictions, the findings from Experiment 1 and Experiment 
4 provided no evidence to suggest that anxious and non-anxious individuals differ in 
their ability to orient foveal vision towards threatening stimuli. In Experiment 1, anxiety 
was not associated with greater speed, accuracy or efficiency in locating a single 
threatening stimulus in a parafoveal or peripheral region of the visual field. Experiment 
4 extended this finding to indicate that anxiety did not influence the speed of orienting 
to a single threatening stimulus when multiple threats were present in the visual field. 
Thus, these studies did not find any evidence to suggest that anxiety affects the 
mechanisms that should underlie selective attention to threat (i.e., rapid orienting 
towards and localisation of threat).   
The present results were consistent with findings from the spatial cuing 
paradigm in which there is no evidence of rapid attentional engagement with threat in 
state or trait anxious individuals (e.g. Fox et al., 2001, 2002). However, the conclusions 
drawn in this thesis are less consistent with RT findings from the dot probe paradigm. 
Dot probe studies consistently report that attention is preferentially allocated to 
threatening (vs. neutral) stimuli in individuals with high levels of anxiety (e.g., Bradley 
et al., 1998; Mogg et al., 1997, 2004; Mogg & Bradley, 1999, 2002).  In contrast with 
the findings from the current experiments, the typical conclusion drawn from dot probe 
studies is that there is selective attention and vigilance for threat at an early stage of 
stimulus processing in anxious individuals. However, an explanation that has the 
potential to incorporate the current findings was put forward by Koster et al., (2005, 
2006). They found evidence to suggest that the RT dot probe findings can be explained 
by slow and controlled processes such as delayed disengagement from threat rather than 
early and rapid orienting to threat. While the results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 
were consistent with the notion that anxiety is unrelated to initial orienting responses, 
they did not address the possibility that anxiety is characterised by delayed 
disengagement from threat.  
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It is more difficult to envisage how delayed disengagement can account for the 
finding that anxious individuals direct their initial eye movement towards a threatening 
(vs. neutral) face with greater speed and frequency in the dot probe paradigm (Garner et 
al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2000, 2007). However, a closer examination of these eye tracking 
studies suggests that the findings they report could occur as a consequence of later, 
more controlled attentional processes. Garner et al. (2006), for example, reported that 
the latency of first fixations that landed on an emotional face (approximately 375 ms) 
were faster than first fixations that landed on a neutral face (approximately 420 ms) in 
individuals with high levels of social anxiety. They concluded that there was a rapid 
initial orienting bias to emotional faces in anxiety. However, the average latency of the 
first saccade was between 225 ms and 245 ms in the displays containing one target and 
one distractor in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 of this thesis. Even allowing 
approximately 50 ms to execute a saccade to a peripheral target, this indicates that the 
average latency of the first fixation would be no more than 300 ms in displays 
containing stimulus pairs. Interestingly, the total time taken before the eyes landed on 
the target in Experiment 1 (irrespective of the number of saccades executed in the 
process) was approximately 390 ms in two-peripheral displays, which is more 
comparable with the latencies reported by Garner et al., (2006).  
Therefore, the findings from the current set of experiments question the 
proposition that previous studies show rapid orienting to threat in anxiety (e.g., Garner 
et al., 2006). The differences in the latencies of the first eye movements are likely to 
occur as a consequence of the task demands; participants were explicitly asked to 
rapidly locate the target with their eyes in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 of the current 
research, whereas there were no localisation demands in Garner et al’s (2006) study. 
Therefore, an alternative interpretation of their findings is that anxious individuals 
initially maintained a wide distribution of attention (i.e. without moving their eyes) and, 
after processing both stimuli and in the absence of a localisation task, they had a 
preference to orient to the emotional item. As soon as time demands were implemented 
(as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 of this thesis), this anxiety-based orienting bias 
disappeared. This interpretation may also apply to Mogg et al’s (2007) findings. Here, 
they report a bias in directing the initial eye movement to threat in anxious individuals 
but the latencies of the eye movements are not reported. Specifically, in the context of 
an RT dot-probe paradigm in which emotional-neutral picture pairs were presented, they 
found that there was a greater proportion of trials in which the initial eye movement was 
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directed towards a threatening face (anger or fear) compared with a neutral face and that 
this effect was greatest in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety.  
Mogg et al. (2000) did find an attentional bias to threat in earlier orienting 
responses in individuals with GAD. They found that, in comparison with controls, 
individuals with GAD directed significantly more eye movements towards threatening 
faces compared with neutral faces; but, in line with Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 
from the current work, there were no group differences in the speed of initial eye 
movements to threat. However, they did find that, unlike the control group, the latency 
of the initial eye movement towards threat (220 ms) was quicker than the latency of the 
initial eye movement away from threat (246 ms) in individuals with GAD. However, it 
is not clear whether these effects were driven by rapid and involuntary attentional 
capture by the threat stimulus (individuals with GAD were 10 ms faster than controls in 
directing their eyes towards threat) or difficulties disengaging from threat (individuals 
with GAD were 23 ms slower than controls in directing their eyes away from threat).  
In summary, the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 did not support the 
theoretical proposition of selective attention and enhanced localisation of threat in 
anxious individuals. While previous studies suggest that there is a selective attentional 
bias to threat in anxiety (see review, Bar-Haim et al., 2007), Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 4 extend this work to highlight that the preferential allocation of attention to 
threat stimuli is unlikely to occur as a result of rapid or accurate initial orienting to 
threat. Instead, it is more likely that these previous findings of a selective attentional 
bias to threat in anxiety arose as a consequence of slower and more controlled processes 
such as delayed disengagement from threat. However, these conclusions need to be 
treated with some caution due to the limitations associated with Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 4; in particular, both studies were limited by the fact that localisation 
performance was relatively poor across participants irrespective of individual 
differences in anxiety or the expression of the target face. It is possible that there would 
be evidence for enhanced localisation and selective attention to threat in anxiety under 
different experimental conditions (e.g., where target-distractor similarity is reduced). 
Therefore, future research is required to further explore the relationship between anxiety 
and threat localisation.  
 
7.2.2 Impaired Attentional Control in Anxiety 
Although anxiety was not associated with facilitated orienting to threat, it 
remained possible that individuals with high levels of anxiety would be unable to 
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regulate orienting responses in the presence of threat. This proposition is consistent with 
recent conceptual frameworks suggesting that anxiety is characterised by impaired 
attentional control, where individuals with high levels of anxiety are unable to use goal-
directed processes to inhibit threat processing (Eysenck et al., 2007) or disengage from 
threat (Fox et al., 2001, 2002). In terms of eye movement behaviour, the regulation of 
orienting responses involves the voluntary suppression or generation of saccades (e.g., 
Level 5 of Findlay & Walker’s, 1999 model; see Figure 2.1). Godijn and Theeuwes 
(2002, 2003) argued that when endogenous and exogenous stimuli are presented 
simultaneously, it is necessary to use top-down control (i.e., goal-directed processes) to 
voluntarily inhibit activation from the exogenous stimulus such that the endogenous 
stimulus can reach the threshold level of activation required to generate and execute a 
saccade.  
Experiment 2 assessed the relationship between anxiety and the ability to 
regulate orienting responses when task-relevant (endogenous) neutral stimuli and task-
irrelevant (exogenous) threatening stimuli were placed in direct competition for 
attentional resources. The results from this experiment suggested that individuals with 
high levels of trait anxiety were able to suppress exogenous saccades to task-irrelevant 
threat; however, they found it difficult to generate and execute endogenous saccades to 
task-relevant neutral items in the presence of threatening distractors. Thus, in line with 
ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007), anxiety was associated with impaired inhibition of 
threatening distractors and, consequently, a loss of attentional focus on the ongoing 
task. Furthermore, the findings from Experiment 2 were consistent with findings from 
RT (Fox et al., 2001, 2002), eye tracking (Derakshan et al., 2009) and ERP 
(MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010) studies highlighting that anxious individuals are slow to 
disengage from or inhibit processing of threatening stimuli.  
Experiment 2 further questions the proposition that individuals with high levels 
of anxiety selectively narrow attention onto threat. Firstly, there was no evidence in this 
task to suggest that individuals with high levels of anxiety involuntarily allocated 
attentional resources towards task-irrelevant threat (i.e., attentional capture). Secondly, 
while anxious individuals were slow to orient towards the target in the presence of 
threat, it was difficult to incorporate this attentional bias within a spotlight metaphor of 
attention because it occurred for parafoveal and peripheral distractors as well as central 
distractors. Instead, the results were more consistent with the notion that individuals 
with high levels of anxiety adopt a wide distribution of attention, where a cost of this 
strategy is an inability to inhibit processing of threatening stimuli presented in a variety 
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of locations across the visual field (Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007). In terms of 
orienting responses, this inability to inhibit threat was reflected in difficulties directing a 
spotlight of attention to non-threat stimuli in the environment (as indexed by delayed 
endogenous saccades). This indicates that individuals with high levels of anxiety are 
reluctant to focus attention on a neutral stimulus that is relevant to ongoing task 
demands when it is known that threats are present in other areas of the environment.  
Experiment 4 aimed to extend these findings by assessing the possibility that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety find it difficult to orient towards and locate a 
single threat when multiple threats are present in the visual environment. Specifically, 
an individual with high levels of anxiety may be reluctant to orient towards and focus 
attention on one threat as this will minimise processing of additional threats that are 
known to be present in other locations. Contrary to this prediction, anxiety was not 
associated with impaired threat localisation in the presence of multiple threats (as 
indexed by overall speed and processing capacity); that is, anxious individuals were 
able to inhibit processing of redundant threats.  
Taken together, the findings from Experiment 2 and Experiment 4 suggest that 
an inability to inhibit processing of a threatening stimulus only occurs when it competes 
with a neutral stimulus for attentional resources.  That is, anxious individuals find it 
difficult to focus attentional resources on a neutral stimulus when threat is present in the 
environment. This is partially consistent with the proposition put forward by Mathews 
and Mackintosh (1998) that an attentional bias to threat only occurs if there is 
competition between a threatening and non-threatening stimulus. These conclusions 
shed further light on existing eye-tracking studies that report a threat-related bias in 
initial orienting in anxiety (Garner et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2000, 2007). The current 
findings suggest that it is unlikely that this bias occurred as a consequence of attentional 
capture by threat or focusing a narrow spotlight of attention onto threat. Instead, it is 
more likely that the difference in initial orienting responses to threatening and neutral 
stimuli was driven by an inability to inhibit threatening stimuli falling within a broad 
attentional beam. Thus, anxious individuals were slower and less likely to orient to the 
neutral item due to interference from the threatening item. In line with RT research 
indicating that anxiety is associated with impaired inhibition of threat (e.g. Stroop 
findings; see review by Williams et al., 1996) or delayed disengagement from threat 
(Fox et al., 2001, 2002; Koster et al., 2005, 2006), the current findings suggest that the 
apparent bias in initial orienting to threat may occur as a result of later, more controlled 
processes.  
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7.2.3 Hypervigilance and Threat Detection in Anxiety 
From a theoretical perspective, it has been proposed that individuals with high 
levels of anxiety maintain a broad focus of attention in order to facilitate threat detection 
(Eysenck, 1992). Experiment 3 assessed the cognitive mechanisms underlying enhanced 
threat detection in anxiety and, furthermore, it considered whether enhanced threat 
detection occurred within a broad focus of attention (with few eye movements) or 
following excessive scanning of the visual environment with numerous eye movements. 
It was predicted that a broad focus of attention would be the optimal strategy for threat 
detection when there were multiple threats occurring at a variety of locations across the 
visual field.  
The findings from Experiment 3 suggested that anxiety was associated with a 
tendency to maintain fixation such that, when there was no requirement to move the 
eyes, anxious individuals (vs. non-anxious individuals) executed fewer eye movements 
in the presence and absence of threat. In relation to Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model 
of saccade generation, this experiment supports the proposition that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety voluntarily promote fixation as a default strategy that allows them 
to maintain a broad focus of attention such that they can monitor for the presence of 
threatening or potentially threatening stimuli across the visual field. This strategy is 
likely to be implemented at Level 4 and Level 5 of Findlay and Walker’s (1999) model 
(see Figure 2.1); specifically, it is possible that a voluntary bias leads to the suppression 
of saccades (Level 5) such that, in terms of spatial selection (Level 4), the entire visual 
field is selected for further processing. This finding also links to the theoretical notion 
of hypervigilance for threat in anxiety (Eysenck, 1991, 1992) and findings from other 
studies which suggest that anxious individuals maintain a broad focus of attention, even 
in the absence of threat (Keogh & French, 1999; Shapiro & Lim, 1989; Solso et al., 
1968). In line with Freeman et al., (2000), there was no evidence to suggest that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety excessively scan the visual environment with 
numerous eye movements to enhance threat detection. It seems unlikely that scanning 
would be an effective strategy for detecting threat across the visual field because if 
foveal vision is directed towards one location, then stimulus processing in this area will 
be enhanced and stimulus processing in other locations will deteriorate. Therefore, 
threatening stimuli are less likely to be detected from multiple locations if there is 
excessive scanning.   
Experiment 3 showed that the benefits of this broad focus of attention in anxiety 
were particularly evident when threats occurred in multiple locations across the visual 
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field. Specifically, individuals with high levels of anxiety were able to pool or co-
activate multiple threat signals with greater efficiency compared with non-anxious 
individuals (as indexed by measures of processing capacity). The evolutionary purpose 
of a co-active threat detection system would be to ensure that less work (or processing 
capacity) is required to detect threat as the potential severity of the threatening situation 
increases (i.e. as the number of threats increase from an angry individual to an angry 
crowd). This finding does not necessarily imply that anxious individuals are unable to 
co-activate non-threat signals or that co-activation does not occur in non-anxious 
individuals. Indeed, the overall results from Experiment 3 highlighted that there was an 
increase in processing capacity for the detection of multiple (vs. single) threat or non-
threat signals across participants. However, the results do imply that anxiety is 
associated with the efficiency of a co-active threat detection system. Thus, the current 
work extends previous findings of enhanced detection of singleton threat in anxiety 
(Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Eastwood et al., 2005; Juth et al., 2005; Matsumoto, 2010) by 
suggesting that the cognitive mechanism underlying this improved performance is a co-
active threat detection system. The findings are consistent with search slope analyses 
from visual search studies, which suggest that anxiety is associated with greater 
efficiency in detecting singleton threat (Eastwood et al., 2005; Matsumoto, 2010).   
 
7.2.4 Summary 
The current work demonstrated the utility of employing eye movement measures 
and measures of the RT distribution to explore the effect of anxiety on attention and 
threat processing. The current data are consistent with the theoretical proposition that 
anxiety is characterised by hypervigilance for threat and a broad focus of attention 
(Eysenck, 1991, 1992), where the outcomes of this approach include enhanced threat 
detection (Eysenck, 1992) in addition to greater distractibility from threat and a loss of 
attentional focus on the ongoing task (Eysenck et al., 2007). In contrast, the current 
findings were inconsistent with the theoretical proposition that individuals with high 
levels of anxiety selectively focus their attention on threatening stimuli (e.g., Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Finally, the current findings highlighted that the 
relationship between anxiety and the inhibition and detection of threat was specific to 
trait anxiety; the threat-related bias was not observed in individuals with high levels of 
social or state anxiety.   
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7.3 Theoretical Implications 
 
 The results from the empirical studies presented in this thesis concur with the 
notion that a number of attentional processes differ as a function of anxiety such that 
anxious individuals are biased towards detecting and processing threatening stimuli. A 
key consideration for the development of theory and research should be to establish the 
benefits and costs associated with a broad focus of attention in individuals with high 
levels of anxiety.  
 
7.3.1 The Benefits of Distributed Attention in Anxiety 
The results from the current data suggest that anxiety increases the efficiency of 
a co-active threat detection mechanism such that anxious individuals have a greater 
ability to integrate threatening information from across the visual field.  Therefore, 
theoretical frameworks of anxiety and attention need to further consider the factors that 
may enhance the efficiency of the co-active threat detection system in individuals with 
high levels of anxiety. The current work and existing cognitive models (Eysenck et al., 
2007) suggest that individuals with high levels of anxiety adopt a wide distribution of 
attention as a default strategy, even when it is unlikely that threat is present in the 
environment. Therefore, although it is likely that a broad focus of attention is an optimal 
strategy for threat detection, it is unlikely that this alone can account for the increased 
ability to co-activate a detection response in anxiety. Instead, it is likely that a wide 
distribution of attention in conjunction with a greater sensitivity to threat enhances 
threat detection in anxious individuals. This sensitivity to threat may be due to factors 
specifically related to target detection (Tanner & Swets, 1954) such as a lowered 
threshold for deciding that a threat is present. Alternatively, it could be due to factors 
such as increased reactivity or augmented output from the amygdala in response to 
threatening stimuli (Bishop, 2007; LeDoux, 1998) or a lowered threshold for evaluating 
a stimulus as threatening (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
 
7.3.2 The Costs of Distributed Attention in Anxiety 
The current work implies that theoretical frameworks need to reconsider the 
extent of impaired attentional control in anxiety. Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed that a 
cost associated with a wide distribution of attention is a loss of attentional focus on the 
ongoing task. Similarly, Beck et al., (2005) suggested that a considerable proportion of 
an anxious individual’s cognitive capacity would be dedicated to scanning the 
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environment for threat and, therefore, it would be difficult to assign attentional 
resources to ongoing tasks. There are a number of reasons to question the scope of these 
propositions. In the current data there was no evidence to indicate that individuals with 
high levels of anxiety excessively scan the environment for threat; instead, the findings 
suggested that anxiety was associated with fewer eye movements and a broad focus of 
attention which enabled the processing and detection of threat in parafoveal and 
peripheral regions of the visual field. 
Furthermore, while Eysenck et al., (2007) suggested that impairments in 
attentional control should occur in the presence of any distractor, albeit to a greater 
extent for threatening stimuli, these impairments were specific to task-irrelevant threat 
in the current work. Interestingly, the results also suggested that the impairment in 
inhibiting processing of threat is specific to situations in which there is competition 
between a non-threatening and threatening stimulus (see also Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998).  In other words, anxious individuals are able to inhibit processing of one threat in 
order to orient towards another threat, but they are unable to inhibit processing of threat 
in order to orient towards a neutral stimulus. Thus, the results highlighted that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety experience difficulties assigning attentional 
resources to an ongoing task but only in the presence of threat.  
In contrast with the notion of impaired attentional control in anxiety, it is 
possible that the ability to maintain a wide distribution of attention actually requires 
good attentional control, but only when detecting threat. Belopolsky et al., (2007), for 
example, suggested that the size of the attentional window may be under top-down 
control. Future studies that assess the ability to flexibly adjust the attentional window in 
order to optimally detect threat in anxiety will provide further insight into this 
proposition.  
  
7.4 Limitations 
 
 It is important that future research establishes whether there are quantitative 
differences between sub-clinical and clinical populations for the effects reported in this 
thesis (though note that Bar-Haim et al., 2007 reported similar effect sizes for the threat 
bias in clinical and sub-clinical samples). The current work considered the relationship 
between anxiety and attention in a sample of participants from a typical population. 
There are practical and theoretical advantages in adopting this approach. From a 
practical perspective, it is easier to obtain data from this population and, therefore, this 
 177 
approach avoids the problems associated with making inferences based on small clinical 
samples. From a theoretical perspective, the differences between clinical and sub-
clinical anxiety are typically regarded as variations on a dimensional construct rather 
than representing qualitatively distinct categories (Beck & Clark, 1997; Hadwin & 
Field, 2010; Yiend, 2010).  
The current work relied on self-report measures of anxiety and attentional 
control. This is an approach that is typically adopted in anxiety research and there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that the anxiety measures have good psychometric 
properties. In contrast, the ACS is a more recent measure that is used less frequently in 
comparison with the anxiety measures. The reliability and validity of this measure is not 
as clear; indeed, the current work reported lower, albeit acceptable, internal consistency 
for this measure compared with the anxiety measures. Therefore, it is unclear whether 
self-reported attentional control was highly correlated with actual attentional control 
capacities; a behavioural measure of attentional control would serve to validate the 
findings (see Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2009 for a study in which there was no evidence 
of an association between self-reported and behavioural measures of attentional 
control).   
Theories and research have suggested that the threat bias is particularly apparent 
in high trait anxious individuals who are also high in state anxiety (Eysenck, 1992; 
Eysenck et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998) or low in attentional control (Derryberry 
& Reed, 2002; Lonigan et al., 2004). Although there was no evidence to support either 
of these propositions in the current work, the state anxiety scores were relatively low 
with a maximum of 15% of any sample being identified as ‘high’ state anxious. In 
contrast, research reporting an interaction between state and trait anxiety has typically 
used mood manipulations to experimentally enhance state anxiety levels (Keogh & 
French, 1999; Markowitz, 1969). Therefore, future work is required to consider the 
effects reported in this thesis when state anxiety is manipulated. A similar criticism can 
be made in relation to the interaction between trait anxiety and attentional control; there 
were significant negative correlations between self-report trait anxiety and attentional 
control and, therefore, it may be that an insufficient proportion of the sample reported 
high trait anxiety and high attentional control. In order to fully assess this interaction, 
future research should screen participants prior to testing to ensure that samples consist 
of similar numbers of high trait anxious individuals reporting high and low attentional 
control.  
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 Finally, it could also be argued that the effects were attributable to low level 
features of the angry faces rather than the emotional content per se. This is deemed 
unlikely because at least 8 models were used as photographic stimuli for each emotion 
in every study. Therefore, a low level feature account would require that the feature was 
present in the whole set of angry faces and absent in the whole set of happy and neutral 
faces and, furthermore, that anxiety was related to processing this feature.  
 
7.5 Directions for Future Research 
 
  This thesis highlights that the distribution of attention and its associated benefits 
for threat detection are potentially important factors in understanding the cognitive basis 
of anxiety. There is currently a paucity of literature in this area, though it appears to be a 
particularly fruitful direction for future research. In the short term, a number of 
questions need to be addressed in relation to the flexibility of the attentional beam and 
the parameters and neural mechanisms underlying a co-active threat detection system. 
In the longer term, it would be of interest to consider whether the flexibility of the 
attentional beam and enhanced functioning of a co-active threat detection system are 
factors that cause or maintain elevated anxiety. If this is the case, then it will have 
implications for extending the Attention Training Techniques (ATTs) that are currently 
implemented in the treatment of individuals with high levels of anxiety (Bar-Haim, 
2010; Cowart & Ollendick, 2010; MacLeod, 2010).  
 
7.5.1 Co-activation and the Breadth of Attention 
 It is important that future research determines the parameters in which a co-
active threat detection system can operate in order to understand the full extent of the 
relationship between anxiety, threat detection and the distribution of attention. It is 
possible that a wide distribution of attention is only an optimal strategy for threat 
detection under conditions that allow co-activation. When it is not possible to co-active 
threat signals, a more effective strategy may be to scan the environment with rapid eye 
movements. Thus, anxious individuals may adopt different strategies (i.e. a wide 
distribution of attention vs. excessive scanning) to enhance threat detection depending 
on the demands of the situation. The sections below provide examples of experimental 
manipulations that could be used to explore the relationship between anxiety and the 
parameters of the co-active threat detection system.  
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Perceptual load. Neuroimaging studies suggest that the relationship between 
anxiety and the amygdala response to threatening distractors is only apparent under 
conditions of low perceptual load (Bishop et al., 2007; Bishop, 2009), where the typical 
explanation for this finding is that there are no attentional resources available to process 
the threatening distractors under conditions of high perceptual load. Although the 
threatening stimuli serve as targets in the redundant signals paradigm, it would still be 
of interest to consider whether the enhanced ability to co-activate threat signals occurs 
under conditions of high perceptual load in individuals with high levels of anxiety. One 
means of increasing perceptual load is to increase set size (Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003). 
In the context of the redundant signals paradigm, this would be achieved by increasing 
the number of non-threatening distractors in the display. It seems possible that the 
magnitude of the relationship between anxiety and processing capacity may increase 
under conditions of high perceptual load because anxious individuals will invest greater 
effort in threat detection compared with non-anxious individuals and, therefore, they 
will have less attentional capacity available to process non-threatening distractors 
(Lavie, 2005).  
The number of threatening stimuli. It is of interest to establish how many 
threatening stimuli can be used to co-activate a detection response. It is possible that the 
magnitude of the relationship between processing capacity and anxiety will increase 
with an increasing number of threats because anxious individuals will be able to co-
activate all threatening signals that fall within their broad attentional beam.  However, it 
is likely that there will be an asymptotic effect on the relationship between anxiety and 
processing capacity, where the detection responses of anxious individuals cannot be 
improved any further after reaching a threshold number of threats in the environment. It 
is possible that individuals with high levels of anxiety switch from a broad to a narrow 
focus of attention at the onset of this asymptotic effect; if there are a large number of 
threats, it may be that anxious individuals scan the visual environment with excessive 
and rapid eye movements in order to detect and process every threatening stimulus.  
 The flexibility of the attentional beam. It has previously been argued that neither 
the spotlight nor zoom lens metaphors of attention are sufficient explanations of the 
deployment of attention. Both accounts suggest that the attentional beam falls over one 
contiguous location. In contrast, there is evidence to suggest that two targets can be 
identified when they are presented simultaneously and separated by intervening 
distractors (Bichot, Cave, & Pashler, 1999). Therefore, attention can be divided between 
non-contiguous target locations without simultaneously selecting intervening distractor 
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locations. These findings suggest that attention can be deployed flexibly depending on 
the task demands.  Therefore, it is important to establish whether individuals with high 
levels of anxiety flexibly deploy attention to optimise threat detection across a variety of 
situations. For example, it is of interest to consider whether the relationship between 
anxiety and processing capacity for threat detection also occurs when the target signals 
are separated by an intervening non-threat distractor. This would provide an insight into 
the extent to which the distribution of attention is under top-down control in anxious 
individuals.  
 
7.5.2 Neural Co-activation 
 An important line of enquiry for future research is to consider the neural basis of 
co-active processing during threat detection in anxious and non-anxious individuals. 
Previous research has concurrently used behavioural and ERP measures to consider the 
redundancy gain and neural co-activation (Miniussi, Girelli, & Marzi, 1998). Miniussi 
et al., (1998) presented either one unilateral target or two bilateral targets in peripheral 
locations. They reported a redundancy gain in the behavioural RT data that was 
consistent with a co-activation model (i.e., there was a violation of the race model 
inequality). They also found evidence of neural co-activation in extrastriate visual areas, 
where the latency of the P1 and N1 components were shorter when two stimuli were 
presented bilaterally compared with when one stimulus was presented unilaterally.  
In light of these findings, it would be of interest to consider whether there is 
evidence of neural co-activation when detecting threat in the presence of multiple (vs. 
single) targets and, furthermore, whether the magnitude of this effect is greater in 
individuals with high levels of anxiety. For example, it is possible that anxiety would 
modulate neural co-activation as indexed by the latency and/or amplitude of the P1 
component. The allocation of covert visuospatial attention to a stimulus is reflected in 
an enhanced occipital P1 response at 80-110 ms post stimulus onset (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
& Glickman, 2005). Previous research indicates that the P1 amplitude is greater in 
response to threatening (vs. positive) stimuli in individuals with high levels of anxiety 
(Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008; Mueller et al., 2009) and it is argued that this 
effect may reflect hypervigilance for threat. Therefore, if anxiety is associated with 
hypervigilance, a wide distribution of attention and a co-active threat detection system, 
then there should be evidence of enhanced neural co-activation in the amplitude or 
latency of the P1 component in anxious individuals when presented with multiple (vs. 
single) threats.  
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7.5.3 Clinical Implications 
 Given the possible role of attentional biases in the development and maintenance 
of elevated anxiety and anxiety disorders, it has been suggested that clinicians should 
apply therapeutic interventions that serve to reduce attentional biases to threat (Mobini 
& Grant, 2007). Attention training techniques (ATTs) have also been used to modify 
attentional biases to threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim, 2010; Cowart & Ollendick, 2010; 
MacLeod, 2010). ATTs aim to reduce anxiety by using experimental tasks (e.g., the dot 
probe paradigm) that train individuals with high levels of anxiety to shift their attention 
away from negative or threatening stimuli and towards neutral stimuli. Research 
indicates that extended exposure to these techniques successfully modifies attentional 
biases to threat and, more importantly, reduces trait anxiety, state anxiety and clinical 
symptoms in individuals with social anxiety disorder and GAD (Bar-Haim, 2010; 
Cowart & Ollendick, 2010; MacLeod, 2010).  
The current findings fit well with the rationale underlying ATTs, which suggests 
that individuals with high levels of anxiety require training to direct attentional 
resources towards neutral stimuli when threat is present in the environment.  However, 
if it is the case that a wide distribution of attention and a co-active threat detection 
system cause, maintain or exacerbate anxiety, then this has important implications for 
extending the existing ATTs. Specifically, the current findings raise the possibility that 
cognitive modification procedures should also aim to reduce the breadth of attention 
prior to threat detection in individuals with high levels of anxiety.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
 The results presented in this thesis extend existing theories and research by 
highlighting that sensitivity to threat in anxiety can be understood most effectively 
within a conceptual framework that emphasises the costs, benefits and purpose of a 
wide distribution of attention in anxious individuals. Most importantly, this framework 
would propose that individuals with high levels of anxiety frequently adopt a broad 
focus of attention, which ensures that they are hypervigilant for threat. The benefit of 
this strategy is that it allows enhanced threat detection, especially in the presence of 
multiple threats, due to a greater ability to integrate threat signals from an extensive 
region of the visual field. However, the strategy also comes at a cost; specifically, it 
increases the likelihood of distraction by task-irrelevant threat due to a failure to inhibit 
threat processing within the broad attentional beam. Future research is required to 
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understand the parameters of these attentional processes and to consider how the 
findings can be used in a clinical setting to modify the breadth and direction of attention 
in individuals with high levels of anxiety.  
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Appendix A: Examples of Participant Consent and Debriefing Forms 
 
A.1 Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study Title: Eye movements and visual search for emotional faces 
Researchers: Helen Richards, Dr. Julie Hadwin, Dr. Valerie Benson & Professor Nick 
Donnelly.  
Ethics number: 851 
 
Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this research. 
If you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
 
What is the research about? 
I am Helen Richards, a PhD student at the University of Southampton. This research 
will assess individual differences in the speed and accuracy of searching for and 
detecting emotional faces. The research will also consider whether emotions and 
concentration affect the way in which attention is allocated to emotional stimuli 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You will have been asked to participate in this study based on the responses you 
provided in the online questionnaire about your emotions and perceptions in social 
situations. The purpose of the online questionnaire was to select an equal number of 
participants with above average and below average scores on this measure.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
In the initial phase of the experiment, you will be asked to spend a couple of minutes 
completing a short questionnaire about how you are feeling at that particular moment 
in time. In the second phase of the experiment, you will be asked to participate in a 
computer based task for 45-60 minutes. This task will involve searching for and 
deciding upon the presence or absence of an emotional face, presented amongst neutral 
faces. Your eye movements will be monitored by a camera as you carry out this task.  
The final phase of the experiment will involve completing four short questionnaires 
about your emotions and your ability to concentrate. These questionnaires will take 
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete.  
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Are there any benefits in my taking part? 
Your contribution to this study will add to current knowledge in the field of emotion and 
attention. You will also be paid £7.50 or allocated 5 credits for your participation.  
 
Are there any risks involved? 
There are very few risks involved in this study. The eye tracking equipment is entirely 
non-invasive and should not cause any discomfort. You will be provided with breaks 
throughout the experiment (and you can ask for any additional breaks that you feel you 
need at any time). Your questionnaire responses will be confidential and will only be 
viewed by the researchers involved in this project. If the study raises any questions or 
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenter or the helpline number 
provided on the debriefing statement.  
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
This study complies with the Data Protection Act/University policy. Your confidentiality 
will be maintained at all times. Your responses will be stored on a password protected 
computer and/or stored in a locked filing cabinet. 
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
You have the right to withdraw consent to participate at any time (before, during or 
after the experiment) without any penalty or consequence to your grades or your 
treatment as a student. 
 
What happens if something goes wrong? 
In the unlikely case of concern or complaint, you should contact the Chair of the Ethics 
Committee, Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 
1BJ. Tel: 023 8059 3995 
 
Where can I get more information? 
If you have any questions please ask them now, or contact Helen Richards at 
hjr105@soton.ac.uk 
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A.2 Participant Consent Form 
 
Eye movements in visual search for emotional faces 
Consent Form 
 
I am Helen Richards, a postgraduate student completing a PhD at the University of 
Southampton.  I am requesting your participation in a study which will assess individual 
differences in the speed and accuracy of searching for and detecting emotional faces.  
This study will involve taking part in a simple computer based task.  You will be asked 
to indicate whether an emotional face is present or absent among displays containing 
neutral faces. Your eye movements will be recorded by a camera as you do this. The 
study will also involve completing four short questionnaires, asking you to rate your 
emotions (e.g. ‘I feel upset’, ‘I feel pleasant’) and asking you to rate your ability to 
concentrate on your work (e.g. ‘It is hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when 
there are noises around’). The study will last approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes in 
total.  
 
Personal information will not be released to or viewed by anyone other than researchers 
involved in this project. Results of this study will not include your name or any other 
identifying characteristics. Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your 
participation at any time. If you choose not to participate there will be no penalty or 
consequences to your grade or to your treatment as a student in the psychology 
department.  If you have any questions please ask them now, or contact Helen 
Richards at hjr105@soton.ac.uk. 
 
Name: ………………..……….. Signature: …………….………… Date: …………… 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Statement of Consent 
 
I                                                   have read the above informed consent form.  
           
I understand that I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation at any time 
without penalty or loss of benefit to myself.  I understand that data collected as part of 
this research project will be treated confidentially, and that published results of this 
research project will maintain my confidentially.  In signing this consent letter, I am not 
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waiving my legal claims, rights, or remedies.  A copy of this consent letter will be 
offered to me. 
I give consent to participate in the above study.  (Circle Yes or No)    Yes           No 
Signature                              Date 
 
Name   
 
I understand that if I have questions about my rights as a participant in this research, or 
if I feel that I have been placed at risk, I can contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, 
Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ.  
Phone:  (023) 8059 3995. 
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A.3 Participant Debriefing Form 
 
Eye movements in visual search for emotional faces 
 
Debriefing Statement 
 
The aim of this research was to investigate individual differences in the speed and 
accuracy of searching for angry and happy faces. There is evidence to suggest that there 
is an automatic attentional bias towards threatening stimuli in anxious individuals (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg & Ijzendoorn, 2007). In the current 
study, it was expected that the speed of moving the eyes towards an angry target face 
would be greater in individuals reporting higher levels of anxiety (vs. individuals 
reporting lower levels of anxiety). Similarly, it was expected that the time taken to 
manually indicate the presence or absence of an angry target face would be reduced in 
anxious individuals. Furthermore, it was expected that very early stages of search 
performance would be enhanced on trials containing two angry target faces compared 
with one angry target face in individuals reporting higher levels of anxiety. This finding 
would indicate that, when there is more than one source of threat in the environment, 
anxious individuals are able to simultaneously process these threatening items. The 
study also aims to consider the moderating effects of attentional control. Specifically, it 
is expected that this bias towards angry faces in anxious individuals will be especially 
evident in participants who also report low levels of attentional control (i.e. difficulties 
in shifting and focusing their attention).  
 
Once again results of this study will not include your name or any other identifying 
characteristics.  The experiment did not use deception.  You may have a copy of this 
summary if you wish and a summary of the research findings on completion of the 
project. 
 
If you have any further questions please contact Helen Richards at hjr105@soton.ac.uk.  
 
Alternatively, if participation in this study has raised any issues that you wish to discuss 
in confidence, the University provides a confidential helpline. Phone: 023 8059 3719. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. 
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Signature: ……………………………….    Date: ……………………….. 
 
 
Name: …………………………………… 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, or if you 
feel that you have been placed a risk, you may contact the Chair of the Ethics 
Committee, Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, 
SO17 1BJ.  Phone: (023) 8059 3995 
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Appendix B: Rating Responses for the NimStim Models 
 
B.1 Aims 
 
To ensure that the facial expressions used in the empirical studies throughout this thesis 
were perceived as expressing the intended emotion4.  
 
B.2 Method 
 
B.2.1 Participants 
24 undergraduate students (Mean age = 19.21 years, SD = 0.87, range = 18-21; 3 
males) from the University of Southampton.  
 
B.2.2 Stimuli 
20 models were selected from the NimStim Face Set (Tottenham et al, 2009) based on 
validity ratings provided with the stimulus set. There were 7 facial expressions 
associated with each model: neutral, sad, surprised, happy, disgusted, fearful and angry. 
There were two versions of each expression; open-mouth and closed-mouth.  Only the 
angry, happy and neutral faces will be considered here.  
 
B.2.3 Procedure 
Participants viewed each face separately and rated the extent to which it expressed 
neutrality, sadness, surprise, happiness, disgust, fear and anger. Ratings were made on a 
9-button response box ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 9 (‘extremely’). Only the angry, 
happy and neutral rating responses will be considered here. 
 
B.3 Results 
 
Paired sample t-tests indicated that the open mouth versions of the angry faces 
were rated significantly higher for anger compared with the closed mouth versions of 
the angry faces, t(23) = 6.33, p < .001, d = 0.60. The open mouth versions of the happy 
faces were rated significantly higher for happiness compared with the closed mouth 
versions of the happy faces, t(23) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 0.73. The closed mouth version 
                                                 
4 This pilot study was conducted in collaboration with Abigail Lucas and was submitted as an 
experimental research project for the MSc in Research Methods in Psychology at the University of 
Southampton (this MSc was awarded to Helen Richards in 2007).  
 190 
of the neutral faces was rated significantly higher for neutrality compared with the open 
mouth version of this expression, t(23) = 3.00, p < .05, d = 0.30. Therefore, only the 
open mouth versions of angry and happy faces and the closed mouth versions of neutral 
faces were used in the empirical studies presented throughout this thesis.  
 The 16 NimStim models with the highest ratings for the intended emotion (e.g. 
high anger ratings for angry faces) and the lowest ratings for unintended emotions (e.g. 
happy ratings for angry faces) were selected. These were models 1, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 
18, 22, 23, 26, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40 from the NimStim database. The mean angry, happy 
and neutral ratings for the angry, happy and neutral faces from this subset of 16 models 
are provided in Table B1. 
 
Table B1 
Mean (+SD) rating responses for the angry, happy and neutral faces.  
 Anger rating Happy rating Neutral rating 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
Angry faces (o)* 7.42 0.51  1.67 0.24  1.97 0.21 
Happy faces (o)* 1.39 0.11  7.73 0.40  2.93 0.40 
Neutral faces (c)* 3.36 0.54  2.98 0.52  7.05 0.42 
*o = open mouth version of the expression; c = closed mouth version of the expression 
 
B.4 Conclusion 
The intended emotion of the facial expressions was perceived at a high level in this 
subset of 16 NimStim models.  
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Appendix C: Recognition of Facial Expression in Parafoveal and Peripheral Vision. 
 
C.1 Aim 
To ensure that the intended emotion of the faces used in the empirical studies 
could be recognised in parafoveal and peripheral locations in the absence of overt eye 
movements to the face. 
 
C.2 Method 
C.2.1 Participants 
Four postgraduate students (Mean age = 27.75 years, SD = 3.34, range = 24-33; 
1 male) from the University of Southampton.  
 
C.2.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli consisted of the angry, happy and neutral faces from the 16 
NimStim models that were used throughout this thesis. Each stimulus display consisted 
of a face presented in one of four possible locations: a) at a parafoveal location to the 
right of fixation; b) at a parafoveal location to the left of fixation; c) at a peripheral 
location to the right of fixation or; d) at a peripheral location to the left of fixation. 
Parafoveal and peripheral faces were presented at 4 degrees eccentricity and 8 degrees 
eccentricity, respectively.  
 
C.2.3 Procedure 
Participants completed 96 trials. There were an equal proportion of trials 
associated with each expression and the target appeared in every possible location with 
an equal frequency. For each trial, a central fixation cross was presented for 1000 ms. 
This was followed by the stimulus display, which remained on the screen until the 
participant made a button-press response. A trial ended with a blank screen, which was 
presented for 1000 ms.  
 Participants were instructed to keep their eyes focused on the centre of the 
screen at all times and not to look at the faces. They were asked to make a button-press 
response to indicate whether the face presented in each display was angry, happy or 
neutral. The buttons assigned to each emotion were counterbalanced across participants.  
 
 
 
 192 
C.3 Results 
 
Trials were excluded from the analysis if the participant moved their eyes (M = 
10.75 trials, SD = 3.70, range = 6-16 trials). A repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted with eccentricity (parafoveal and peripheral) and expression (angry, happy 
and neutral) as within-subject variables. The dependent variable was the percentage of 
correct categorisations of the facial expressions. There was no significant main effect of 
eccentricity or expression and there was also no interaction between these variables. 
Although non-significant, Table C1 shows that the percentage of correct categorisations 
was higher for parafoveal compared with peripheral faces. Table C2 presents the 
percentage of correct categorisations associated with each expression.  
 
Table C1 
Descriptive statistics for the percentage of correct categorisations as a function of 
eccentricity 
 M SD Minimum Maximum 
Parafoveal faces 97.76 1.72 92.31 100 
Peripheral faces 94.84 3.26 81.25 100 
  
Table C2 
Descriptive statistics for the percentage of correct categorisations as a function of 
expression.  
 M SD Minimum Maximum 
Angry faces 97.55 1.66 92.86 100 
Happy faces 93.29 4.14 81.25 100 
Neutral faces 98.07 2.24 91.67 100 
 
 
C.4 Conclusions 
 
Emotional (angry and happy) and non-emotional (neutral) faces can be 
recognised with a high level of accuracy (> 90%) when they are presented in parafoveal 
or peripheral regions of the visual field.  
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Appendix D: Questionnaire Measures 
 
D.1 State Version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger, 1983) 
 
Instructions: A number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate 
number to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on one statement but give the answer 
which seems to describe your present feelings best.  
1 = Not at all 2 = Somewhat  3 = Moderately so 4 = Very much so 
 
1. I feel calm 
2. I feel secure 
3. I am tense 
4. I feel strained 
5. I feel at ease 
6. I feel upset 
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes 
8. I feel satisfied 
9. I feel frightened 
10. I feel comfortable 
11. I feel self-confident 
12. I feel nervous 
13. I am jittery 
14. I feel indecisive 
15. I am relaxed 
16. I feel content 
17. I am worried 
18. I feel confused 
19. I feel steady 
20. I feel pleasant 
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D.2 Trait Version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger, 1983) 
  
Instructions: A number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate 
number to indicate how you generally feel.  
1 = Almost never    2 = Sometimes 3 = Often 4 = Almost always 
 
1. I feel pleasant 
2. I feel nervous and restless 
3. I feel satisfied with myself 
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be 
5. I feel like a failure 
6. I feel rested 
7. I am “calm, cool and collected” 
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them 
9. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter 
10. I am happy 
11. I have disturbing thoughts 
12. I lack self-confidence 
13. I feel secure 
14. I make decisions easily 
15. I feel inadequate 
16. I am content 
17. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me 
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind 
19. I am a steady person 
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and 
interests 
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D.3 Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clark, 1998) 
 
Instructions: Indicate the degree to which you feel each statement is 
characteristic or true of you. 
0 = Not at all    1 = Slightly         2 = Moderately         3 = Very       4 = Extremely    
 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority (teacher, boss, etc). 
2. I have difficulty making eye-contact with others. 
3. I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. 
4. I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work with. 
5. I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance in the street. 
6. When mixing socially I am uncomfortable. 
7. I feel tense if I am alone with just one other person. 
8. I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 
9. I have difficulty talking with other people. 
10. I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 
11. I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 
12. I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view. 
13. I have difficulty talking to attractive persons of the opposite sex. 
14. I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in social situations. 
15. I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well. 
16. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 
17. When mixing in a group I find myself worrying I will be ignored. 
18. I am tense mixing in a group.         
19. I am unsure whether to greet someone I know only slightly. 
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D.4 Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Watson & Friend, 1969) 
 
 Instructions: Please show your reactions to the following statements by circling 
‘True’ or ‘False’. Answer the questions quickly without thinking too much about them.  
1. I rarely worry about seeming foolish to others. 
2. I worry about what people will think of me even when I know it doesn’t make 
any difference.  
3. I become tense and jittery if I know someone is sizing me up. 
4. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavourable impression 
of me.  
5. I feel very upset when I commit some social error.  
6. The opinions that important people have of me cause me little concern. 
7. I am often afraid that I may look ridiculous or make a fool of myself. 
8. I react very little when other people disapprove of me. 
9. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings. 
10. The disapproval of others would have little effect on me. 
11. If someone is evaluating me I tend to expect the worst. 
12. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on someone.  
13. I am afraid that others will not approve of me. 
14. I am afraid that people will find fault with me. 
15. Other people’s opinions of me do not bother me.  
16. I am not necessarily upset if I do not please someone. 
17. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be thinking of me.  
18. I feel that you can’t help making social errors sometimes so why worry about it.  
19. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make.  
20. I worry a lot about what my superiors think of me.  
21. If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on me.  
22. I worry that others will think I am not worthwhile. 
23. I worry very little about what others may think of me. 
24. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think of me. 
25. I often worry I will say or do the wrong things. 
26. I am often indifferent to the opinions others have of me. 
27. I am usually confident that others will have a favourable impression of me. 
28. I often worry that people who are important to me won’t think very much of me. 
29. I brood about the opinions my friends have of me. 
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30. I become tense and jittery if I know I am being judged by my superiors. 
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D.5 Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002) 
 
Instructions: These questions are about how well you feel you concentrate on your 
work. Please answer each item, indicating how often it is true for you on the scale 
beside each question. 
1 = Almost never     2 = Sometimes     3 = Often          4 = Always 
 
1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task when there are noises around. 
2.  When I need to concentrate and solve a problem, I have trouble focusing my 
attention. 
3. When I am working hard on something, I still get distracted by events around me.  
4. My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me. 
5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that I become unaware of what’s 
going on in the room around me. 
6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted if there are people talking in 
the same room. 
7. When trying to focus my attention on something, I have difficulty blocking out 
distracting thoughts. 
8.  I have a hard time concentrating when I am excited about something. 
9. When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst. 
10. I can quickly switch from one task to another 
11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task. 
12. It is difficult to coordinate my attention between the listening and writing required 
when taking notes during lessons.  
13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly when I need to. 
14. It is easy for me to read or write while I am also talking on the phone. 
15. I have trouble carrying out two conversations at once.  
16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly.  
17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily switch my attention back to what I 
was doing before.  
18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy for me to shift my attention 
away from it.  
19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks. 
20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about something and look at it 
from another point of view. 
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